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Abstract
Starting from the premise that international human rights law is not a neutral fact, this
dissertation is a critical exploration of the promises, transmissions and impacts of
intersectionality as an approach to gender protections in international human rights law. I begin
with a definition of intersectionality at the individual claimant and jurisprudential levels, as an
approach to anti-discrimination and equality law that attempts to move beyond static
conceptions and fixed identities of discriminated subjects, and, based on Kimberlé Crenshaw’s
powerful metaphor of a traffic intersection, delineates the flow of discrimination as multidirectional, and injury as seldom attributable to a single source. But in its life beyond these early
works, intersectionality’s epistemological and ontological claims have since come to express the
possibility of a nearly infinite entanglement of human experience as impacted by systems of
governance and regulation. In exploring this, I articulate an additional conditioning intersection.
That is, in addition to the intersection of multiple harms, forms of discrimination or identities—
which are, variously, the meanings ascribed to intersectionality as an approach to international
human rights law—the intersection this dissertation fundamentally straddles is that between
social critique and instrumental engagement. This dissertation is guided by an engaged
ambivalence about the core project of harnessing feminist social critique, such as that invited by
intersectionality’s migratory path, to the perilous project of feminist governance. I mobilize a
critical international law framework, to review relevant literature, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) practices and decisions,
related United Nations memos, documents and Special Rapporteur materials, along with
original interviews with CEDAW Committee members to assess the legal status, governance
implications and feminist goals realized and missed in the intersectional turn in international
human rights. It concludes that intersectionality both advances critical legal practice, and
remains entangled in the imperial vestiges of international law’s genealogy.

iii
Dedication
“[I]t is, in fact, far easier to act under conditions of tyranny than it is to think.”
Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition1

This dissertation is dedicated to the generosity of the CEDAW Committee members, UN
staff and past CERD member who shared their insights with me in a spirit of intellectual
openness; to all the women who have shared their personal and collective stories of
intersectional discrimination and resiliency over my time organizing and advocating for
women’s rights.
And, to the love of my life, Anja Kessler, who taught me to love, to live fully and to
believe that I am the right person to do what I am doing.

1

Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958) at 324.

iv
Acknowledgments

This dissertation comes late in life. Even more than the products of youth, it therefore
owes its existence to many. And yet none of them should be burdened with responsibility for its
failings or follies. Premier among the many are the clients, staff and board of directors of the
Barbra Schlifer Commemorative Clinic, which I have called my activist and organizing home
since 2010. Nora Angeles gracefully stepped into a role she neither relished nor sought in order
to free me up to initiate and then complete this project. On the way, she also taught me a great
deal about my subject and myself.
Professor Ruth Buchanan played a steady, respectful and intellectually rigorous role in
the development of this dissertation. As my advisor, she could guide me in ways that felt
invisible yet seismic: she draws from a deep well of gravitas that has made this project a joy. To
the rest of my examination committee, professors Sonia Lawrence and Obi Okafor, who both
saved me from certain embarrassment when guiding me to re-examine early approaches to my
topic that might have led me into thickets I was not equipped to emerge from, I owe sincere
thanks. Together with professor Buchanan, they have been rightly characterized by all who
know my good fortune, as the “dream team”.
I must acknowledge the profound influence of Fay Faraday on my life and thought over
the last few years. Fay entered my life as my “boss” when I was assigned as Teaching Assistant
to her section of a first-year legal ethics class at Osgoode Hall Law School. I leave that role as
her friend, colleague, and in the way of feminist organizing, her “boss” on the projects we have
ignited together to address the experiences of women who can count on the Schlifer Clinic’s
support in their various struggles to live free from intersectional violence.
I owe a great deal to the support of Osgoode Hall, Dayna Scott, Janet Mosher and many
of my peers who began this journey with me and encouraged and supported me, chief among
them Julie Falck and Dana Phillips. Materially, none of this would have been possible without
the support of the Joseph-Armand Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholarship, Social Sciences
and Humanities Research Council of Canada; the Fellowship of the Jack and May Nathanson

v
Centre on Transnational Rights, Crime and Security; the Helena Orton Memorial Scholarship;
and the Judge Hallet Scholarship.
To my dear old friend, Andrea Meeson, I owe the life-long challenge of engagement and
reflection on political activism, as well as the practical assistance of expert copyediting. To my
brother Jamie, I owe the spur of survival and intellectual fierceness; to my brother Matt, the
recalled gift of humour and creativity; to my sister Lisa, the few protections of a troubled
childhood; to my father, a love of learning and intellectual curiosity. They all remain influential
although they are all long gone. While writing this, I also lost my mother, a vibrant and
mercurial woman who taught me a great deal about social justice, writing and determination. I
miss her as this project ends. My small remaining family of niece Robyn, nephew Adrian, and
their spouses Tom and Calla, my smart and beautiful goddaughters Claire and Lucie, as well as
Nour, and granddaughters Emma and Freija, along with their generous parents, have sustained
and invigorated me through many ups and downs related to this project and all of life’s
concurrent challenges.
To the fierce and uncompromising women whose intellectual and activist trails blazed a
path for me, and those who are blazing many more alongside me, I hope I have honoured you
throughout with serious engagement of your ideas and actions. Thank you!

vi

Table of Contents
ABSTRACT

II

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

IV

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

IX

INTRODUCTION

1

A NOTE ABOUT METHOD........................................................................................................................................................... 10
1

PROMISES: INTERSECTIONALITY, LAW AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS—A LITERATURE
REVIEW OF HISTORY IN THE PRESENT

16

1.1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................................16
1.2 INTERSECTIONALITY’S INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS: HISTORY IN THE PRESENT ............................................17
1.3 AT THE INTERSECTION WITH CRENSHAW ...................................................................................................22
1.3.1 WHAT INTERSECTIONS MAKE UP INTERSECTIONALITY? ....................................................................................... 26
1.4 ESSENTIALLY ANTI-ESSENTIALIST? .............................................................................................................28
1.5 WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE
FEMINISM, AND INTERSECTIONALITY .......................................................................................................... 29

1.5.1 CRITICAL INTERSECTIONALITY AND LGBT RIGHTS ................................................................................................ 40
1.6 WHAT LIES AHEAD ........................................................................................................................................51
1.7 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................................59
2

TRANSMISSIONS: THE INSTITUTIONAL, TEXTUAL AND NORMATIVE GROUNDING OF
WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AT CEDAW

61

2.1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................................62
2.2 BEFORE CEDAW ..........................................................................................................................................63

vii
2.2.1 A MANDATE TO BROADEN THE PROVISION AND PROTECTION OF WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS .......................... 70
2.3 WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS? ..........................................................................................................................72
2.4 CEDAW: AN INSTRUMENT IN, BUT NOT SOLELY OF, THE UN....................................................................74
2.4.1 CEDAW’S COMPETING DISCOURSES ......................................................................................................................... 79
2.4.2 THE CEDAW COMMITTEE ......................................................................................................................................... 86
2.4.3 LIMITING THE NORMATIVE SCOPE: RESERVATIONS TO CEDAW......................................................................... 88
2.4.4 CEDAW: EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION ................................................................................................... 96
2.5 A NOTE ABOUT CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE....................................................................... 103

2.5.1 CULTURE AS DISCRIMINATION................................................................................................................................. 107
2.6 THE RISE OF INTERSECTIONALITY ............................................................................................................ 110
3

TRANSMISSIONS TO IMPACTS: INTERSECTIONALITY AT CEDAW, ANTECEDENTS AND
APPLICATIONS

112

3.1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 112
3.2 INTERSECTIONALITY: MAPPING HOW THE IDEA TRAVELS ...................................................................... 115
3.3 EMERGING GROUNDS: MULTIPLE, COMPOUND OR INTERSECTIONAL DISCRIMINATION? ..................... 120
3.4 WHAT INTERSECTIONALITY OWES TO THE UN FAILURES IN RWANDA AND BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA .. 129
3.5 THE “INTERSECTIONALIZATION” OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY PROTECTIONS: WHAT CEDAW OWES TO
CERD ......................................................................................................................................................... 142
4

INTERSECTIONALITY AND THE CEDAW COMMITTEE’S CONSCIOUSNESS OF ITSELF 155

4.1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 155
4.2 CEDAW INTERVIEWS AS AN ASPECT OF LEGAL METHOD ....................................................................... 159
4.3 INTERSECTIONALITY THROUGH THE EYES OF CEDAW MEMBERS: ORIGINATING CONCEPT OR
RETROSPECTIVE ATTRIBUTION? .............................................................................................................. 164

4.4 CEES FLINTERMAN: INTERSECTIONALITY AT CEDAW........................................................................... 170
4.5 SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY AT THE INTERSECTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW .............................................................................................................................................. 176
5

INTERSECTIONALITY AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF ITSELF IN THE CEDAW
JURISPRUDENCE

197

5.1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 198
5.2 BACKGROUND TO TREATY BODY DECISION-MAKING ............................................................................... 199
5.3 METHOD FOR SELECTING CEDAW DECISIONS ........................................................................................ 204

viii
5.4 CEDAW FROM 2010 ONWARD................................................................................................................ 207
5.5 GENERAL RECOMMENDATION 35............................................................................................................. 208
5.6 INDIVIDUAL COMMUNICATIONS POST-2010 ........................................................................................... 218
5.6.1 INTERSECTIONALITY AS A FACTOR IN THE INDIVIDUAL COMMUNICATIONS DECISIONS OF THE CEDAW
COMMITTEE ................................................................................................................................................................ 220
5.6.2 INTERSECTIONALITY AS A FACTOR IN CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ............................................................... 233
5.6.3 INQUIRY INTO CANADA’S TREATMENT OF INDIGENOUS WOMEN: CEDAW /C/O P.8/CAN/1 ............... 246
5.7 ASSESSING THE RECORD ............................................................................................................................ 250
6

THINKING WHILE ACTING: CONCLUSION

255

APPENDIX 1

259

BIBLIOGRAPHY

264

ix

Glossary of Terms

CEDAW

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women

CO

Concluding Observations

CRPD

Convention for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

CSW

Sub-Commission on the Status of Women

DEDAW

Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women

DAW

Division for the Advancement of Women (United Nations)

FORB

Freedom of Religion and Belief

GBV

Gender-based Violence

GC

General Comment

GCRF

Global Critical Race Feminism

GR

General Recommendations

HRC

Human Rights Committee (United Nations, CCPR)

ICC

International Criminal Court

ICCPR

International Convention of Civil and Political Rights

ICERD

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination

ICESCR

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

ICTR

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

ICTY

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

IHRL

International Human Rights Law

x
INGO

International Non-Governmental Organization

LBT

Lesbian Bisexual Trans

LGBT

Lesbian Gay Bisexual Trans

LGBTQI

Lesbian Gay Bisexual Trans Queer Intersex

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO

Non-Governmental Organization

OHCHR

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

R2P

Responsibility to Protect

SRSG-SVC

Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in
Conflict

SRVAW

Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women

TWAIL

Third World Approaches to International Law

UDHR

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UN

United Nations

UNGA

United Nations General Assembly

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNIFEM

United Nations Development Fund for Women

VAW

Violence Against Women

1

Introduction
“Can feminism foster a critique of its own successes”?2

In a 2002 essay,3 Anne Orford issued a challenge to feminist international legal theorists
and practitioners. Within an overall critique of the imperial shadow cast over the deployment of
women’s rights’ rhetoric and its effect in a neoliberal economic context, Orford asks: “What
might a feminist reading that attempts to avoid reproducing the unarticulated assumptions of
imperialism look like?”4
In this dissertation I ask, what if the introduction of intersectionality as a framework for
approaching women’s international human rights is a partial answer to this question? In order to
both pose and answer this question, I will advance a critical exploration of the promises,
transmissions and impacts of intersectionality as an approach to gender protections in
international human rights law. Mobilizing a critical international law framework, I review
relevant literature, practices and decisions of the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), related United Nations (UN) memos, documents and
Special Rapporteur materials, along with original interviews with CEDAW Committee members

2

Janet Halley et al, eds, Governance Feminism: An Introduction, Legal Studies/Feminist Theory (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2018).
3
Anne Orford, “Feminism, Imperialism and the Mission of International Law” (2002) 71 Nord J Int Law 275.
4
Ibid.

2
to assess the legal status, governance implications and feminist goals realized and missed in the
intersectional turn in international human rights law.
Promising an account of the full complexity of discriminated persons, intersectionality at
its most involute allows us to elaborate the specifically structural histories of exclusion from the
distributional benefits of equality that an anti-imperial approach would require. Traceable
through many academic fields, standpoints of critique and approaches to method,
intersectionality has travelled the globe, articulating this promise through its potent metaphor of
the confluence of pathways to harm through multiple identities. As with other feminist ideals
active in public life, intersectionality has leapt from the page, transmitting and thereby being
transformed through its movement “from the international to the local and back again, from
centre to periphery and back again, from the ivory tower to the street and back again”.5 Although
there is a strong body of work that catalogues intersectionality’s failures in domestic law,6
relatively little has been done to account for its robust adoption in international law. Notable
exceptions to this are divided between critiques of the UN’s allegedly incomplete understanding
of the concept,7 upset at the primacy of Kimberlé Crenshaw’s work in informing it,8 and
practitioners’ guides to its deployment.9

5

Janet E Halley, Governance feminism: an introduction (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 2018) at 23.
Emily Grabham, Intersectionality and beyond: law, power and the politics of location, Social justice (Abingdon,
England) (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009).
7
Johanna E Bond, “International Intersectionality: A Theoretical and Pragmatic Exploration of Women’s
International Human Rights Violations” (2003) 52 Emory LJ 71.
8
N Yuval-Davis, “Intersectionality and Feminist Politics” (2006) 13:3 Eur J Womens Stud 193; Nira Yuval-Davis,
The Politics of Belonging: Intersectional Contestations (London: Sage, 2011).
9
Meghan Campbell, “CEDAW and Women’s Intersecting Identities: A Pioneering New Approach” (2015) 11:2 Rev
Dierito GV 479; Fredman, Sandra, Intersectional discrimination in EU gender equality and non-discrimination law
(European network of legal experts in gender equality and non-discrimination: European Commission, 2016).
6

3
Of particular interest to me in this dissertation is intersectionality’s now nearly ubiquitous
appearance as a key aspect of women’s international human rights law. Its deployment needs to
be better understood so as to pose and explore the question of whether its adoption helps
international law to shed its imperial mantel, effectively moving intersectionality from critical
social theory to critical legal technique. Therefore, while there is a vast literature through which
the concept can be traced and usefully sharpened, it is the transmissions and impacts—
productions and receptions—particular to international human rights law that will shape the
contours of this work. Specifically, I trace the promises, transmissions and impacts of
intersectionality at and through CEDAW and its monitoring committee (the Committee), and
consider the ways in which intersectionality has been elaborated as an approach to international
human rights’ protections for multiply10 discriminated women.
For this context, I begin with a definition of intersectionality at the individual claimant
and jurisprudential levels, as an approach to anti-discrimination and equality law that attempts to
move beyond static conceptions11 and fixed identities of discriminated subjects, and which,
based on the metaphor of a traffic intersection, delineates the flow of discrimination as multidirectional, and injury as seldom attributable to a single source.12 As I explore in Chapter 1 and
continue to trace throughout the dissertation, the strain of intersectionality that arose in
Crenshaw’s work was an attempt to account for the duality of race and gender as they shaped
experiences of discrimination and were rendered invisible by the systems that both inflicted

10

I use multiply in this context as an adverb, meaning in multiple ways, or in several ways.
Emily Grabham et al, “Introduction” in Emily Grabham et al, eds, Intersect Law Power Polit Locat, Social Justice
(Abingdon, UK: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009) 1.
12
Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics” (1989) U Chi Leg F 139 at 149.
11

4
harms and proposed remedies.13 But in its life beyond these early works, its epistemic and
ontological claims have since come to express the possibility of a nearly infinite entanglement of
human experience as impacted by systems of governance and regulation. Does this extend the
emancipatory possibilities of law as it accounts for these variables, or does the concept become
incoherent? Does intersectionality as human rights law provide a way out of the impasses in
rights protections that pit vulnerable groups against one another, that view human rights in solely
binary fashion in either/or propositions, or that seek always to balance rights between winners
and losers, or painfully, between aspects of a single individual seeking protection?
In attempting to answer these questions, this dissertation focuses on the promises,
transmissions and impacts of intersectionality. In doing so, I articulate an additional conditioning
intersection. That is, in addition to the intersection of multiple harms, forms of discrimination or
identities—which are, variously, the meanings ascribed to intersectionality as an approach to
international human rights law—the intersection this dissertation fundamentally straddles is that
between social critique and instrumental engagement. This work is guided by an engaged
ambivalence about the core project of harnessing feminist social critique, such as that invited by
intersectionality’s migratory path, to the perilous project of feminist governance. Put another
way, throughout the chapters that follow, there is a “story” of intersectionality that traces the
concept and its work, contextualizing where and how it appears on its route to acceptance as
international legal technique. In doing so, and in accounting for both losses and advances made

13

Kimberle Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: A black feminist critique of
antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics” (1989) U Chi Leg F 139; Kimberle Crenshaw,
“Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color” (1991) Stanford
Law Rev 1241.

5
possible by its adoption, there is a more general question of what wider power struggles might be
at play that allow for an idea’s acceptance or pave the way for its advancement; what does the
concept facilitate and what does it permit, both at the level of its expressed purpose and with a
wider view. This is what is meant by asking what “work” a concept is doing in the worlds it
travels through.
I begin this account of transmissions and impacts by asking what it is we are talking
about when we refer to intersectionality, and for this I turn to the literature on intersectionality
that simultaneously exceeds and informs law. Nevertheless, the act of tracing intersectionality
through the literature is not an exhaustive intellectual history. The approach I have taken to the
topic of intersectionality as a legal concept and practice recognizes that intersectionality has a
life in and beyond law. It thus manifests as epistemology, ontology, methodology, as well as
legal technique.
As an acknowledged “travelling idea”,14 intersectionality does not always appear under
its own name. Its antecedents, co-travellers, as well as its staunchest critics, need to be
considered to plumb its deeper meaning and contribution. I will note intersectionality’s
transformation across these categories and iterations as I explore them in the following chapters.
This is necessary to assess its putative contribution to social critique before following its
movement back and forth in law.
In all its travels noted above, intersectionality appears as a metaphor to express domestic
human rights critiques as well as a concept in sociological, activist and legal analysis, and I

14

Halley, supra note 5.

6
explore this grounding in the literature in Chapter 1. Here, I also explore the implications of
intersectionality as a manifestation of feminist theory, and as part of the long and aporetic
relationship between feminism and governance, and more specifically, between feminism and
law.
In Chapter 2, I distinguish the role of CEDAW as text and as Committee, exploring the
textual life of the treaty as both instrument of law and discursive text, caught up in a history of
empire and simultaneous resistance to particular manifestations of patriarchy, often couched as
expressions of “culture”. In this context and throughout the dissertation, I challenge the oftproffered reasoning that pits women’s rights as a self-evident entity in a reified clash with a fixed
idea of “tradition” and “culture”, finding that CEDAW as text, and later in the dissertation as
Committee, retains some imperial vestiges foreshadowed in the literature review.
Intersectionality has an active life as discourse in various UN documents, which I explore
in Chapter 3. Here—as in all chapters—I critically examine the subtle ways in which the various
notions of intersectionality surface and in which empire remains influential. It is this
subliminally imperial discourse of international human rights law that I explore, and which I find
newly embedded in sovereignty and security agendas. I examine what, if any modifications
intersectionality has made to this mix. These agendas are equally relevant as I dig deeper into the
literature on the clash between religious/cultural and gender-based rights that I first present in
Chapter 1. This work sets the stage for a closer examination of the complicated role played by
international human rights law and CEDAW as governance feminism, in Janet Halley’s sense,

7
and therefore as both vector of liberatory ideals and consolidator of forms of power.15 In Anne
Orford’s formulation, these twin manifestations are most fruitfully seen through a method that
traces their appearance as expressions and advancements of authority. Following Orford’s
example, I find a fragile thread that links a desire for mastery over the major geo-political events
of genocide in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda with the UN’s receptivity to an
intersectional approach to the conceptualization of discrimination. This thread grows thicker with
each step I follow along its vestigial path. I bring the reader on this journey throughout Chapter
3, until the links are made expressly through the documents I examine and that later, in Chapter
4, I ask my original sources to reflect on.
Intersectionality, in its more liberatory appearances, is an heuristic device for theoretical
examination of the dynamics of power. I explore this in Chapter I as a theoretical proposition and
further in Chapter 4 in light of my original interviews. In these chapters I discern the
institutional, instrumental and normative grounding of intersectionality’s adoption in the
conflicted and contested terrain of CEDAW, and then examine and analyze these appearances
through the lens of my conversations with CEDAW Committee members. A key part of my work
mobilizes original research to assist in tracing the promises, transmissions and impacts of
intersectionality. This takes the form of semi-structured interviews that I conducted in person
during CEDAW’s Fall 2016 session in Geneva, and via Skype interviews with additional
informants no longer part of, or situated outside CEDAW, in the year following. I make meaning
of this material as an element of “law’s consciousness of itself”16 and to do so I turn my attention

15

Ibid.
ESIL Lecture Series, Anne Orford - Histories of International Law and Empire (University of Paris 1 Sorbonne,
2013).
16

8
fully to Orford and mobilize her body of work in critical international law. Orford holds that
“law is inherently genealogical, depending as it does upon the movement of concepts, languages
and norms across space and even time”.17 For Orford, making meaning in law hinges on the
Foucauldian phrase “consciousness of itself”,18 because it signals the methodological approach of
starting from the practices of law as they are given, or operate, but at the same time as they
reflect on themselves and are rationalized. In Chapter 4, I employ this methodology in the
analysis of my original interviews with CEDAW members as they reconstruct and reflect on the
development and current practice of intersectionality in their deliberations. This places their
individual and collective understanding of intersectionality in direct conversation with the twin
aspects of authoritative and liberatory impulses in governance feminism, adding their reflections
(individual law-makers’ consciousness of themselves) to a literal account of law’s consciousness
of itself.
Following Orford’s method further, in Chapter 5 I gather the preexisting but dispersed
practices of intersectionality into a coherent examination, attentive to its adoption in the
consideration and adjudication of women’s international human rights at CEDAW. Here I assess
the written decisions and pronouncements of the CEDAW Committee in its role as custodian of
the treaty charged with protecting women’s rights considering what I have examined before: the
theoretical grounding and political promise of intersectionality; the geopolitical context of its
adoption; the textual and discursive manifestations of it in international law; and the self-

17

ESIL Lecture Series, Anne Orford - Histories of International Law and Empire (University of Paris 1 Sorbonne,
2013).
18
Anne Orford, “On International Legal Method” (2013) I:I Lond Rev Int Law 166; Michel Foucault, The birth of
biopolitics: lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979, 1st Picador pbk ed.. ed (New York: Picador, 2010) at 3.
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conscious adoption of it as an approach in decision making as articulated by the Committee
members. This final chapter comes full circle to Orford’s challenge, completing the task of
scrutinizing the decisions of CEDAW as a window into assessing intersectionality’s role as a
legal tool in international jurisprudence, concluding that it simultaneously bolsters imperial
authority and advances post-colonial critique.
A theme throughout this dissertation is the struggle to discern a distinct elaboration of
intersectionality as a means to sharpen the focus on a mutually constitutive form of
discrimination which is at once a product of multiple vulnerabilities and social oppressions, but
not simply additive. Resisting the appearance of intersectionality as simply part of a “tag-cloud”
of key recurring terms that inform contemporary theorizing,19 I take its advent seriously. I
advance a view of intersectionality as not an indiscriminate assemblage of concepts, but as
revealing a range of different approaches to categorizing complex, violent and systemic
discriminations, and attempts to trace the burdens of dynamic disempowerment these create. As
such, its promise to reveal and illuminate must be taken seriously as a possible precondition to
individual as well as collective resistance, amelioration and agency.
Although there is little room for intellectual or political purity in the world of applied
feminism, there is a great need for reflection and accountability. Resisting naivety or easy
answers in responding to Orford’s gauntlet which began this introduction—indeed in honouring
her method of assessing law’s retrospective self-justification for its claim to authority—I trace

19

I paraphrase in a different context Orford, Hoffmann and Clark in, Anne Orford, Florian Hoffmann & Martin
Clark, The Oxford handbook of the theory of international law, first edition. ed, Oxford handbooks (Oxford, United
Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2016).
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the critical insights brought to law from intersectionality, both describing what I find, and
elaborating what can be. It is my effort to make room for a conversation about “critically
engaged governance”,20 and governance-engaged critique that drives this work overall. “Be
prepared for paradoxes”, 21 offers Janet Halley in a warning about the nature of feminism as a
governance project that could equally apply to what follows here. My work seeks to be an openeyed approach to weighing the complicated and sometimes fractured twin projects of social
critique and governance technique. To do so, as I trace the ideas, governance pathways and
people at the UN responsible for holding states accountable for preventing and ameliorating
intersectional violence, inviting them as I go, to engage in a little reflection of their own.

A note about method
As I hope I will establish, intersectionality is a word that neither clarifies which academic
terrain you are on nor what exact epistemological, ontological or political frames you are
referencing. In part, this project has a purpose to precisely trace the meanings and disciplinary
manifestations of the term and the work intersectionality does as an aspect of the back and forth
nature of its relationship to law. Although there is an argument to be made that all contemporary
advanced academic work is in some senses interdisciplinary,22 some of the disciplinary norms of
the work I engage are more fluid than others. The introduction of Queer Theory into the flow of
understandings of intersectionality, for instance, precisely aims to “reflect both an unhomed
interdisciplinarity as well as mediated tensions and deliberate blurring between area studies

20

Halley, supra note 5 at 266.
Ibid at 261.
22
Kristin Luker, Salsa Dancing into the Social Sciences: Research in an Age of Info-Glut, EBSCOhost (Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2008).
21
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knowledge formations and ethnic, diaspora, and transnational studies.”23 So while this is a
dissertation in law, and as I will sketch briefly below and elaborate more fully in the chapters
that follow, I engage a methodology proper to my discipline, much of what is asked of law by
entertaining intersectionality requires consideration of contestations that come from beyond
law’s traditional borders.
I hope to bring these interdisciplinary insights into dialogue with what law has made of
intersectionality to try to assess and if necessary, reinvigorate those aspects that it is law’s natural
tendency to flatten and make into easily justiciable claims. Along the way, it remains necessary
to articulate the structures, processes and legal standing of the mechanisms and material that I am
citing from within law. At times, the reader will need to forgive a remedial lesson in the
structures, sources and status of international human rights law as it frames this discussion in
order that the transition from insight to practice and possibility is made clear. If the
interdisciplinary nature of the concept of intersectionality provides little coherence, the legal uses
of it provide little more. Another ambition of this dissertation is to take the varied legal
manifestations of intersectionality I probe and create a working set of definitions that help clarify
and discern intersectionality’s unique contribution to the field of international human rights law.
By putting these worlds into direct dialogue, I am able to identify the gaps in, for instance, the
self-proclaimed intersectional approach of the CEDAW Committee’s interpretation of women’s
human rights as articulated in their General Comments, as reflected upon by many of them as
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individuals in conversation with me, and as practiced in their Concluding Observations of
reporting states, and their individual communications with claimants.
At the start of this introduction, I quoted Anne Orford. Her work as a critical international
law theorist squarely places the claims of international law, including international human rights
law, within the trajectory and project of international governance and authority. Orford’s work
has spawned resistance from traditional disciplinary historical accounts of law,24 and
simultaneously initiated methodological innovation in tracing the origins and meanings of
international law.25 Orford addresses her methodical choices head on in a volume of the London
Review of International Law26 devoted to her account of international authority’s consciousness
of itself in International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect.27 Orford tells us that her
research method—the rationalization and approach to “gathering” of materials—was influenced
by, and is in the main not dissimilar from, “a sociological approach to the study of international
organisations, and that places ‘renewed emphasis on the study of practices, including the study of
discourses as practices’ rather than the study of ‘disembodied structures, even abstractions’”.28
Much of Orford’s departure from traditional historical accounts is based in her assertion
of an expressly legal way of tracing discourse, as I will briefly review in Chapters 1 and 3.
Specifically, she asks “[w]hat kind of method is appropriate to a discipline in which judges,
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advocates, scholars and students all look to past texts precisely to discover the nature of present
obligations?”.29 In answer, she advocates for an approach to international legal theory that she
situates as based on “the core of legal method”, wherein:
[…]as lawyers, particularly those of us with common law backgrounds, we are trained in
the art of making meaning move across time—by learning, for example, how to make a
plausible argument about why a particular case should be treated as a binding precedent,
or why it should be distinguished as having no bearing on the present.30

Her argument here is against strictly contextualist interpretations of texts, actions and
ideas—a method which holds that examining ideas and actions exclusively through the lens and
meanings of their time is the “proper” approach to avoid misconstruing actors’ motivations and
the proper chronology of history. This approach, Orford argues, diverges from legal method and
is not properly employed in the effort to trace the genealogy of legal concepts. As Orford has
established, law “is inherently genealogical”.31 We have seen above how for Orford, making
meaning in law hinges on the Foucauldian phrase “consciousness of itself”.32 Orford uses
Foucault’s method of embedding critique in the act of tracing origins, to show how “certain
things were able to be formed and the status of what should obviously be questioned”.33
Foucault used the phrase, “consciousness of itself” to characterize the rise and retroactive
self-justification of the state system as a whole—as the entirety of the practices of a governing
police state. Orford uses this same frame to examine a subset of statecraft, namely, international
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legal authority carried out through the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (R2P). In my work,
International Human Rights Law (IHRL) can be seen as an instance of this larger project of
international authority and governance, if perhaps the most legitimating aspect of it (alongside
humanitarian intervention), grounding as it does the ideals of “benevolent humanitarianism” that
come in the package of international law’s valorization of capitalist cosmopolitanism, and of
“free-trade, liberalized economies, informal empire”.34 Throughout this dissertation, my
approach to tracing the movement “across space and … time”35 of intersectionality, follows
Orford’s distinction of an international legal method that examines the history of its own
concepts and ideas, based on the authority of juridical interpretation; namely, how “the past may
be a source of present obligations”.36 I take authority’s consciousness of itself as an approach to
my exploration of the origins and impacts of intersectionality, as I already briefly noted. This is
critical to underscore at the outset, because it assists the reader in comprehending the
methodology of gathering the dispersed practices I trace.
Orford’s approach of revealing the meaning of ideas both within and across time requires
sociological techniques to carry it out, as does my work here. In Orford’s R2P work, the
sociological techniques were necessarily restricted to the examination of documents and
discourse, which I also employ. While Orford examined the individuals, and their influences,
who gave shape and form to the practices she was interested in, the main proponents and
advocates of the doctrine she was interested in were dead. In the case of intersectionality’s
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genealogy, I can complement the written record I explore with the reflections of living
proponents. The interviews I conducted with CEDAW Committee members fit into this
methodology of tracing international law’s consciousness of itself, as well as its claim to
authority through its relationship with intersectionality.
Intersectionality is an active area of theory, methodology and feminist engagement with
statecraft and governance; examining its promise and impact reveals the genuine urge to adapt
law to account for the distributional inequalities of feminism’s successes heretofore, as well as
the need to hold these claims to a high standard of scrutiny and self-critique. In my discussion
with CEDAW Committee members, they related that such a project would be a welcome
opportunity for reflection. In the spirit of critical engagement, I offer this work to the
conversations that have taken place and are yet to happen between practitioners, activists,
international law practitioners and academics about the promises, transmissions and impacts of
intersectionality in women’s international human rights.

16

1 Promises: Intersectionality, Law and Women’s Rights—A
Literature Review of History in the Present
[R]ecovering the specifically feminist ideas that animate various governance feminism projects
strikes us as an urgent undertaking —but one that, we think, should be approached with scholarly
care and political vision.37
The account of ‘feminist approaches’ that I tell in this chapter is not one of
origins, generations, or progress, but of hope and despair, paradox and
conundrum, repetition and conflict, and the importance of history in the present.38

Intersectionality’s institutional incorporation … requires attending to both continuities and
breaches between the ways that intersectionality has been understood and practiced at different
stages of its development in different national and institutional contexts.39

1.1 Introduction
In this initial chapter, I seek to provide the contours of the literature relevant to my telling
of the promises, transmissions and impacts of intersectionality in relation to women’s
international human rights. While each aspect of that triumvirate is part of a continuous
movement of ideas, places and institutions, and thus present throughout this dissertation, it is the
promise of intersectionality that I trace specifically in this chapter because it is in the academic
literature that the aspiration for what the theoretical project can illuminate is its keenest. The
literature on intersectionality has ambitions far beyond an extension of the grounds of
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discrimination protections, and its ambitions will be part of my consideration of its role as an
extension of the law’s protection.
In this chapter I will explore intersectionality’s contested origins, meanings and
applications; its appearance as epistemology, ontology and activist rallying cry, as well as the
putative categories of identity it claims to draw into its metaphoric grasp. It is my contribution to
curating, clarifying and critically appraising the variety of claims promised by intersectionality
as a means to articulate and ameliorate women’s oppression. In order to later assess the
multiplicity of claims and complexity of harms addressed by an intersectional approach to
gender at CEDAW, in this chapter I examine its constituent feminist and anti-racist strands, as
well as the challenges and enrichments offered through critical Queer Theory and scholarship on
the right to freedom of religion and belief (FORB). The examination of this literature is in direct
response to the expanded terrain in which intersectionality, as an elaboration of gender
protections, is asked to do its work internationally.

1.2 Intersectionality’s intellectual origins: history in the present
The provenance of intersectionality is a matter of debate and contention. As intellectual
history,40 the question of origins engages strongly held approaches—claimed,41 contested,42 and
refuted.43 Simply raising the question of where intersectionality travels from and to opens
broader questions as to the existence, or not, of dividing lines between past and present iterations
of the main tenets of the concept. Is intersectionality primarily considered to be technique and
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methodology, or does its principle contribution only remain radical in its formation as
epistemology and ontology.44 Much of the literature contests the term itself, linking it to projects
of “ownership” and prioritizing primacy of a given proponent’s lived experience.45 For instance,
outside of the field of law, it is held that “[i]ntersectionality’s history cannot be neatly organized
in time periods or geographic locations”, and that doing so is “far from neutral”, and leads to
“oversimplified explanations” of its origins and meanings and grants “authoritative” status to
some accounts “at the expense of others”.46 For some, simply asking the question reveals “that
intersectional originalism is its own practice of re-reading and re-interpretation that has its own
complex temporal and racial politics, and which is animated by a desire to rescue
intersectionality from critique in a moment in which identity politics are increasingly suspect”.47
There is little doubt that while there is “tremendous heterogeneity”48 in how the term is defined
and applied, its roots lie in the struggles of black women and women of colour,49 and in the
intellectual projects that took up those struggles and forged a coherent critique and praxis50 of
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them, resulting in a “general consensus”51 about how the concept is understood. Collins and
Bilge capture this in the broadest terms possible in the definition that follows:
Intersectionality is a way of understanding and analyzing the complexity
in the world, in people, and in human experiences. The events and
conditions of social and political life and the self can seldom be
understood as shaped by one factor. They are generally shaped by many
factors in diverse and mutually influencing ways. When it comes to social
inequity, people’s lives and the organization of power in a given society
are better understood as being shaped not by a single axis of social
division, be it race or gender or class, but by many axes that work together
and influence each other. Intersectionality as an analytic tool gives people
better access to the complexity of the world and of themselves.52

Interestingly, this definition does not make special reference to the role of
intersectionality within feminism, or the role of feminism within the popularization of
intersectionality, nor, for our purposes, its role in law. This is likely due to co-author Bilge’s
concern that “disciplinary academic feminism specifically attuned to neoliberal knowledge
economy contributes to the depoliticization of intersectionality”, keeping it palatable for marketoriented university settings by “confining it to an act of metatheoretical contemplation” and by
“whitening” it through stripping its contextual belonging in black feminist politics.53 Along with
Bilge, this project is guided by an ethic of “encouraging methods of debate that reconnect
intersectionality with its initial vision of generating counter-hegemonic and transformative
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knowledge production, activism, pedagogy, and non-oppressive coalitions”,54 expressly and
methodologically resisting “confining intersectionality to an academic exercise”.55
Bilge’s work serves as an important starting place for the contributions of
intersectionality to international law because it reminds us of the social and political context that
gives it meaning and purpose. A critical difference between this project and hers is that Bilge is
principally concerned with using intersectionality as an accountability mechanism within
activism, for creating what she calls “non-oppressive coalitional politics”.56 I draw attention to
this because in tracing the link to law, it is possible to lose intersectionality’s bond with activism.
Law tells its own stories of beginnings and can quickly dissolve intersectionality into a narrative
used only to “analyse law… to unpack…the inadequate recognition of the complexly situated
subject by various law-making or law-enforcing bodies or policy initiatives”.57
It could be argued that law’s claim to intersectionality is just one more version of
originalism. There is, however, a clear geneology of intersectionality in law, arising from critical
race theory, and the specific coining of the term in the work of Kimberlé Crenshaw,58 although
even this attempt to fix a moment of origins in law is complicated by the nearly simultaneous
appearance of the word in the work of Canadian legal scholar Marlee Kline, who drew special
attention to the intersection of indigeneity in criminal law in Canada.59 I argue that the account of
law as the original site of intersectionality is best understood as positioning law as one strand of
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praxis in keeping with intersectionality’s appearance as a multi-pronged route to “counterhegemony”.60 Nevertheless, the simple act of naming raises “challenges associated with
straightening intersectionality’s history”.61
As Collins and Bilge are quick to point out, “[c]ontemporary renditions of
intersectionality’s past increasingly bypass altogether the heterogeneous forms that
intersectionality took during the period of social movement politics”, which they locate
temporally as being in the 1990s.62 This “straightening”, they argue, limits itself to crediting
Crenshaw as the foremother, and the academy as the birthplace. Ultimately, they argue, the
patterns of “incorporation” into the academy served to suppress the “transformative and
potentially disruptive dimensions”63 of the projects steeped in an intersectional critique.
Although these are certainly not lost for good, they need reinvigoration in any assessment of the
concept’s utility to transformative action, whether legal or otherwise. For this reason, the link to
activism and the goals of social change beyond the bounds of law, even if pursued through law,
are important to attend to.
Far from confining the discussion to metatheoretical contemplation, intersectionality as a
legal concept must be understood through its complex role as link to broader demands of
structural social change, realized through law’s contradictory role as both consolidator of
precedent, and harbinger of new approaches to protection. This articulation of law’s dual role as
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fixed to its past and reinterpreted for its current context is a methodology Orford positions as
immanent to law, elaborated through the approach set out in the Introduction.64 Similarly, it is
important to understand that Crenshaw’s association with the “coining” of the term and the
spread of the analytic approach of intersectionality is tied to her grounding in “law as both a site
of repression and as a site of social justice”.65 That is, in Crenshaw’s work, there is an important
link between the “promise” of intersectionality as a form of critical inquiry, and its role as a form
of praxis.
We return to these ideas throughout, and in some detail in Chapters 3 and 5.

1.3 At the intersection with Crenshaw
While it is an altogether different project from this one to determine an intellectual
history of the concepts gathered under intersectionality, notwithstanding the word’s appearance
in Marilee Kline’s work noted above, there seems little controversy that the term intersectionality
appears early and frequently, and its most often sourced back to the work of Kimberlé
Crenshaw.66 Her work forms the core named influence in the uptake of the concept in
international human rights law, as explored further in subsequent chapters.67 Indeed, the
literature on intersectionality that most influenced law originated in Crenshaw’s feminist critical
race writing of the 1980s. It has now become influential in a vast number of fields: Emily
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Grabham et al’s brief survey reveals more than six disciplines, including socio-legal studies, to
which it has since been applied.68 As such, its potential reaches beyond the individual legal
subject of liberalism into the realms of law’s political, symbolic and structural influences with an
appealing epistemological critique that aims to “foreground the erasure”69of—or put more
positively, centre the consideration of—multiply discriminated women, in contrast to traditional
fixed legal categories and practices.
The work of Kimberlé Crenshaw is pivotal in both the domestic (American) and
transnational deployments of intersectionality. Referenced at the outset of this dissertation,
Crenshaw’s pivotal metaphor, more fully reflected here, asks us to
Consider an analogy to traffic in an intersection, coming and going
in all four directions. Discrimination, like traffic through an
intersection, may flow in one direction, and it may flow in another.
If an accident happens in an intersection, it can be caused by cars
traveling from any number of directions, and sometimes from all
of them.70

Her early analysis of employment law and anti-discrimination cases in the
American appellate and constitutional systems was part of a founding insight
growing out of Critical Race Theory,71 and her work was instrumental in
analyzing the ways in which US antidiscrimination law took a ‘but for’ approach
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to the basis of discrimination claims: that is, ‘but for’ being either black, or ‘but
for’ being a woman, the claimant would have received different —equal to the
norm—treatment. Thus, stripped of their complex social identity and only in
negative relief against the putative norm of white males could claimants have
their situations of harm addressed. Crenshaw’s work set into stark relief the way
in which,
race and sex … became significant only when they operate to
explicitly disadvantage the victims; because the privileging of
whiteness or maleness is implicit, it is generally not perceived at
all.72

This insight into the overarching epistemic framework of (anti-discrimination) law,
privileging white male experience and encoding negative subjectivity, was further enriched by
Crenshaw’s observation that gender as a basis of claim, was exclusively modeled on white
women’s experiences. The encoding of gendered and racialized identities as ‘other’ and as
‘victims’ becomes the focus in many adaptations of intersectionality outside law, especially in
sociology.73
In early academic pieces, intersectionality has an orientation to policy and law reform.
Crenshaw’s work was, in large part, a foundational project of critical race feminism to open a
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dialogue between the once separate worlds of anti-racist and feminist activists, in which she
identified how “dominant conceptions of discrimination condition us to think about
subordination and disadvantage occurring along a single categorical axis.”74 This, she claims,
yields a “distorted analysis of racism and sexism” and “contributes to the marginalization of
Black women in feminist theory and anti-racist politics,” and that because of this predicated
“discrete set of experiences,” the intersections of race and gender are not duly accounted for not
only in the status quo, but also in the reforming challenges and possible remedies. Centrally,
theory and policy are “predicated on a discrete set of experiences that often does not accurately
reflect the interaction of race and gender.” 75 The aim of this formulation of intersectionality is to
link the law to the lived experience of complex individuals with claims, and to highlight its status
as an expository tool to check law’s tendency to instrumentalize social identity and categorize
remedy in discrete baskets of entitlements that can’t be added together or compounded.
These aims remain relevant to the ongoing development of equality rights and antidiscrimination work. In the context of the widespread belief in a clash of claims for protection
under human rights instruments and in liberal discourse about state duties to “accommodate”
intersecting claims for protection or not,76 intersectionality reminds us that it is not simply a
matter of stacking up the claims of discretely oppressed persons, nor of balancing the single
claims of a group on the basis of one set of protected grounds versus another; intersectionality
metaphorically recasts discriminations not as additive, but as mutually constitutive.
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Crenshaw locates her initial discussion within the debates surrounding violence against
women (VAW) as a universal experience of oppression, and contests that, “the location of
women of colour at the intersection of race and gender makes our actual experience of domestic
violence, rape and remedial reform qualitatively different from that of white women”.77 In this
example, Black women are not only sometimes like white women in gender, and like Black men
in race, but also often unlike either in an intersectional experience that constitutes its own form
of discrimination, at times at the hands of the two groups they are most supposed to be like.

1.3.1 What intersections make up intersectionality?
While intersectionality has been widely acknowledged to be an influential concept,78 it
has also been accused of falling short of a fully elaborated theory, and of failing to articulate its
scope and reach—“are all subjectivities/identities intersectional or only those multiply
marginalized subjects”?79 Is it important, for instance, to counter the pathologizing impulses of
cataloguing social identity only in terms of its vulnerabilities to social marginalization, or do
those who operate in the political and legal realm from positions of dominance not also carry
intersectional identities?80 As Crenshaw remarked in response to dominant journalistic analyses
of the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States, “[w]hy is the intersection of
maleness and whiteness driving our analysis and not the intersection of being a woman and a
person of color?”81
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Intersectionality is embedded in a murkiness that is inherently ambiguous as to its status
as methodology, the number and meaning of situational identities it represents and their relation
to its putative epistemic claim. There is little doubt, for instance, that while the initial insight of
intersectionality was premised on the unique form of discrimination experienced in relation to
being black and a woman, there has been a proliferation of identity threads feeding into an
intersectional analysis since those early days. In an interview marking the 20th anniversary of her
first use of the term, Crenshaw had the following to say about the epistemic applicability of the
term:
Q: You originally coined the term intersectionality to describe bias
and violence against black women, but it’s become more widely
used—for LGBTQ issues, among others. Is that a
misunderstanding of intersectionality?
Crenshaw: Intersectionality is a lens through which you can see
where power comes and collides, where it interlocks and intersects.
It’s not simply that there’s a race problem here, a gender problem
here, and a class or LBGTQ problem there. Many times that
framework erases what happens to people who are subject to all of
these things.82
This generalizability of the term begs the related practical question of how one
determines the “coherence between intersectionality and lived experiences of multiple
identities?”83 Davina Cooper has pointed out that there is no clear answer to the question of
whether “the axes [of identity and discrimination] have an existence apart from the ways in
which they combine”.84 This is a matter Yuval-Davis has taken up,85 and which we will develop
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more in relation to the concept’s uptake at the UN, where we see the tendency for the mutual
constituency of the harmed identities accounted for in intersectionality come apart again, into
discreet ontologically guarded identity threads. That the original formulation, which highlighted
the intersectional discrimination of race and gender, has expanded to acknowledge a range of
discriminatory experiences, as Crenshaw acknowledges above, deepens the tapestries of
epistemologies and ontologies that make up an intersectional approach; it has also been noted, as
we have seen in Collins and Bilge, that the original insight into the operations of gendered
racism that it came about to highlight remain crucial and even more complex.

1.4 Essentially anti-essentialist?
Based on the foregoing, we can see that intersectionality poses a conundrum for theory
and law: it is at once an effort at anti-categorical, anti-essentializing thinking that is sometimes
theory, sometimes social science methodology and sometimes legal technique, and which
nevertheless categorizes and spotlights—if not fixes—social identities for the purposes of
exposing inequality and disadvantage. This is a thread picked up later in this dissertation through
exploration of the work of Nira Yuval-Davis,86 who argues that in its interaction with
international governance, intersectionality extends the very categorizations and reifications of
identity the concept was meant to alleviate. This may simply be an effect of the conundrum at the
heart of the attempt to enter governing spaces with critical concepts: intersectionality promises a
powerful critique of the hegemonic grasp of law on social access that regardless, engages and
works through law.
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The express use of intersectionality in the international human rights field since 2000
weaves concepts from both inside and outside explicitly legal formulations, including most
directly, those of Crenshaw.87 As Hill Collins and Bilge acknowledge, Kimberle Crenshaw’s
work “made a major contribution to intersectionality’s dispersal in global venues”.88 I explore
this “dispersal” in detail throughout the chapters to come, beginning in Chapter 2. For now, I
return to the grounding and uptake of intersectionality’s elaboration in the academic literature
that makes it attractive to the project of international human rights’ protections based on gender.
Circling back to the debate about origins that began this chapter, many critical scholars not
typically gathered under the banner of intersectionality have nonetheless analyzed the
“intersections of race, gender, sexuality, and class within the context of global colonial
capitalism.”89 Their contributions to an enhancement of intersectionality for IHRL are explored
further below.

1.5 Women’s international human rights, critical race feminism,
global critical race feminism, and intersectionality
In the context of a career of critical examinations of the operations of law through detailed
ethnographic method, it is significant that critical legal anthropologist Sally Engle Merry has
stated that “[t]he global human rights system is now deeply transnational, no longer rooted
exclusively in the west”.90 Nevertheless, she places this declarative sentence in the context of the
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equally crucial conundrum at the heart of engaging intersectionality as an instrument of
international human rights law: “how to relate the progressive ideal to imperial processes that
skew what is considered to be legitimate progress and shape the impact of ideas and institutions
that move across borders[?]”91 This is another way of stating the problem set out in the
introduction: how to work clearly and ethically with a travelling and therefore transmutable idea
in the context of global power imbalances? It is in this context, with this overall framing that I
draw attention to deliberations about the universality of international human rights standards, and
the extent to which they are colonial,92 neo-colonial,93 part of structural adjustment strategies of
the Global North,94 or culturally determined.95 For our purposes, the point of interest is that they
frequently occur in the context of debates over women’s human rights and related gender
protections.96 This is expressed succinctly by Florence Butegwa, when she asks “[w]hy is it only
when women want to bring about change for their own benefit do culture and custom become
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sacred and unchangeable?” 97 Often, states, seeking to consolidate their sovereignty in regional
or global systems, will use “culture” as a defense to encroachment by gender-related rights,98
posing a clash between the rights guaranteed by international human rights law under the
complex rubric of culture or FORB, and the protections offered to women qua women.
According to Michael Freeman, “[w]omen suffer much more than men from justifications of the
violations of almost all their human rights by appeals to culture”.99 Existing side by side to this
are hegemonic notions of women’s rights emanating from the Global North, in which nonwestern women are often represented as if they exist in a “permanently anterior time, with
gender subordination uniquely integral to their culture”.100 This critical perspective on rights,
gestures past intersectionality’s primary interest in the conceptualization of widening the
aperture of legal protections against harms. It concerns itself instead with a critique of the
problematic formulations of global rights frameworks in their whole, as extensions of colonial
and racist narratives that fundamentally silence the agency and vitality of ‘the third world
woman’, reducing her to a trope used to the advancement of western women’s rights. Leti
Volpp’s work articulates and advances this critical perspective on the global transmissions of
feminism. Her scholarship advances the “multi-axis” approach to women’s rights, central to the
concerns of intersectional scholarship. While Volpp primarily is an observer of constructions of
race and gender within the U.S. context, her work has surfaced as part of an American-based
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scholarship on, “Global Critical Race Feminism” (GCRF),101 which takes the insights of
American Critical Race Feminism into observations of women’s rights globally. Volpp initially
developed her work to combat what she terms domestic conservative (feminist) backlash
scholarship and critiques its construction of culture as the problem of feminism. In that work she
focuses on the liberal and racist discursive move the dominant institutional U.S. feminist
deployment of culture and race entails, and its role in obscuring the real institutional and other
operations of women’s inequality.
Volpp complicates the dominant American feminist representation of patriarchy as a third
world women’s problem, and locates its evocation within earlier, colonial models of progress
which cast a reified binary of modern versus pre-modern. She approaches culture differently
from its traditional implication in the oppression of women and, rather than an over-determined
one-size-fits-all obstacle to their agency, Volpp asks what it would mean to our
conceptualization of feminism and women’s rights if we highlighted culture’s role in support of
women’s ingenuity and as a resource in their active engagement with their own struggles, a point
explored in the work of Leslye Obiora over the course of decades.102
In defense of women’s rights qua women, culture, Volpp contends, is often constructed
as the straw man, belonging only to those outside the metropolitan/cosmopolitan centres whereas
“[t]hose with power appear to have no culture; […]Western subjects are defined by their abilities
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to make choices, in contrast to third world subjects, who are defined by their group-based
determinism”.103 As such, her work provides crucial conceptual clarity to counter the work of
single axis feminism, in terms of both its western liberal democratic manifestations (grounded
primarily in the U.S. context), and in terms of its positioning of non-western subjects globally.
As an early participant in these debates, Orford noted this driving force of feminist international
law as the mission of “white women saving brown women from brown men”.104 While Orford is
best known for her innovations in the history of international law and critical approaches to
international law,105 her early work centred on a critical feminist approach to international law
and international human rights law more specifically, observing “the extent to which feminist
internationalism is haunted by the shades of those 19th-century European feminists …
facilitating empire […]”.106
Orford’s early work in fact can be seen to have laid the groundwork for the methodology
she is now known for; it was through her early critique of mainstream feminist engagements with
international law that she began to “propose alternative methodologies for undertaking the risky
project of reading international law.”107 Risk in this context means a risk of colluding with
structures of power and empire that one is invoking human rights frameworks expressly to resist.
Orford shows concern to scrutinize “the ways in which feminist legal theory is invited to
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participate in the project of constituting women and the international community”, 108 remaking
the world in its own (European) image.
These insights belong generally to the scholarship broadly defined as Critical Race
Feminism. Adrien Katherine Wing109 finds its origins in three distinct schools, Critical Legal
Studies, Critical Race Theory and feminist jurisprudence.110 To this synthesis, Wing adds the
conditioning word “global” in a branch of scholarship that seeks to apply its insights to the
global context: The word “global” implies the embrace of strands from international and
comparative law, global feminism, as well as postcolonial theory.111 The work represents a
broadened application of American Critical Race Feminism; however, GCRF does not engage
the express developments jurisprudentially under the new UN interpretations of race and gender
within the treaty framework. Like Orford’s early work, it seeks to displace white, northern
feminism as the “protagonist” of the international human rights story:
Paying attention only to the protagonists in this drama blinds us to
the way in which the Third World is staged as a backdrop, with a
cast of nameless extras imagined as playing a part they have not
written. A feminist analysis of international law that focuses on
gender alone, without analysing the exploitation of women in the
economic ‘South’, would operate to reinforce the depoliticized
notion of ‘difference’ that founds the privileged position of the
imperial feminist.112
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Global Critical Race Feminism Studies is not the only quarter from which critiques of the
uses put to culture in women’s international human rights emanate. Traditional feminist IHRL
scholars, such as Rikki Holmaat and Jonneke Naber,113 have queried the treaty committee’s
choice to focus on violations as a result of culture and custom, and, in light of the role culture
plays in an impasse of contested rights, they have suggested new avenues to broaden acceptance
of women’s rights by focusing on framing infringements differently.114 As I come to examine the
framing of women’s rights’ violations in the discourse of the treaty committee’s utterances in the
final chapter, I will show that the ghost of this dilemma is far from exorcised, although its
existence is certainly addressed, in part, through the elaboration of an expressly intersectional
approach.
The underlying issues of the intersections that are the focus of intersectionality have long
been the purview of scholars of Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL),115
insisting on writing accounts of international law and its effects based in third world experiences
of them—itself a powerful epistemological and ontological challenge to human rights law116—
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displacing “positivist certainties about the autonomy and inherent justice of international law”.117
Instead, they insist on accounting “for the importance of integrating consideration for the
suffering of Third World peoples, the ongoing perpetuation of economic injustice by
international institutions, and acts of resistance by states and social movements in the South, into
an account of international law’s history as well as its possible futures”.118 Some have
specifically noted the turn to trade-related human rights internationalism, a selective
instrumentalization of human rights’ obligations and values, exposing the fundamental material
interest of western/northern states in human rights that takes precedence over its purported
universalism.119 Put another way, TWAIL has revealed that from a different perspective,
“international law is seen as implicated in the preservation and maintenance of a deeply unjust
global order”.120 More plainly put, law is the “chosen instrument of northern domination”,121
with “(Third World) poverty as, potentially, part of the very genetic programming of
international law”.122
This latter, more deterministic view of the role of international law, is challenged by
Orford’s subtle but profound embellishment of its core insight: that both taking international law
at its word while simultaneously scrutinizing it for its long game of consolidating its own
authority, yields a deeper and more complete view of its operations. From this perspective, IHRL
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can be seen as an instance of the larger project of international authority and governance traced
by Orford. A close cousin to humanitarian intervention, IHRL grounds the ideals of “benevolent
humanitarianism” that come in the package of international law’s valorization of capitalist
cosmopolitanism, and of “free-trade, liberalized economies, informal empire”.123Within this
larger view of the imperial work done through international human rights, the debates over
“culture” play a pivotal discursive role in legitimizing, obfuscating and upholding a worldview
that shores up its perpetuation.
Descending from the lofty heights of theorizing systems of power, and returning to the
activist impetus for engaging human rights in the first place, feminist scholars from the TWAIL
movement, such as Celestine Nyamu, demand a step away from “vague notions of culture”
deployed in international human rights law, and instead call for a nuanced approach to how
“formal legal institutions, culture, and customary practices interact”.124 Ratna Kapur counters
international law’s claims of being the champion of women’s equality rights by showing that in
Nepal, “UN interventions in conflict situations and noises around gender mainstreaming did not
help disrupt deeply entrenched normative assumptions about gender…”.125
Outside the TWAIL discourse, others, such as regional systems scholar Fareda Banda,126
and minority rights scholars, such as Patrick Thornberry127 and Alexandra Xanthaki,128 have also
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attended to the intersections of multiple grounds of discrimination. Observers of religious rights
in human rights, Nazila Ghanea-Hercock129 and Ayelet Shachar,130 also concern themselves with
the intersections of gender, minority status, and freedom of religion and belief, so often conflated
with culture; all these scholars attend to intersections in rights discourse and protections without
the banner of intersectionality necessarily branding their work. As we will explore below,
religious or believing women are arguably the most impacted by perceived impasses between
culture or FORB and human rights, impasses that an intersectional approach true to its insights
will have to reckon with. Queer critical culture theorists, like Jasbir K. Puar, argue from a
different but related perspective “for new directions in cultural studies that critically reassess the
use of intersectional models”.131
Informed by the insights of the work of Volpp, Orford, Nyamu and the other scholars
engaged above, women’s rights as a subcategory of human rights is exposed as being posited
frequently in teleological tension with the West. In this formulation, only westernization will
drag women’s equality behind in its wake.132 Thus, resistance to this further attempt at perceived
colonization pits feminists from the Global South in opposition to culture and as apologists for
the last colonizing outreach of the Enlightenment.133 This framing of women’s rights entails the
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reification of each term—gender and culture—and assigns the two protections to the
philosophical polarities of universal and particular, western and non-western, respectively. The
insights from this work allow us to see that the human rights discourse—and its development of
protections—despite the adoption of intersectionality, will continue to struggle with a
conceptualization of gender as essential, and unaffected, except in negative ways, by cultural and
other differences. Halley et al point out that adequate reflection on the intersections that
complicate notions of gender protections implicated in global and intra- feminist power
structures is crucial, to keep “feminist fingerprints” on governance projects.134 Otherwise,
“women benefit differentially”, and “some are [thereby] harmed”.135 They point out that
“transforming a feminist idea into law”,136
can consolidate a particularistic identity-based project, sometimes
at the expense of alternative affiliations. It can respond to more
general discursive or strategic demands making victimization and
identity the prerequisites for legal intelligibility and leave behind
questions about the costs of these formations.137

As Puar’s call for reassessment above articulates, intersectionality is ripe for resistance to
“prematurely settling”138 its understanding of these affiliations, particularly with respect to
LGBT rights. In the context of the Secretary-General of the United Nations’ endorsement of
LGBT rights,139 the frequent articulation of the resistance to these rights as couched in the
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language of culture and religious rights, and CEDAW’s updated definition of intersectionality140
as expressly extending gender protections to be “inextricably linked with … sexual orientation
and gender identity”141 (which we explore in detail in Chapters III and IV), means that the
literature on critical LGBT international human rights deserves some attention here. This is not a
primary focus of my work, but I enter these debates, as they are relevant to framing
intersectionality’s story at CEDAW. A brief summary of their status as rights follows below, in
order to situate the critical examination of intersectionality demanded by transnational queer
theory.

1.5.1 Critical intersectionality and LGBT rights
The articulation and protection of LGBT rights in international human rights law relies on
express intersectional approaches to existing rights—most recently, as part of an expanded
definition of gender protections at CEDAW and elsewhere—since LGBT rights are, unlike race
(ICERD),142 disability (CRPD),143 women’s (CEDAW)144 and children’s rights (CRC),145 not
secured through protections named in a discreet treaty.146 In the strictly legal sense they are, in
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fact, more like the rights to FORB, against which they are most often pitted, than other identity
rights, in that they are not subject to separate treaty protection but dependent on the contested
definition(s) of existing and aspirational protections.147 I will explore this in some more detail in
the chapters that follow. At this stage, the questions raised in the literature I have reviewed invite
exploration as to how it is that as a group of protections, LGBT rights have become a lightning
rod for wider debates about the globalization of culture and identities. The commentary in this
area has begun to move from a plain assertion or denial of LGBT rights as a legitimate concern
of IHRL to a more nuanced account of the politicization of these rights, and specifically of the
essentially political, rather than cultural work they do through the battles mounted for and
against them. Puar’s wide-ranging work in particular, has opened a complex reflection on the
operations of these protections and invites scrutiny of intersectionality’s potential role in
accounting for both the identity affiliations and protections claimed and contested, as well as the
structural and conditioning elements to the work these rights do in the global context we have
been referencing.
Puar asks:
What are the historical linkages between various periods of national crisis and the
pathologizing of sexuality, the inflation of sexual perversions? What are the
heteronormative assumptions still binding the fields and disciplines of security and
surveillance analyses, peace and conflict studies, terrorism research, public policy,
transnational finance net- works, human rights and human security blueprints, and
international peacekeeping organizations such as the United Nations?148
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Her work is concerned ultimately with “a very specific production of terrorist bodies
against properly queer subjects,”149 and offers a self-professed “new paradigm for the
theorization of race and sexuality”.150 As such, it falls outside the scope of the project at hand. To
get there, however, her work is self-consciously and deliberately disruptive, demanding a
“deeper exploration of these connections among sexuality, race, gender, nation, class, and
ethnicity in relation to the tactics, strategies, and logistics of war machines.”151 It therefore has
insights that respond to Crenshaw’s invitation, quoted above, to move beyond the original binary
of race and gender to make intersectionality relevant “to people who are subject to all of these
things”.152 Significantly, it places the discussion of LGBT rights in the context of global power
relations. For this reason, “[i]t is an invitation to take stock of the inclusions and exclusions—the
upsides and the downsides—across their full range”,153 of what and how intersectionality’s
promises transmit in these complex environments. Puar’s work warns of
the powerful emergence of the disciplinary queer (liberal,
homonormative, diasporic) subject into the bountiful market and
the interstices of state benevolence—that is, into the statistical fold
that produces appropriate digits and facts toward the population’s
optimization of life and the ascendancy of whiteness: full-fledged
regulatory queer subjects and the regularization of deviancy.154
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The brilliance of this disruptive work shines clearly on the intersections of governance and
LGBT rights as they boomerang across global governance mechanisms and movements. These
issues are taken up in a more linear fashion and in direct relationship to the mechanisms we are
aiming to focus on, by others writing on global LGBT matters.
Of particular note in the literature is Meredith L. Weiss and Michael J. Bosia’s anthology,
Global Homophobia: States Movements and the Politics of Oppression.155 The work complicates
the polarized debate about the extent of the intersections of human rights protections, and their
place in globalization, with a sophisticated and critical take on the terrain that owes much to
Puar’s formulation. Specifically, the volume,
considers political homophobia as purposeful, especially as
practiced by state actors; as embedded in the scapegoating of an
‘other’ that drives processes of state building and retrenchment; as
the product of transnational influence peddling and alliances; and
as integrated into questions of collective identity and the
complicated legacies of colonialism.156

According to this critique of the mobilization of international human rights, it is often the
politicization of domestic battles that drives the international agenda on this topic, provoking
Bosia’s “radically obvious question,” namely, “tossing aside elusive dichotomies … [w]hy do
state actors embrace homophobic policies and rhetoric”?157 His answer weaves a nuanced view
that eschews the oft-proffered reasoning of culture and tradition as the bulwark against the
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extension of rights. This language of culture and tradition which, as I explore further in the
chapter following, is also the language of CEDAW, and serves to mask the interplay between
internal state weakness, external pressure and globalization in the choices states make to employ
homophobia as a state practice:
It is neither profitable nor demonstrable to claim that state actors
are constrained or compelled to adopt some form of state
homophobia as ‘the same end’ because of personal belief, the
traditions of the past, or the emergence of LGBT demands. Instead,
the power and “will” of the state is such that these policies and
rhetorics can create, refashion, and impose tradition or identity
rather than merely reflect them.158

A more nuanced approach asks, what is “the work done by homophobia in periods of
instability or uncertainty”,159 and the answer proffered by Bosia fits with the approaches I traced
in critical international human rights law scholarship, which place current conflicts and the
development of rights within the shadow of empire and the extension of current global authority.
What Bosia terms “State homophobia” arises in times of violent conflict, resulting in his
analysis, from profound changes in the international system, where “processes of sovereignty
and belonging are in question and an emergent national security apparatus seeks to reestablish
authority”.160 Making clear the intersection between the operations of violence against women as
gender-based violence, and state homophobia, Bosia’s work explores how “state actors, their
proxies, and their allies use homophobic repression as a tool for the reconstitution of belonging,
not only as ethnic cleansing through expulsion and sexual assault, but in the ways brutal
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sexualized and gendered violence affirms authority within.”161 Bosia additionally traces how
ongoing pressures—such as those posed through structural adjustment policies and cyclical
crises embedded within globalization, or emanating from allies or competitors—present state
homophobia as a convenient tool for the “affirmation of rule,” through the deployment of
“prosecution and condemnation as improvisational strategies introducing very public discussions
of sexual differentiation”.162
Once thus mobilized, Bosia points to the work done by “neo-colonial networks that
reinforce the imposition of sexual repression and the full articulation of an LGBT scapegoat
within a Western sexual binary”.163 International Human Rights Law does complex work in this
context: LGBT rights could be seen as an approximate, live version of the controversial entry
into the human rights family that women’s rights once represented,164 and, likewise for these
activists in both the Global South,165 Muslim majority countries,166 and in the human rights
NGOs based in the North167 or West,168 human rights discourse, to repeat Sally Merry’s
assessment, represents “the major global approach to social justice”.169 In the same move, as a
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frame of reference, IHRL can excite State repression based on fears that it counters
“heteronormativity”, with “homonormativity”,170 that is, extends the binary and fixed western
view of sexuality that requires a particular performance of identity that complies with known
definitions and protections, “as if sexual minorities everywhere claim the same rights that define
LGBT organizing in only an handful of countries”.171 These identities are then refracted through
a house of identity mirrors that distort, amplify and reflect the layers of imposition from the
colonial to the neoliberal.
Religious approbation of “native” sexualities now inform post-colonial states,172 who
mobilize colonial tropes as nation building essentialism in order to resist internal and external
political and economic threats.173 At the same time, powerful states in which rights have
allegedly been achieved, deploy what Christine Keating in the same volume calls,
“homoprotectionism,” which likewise, serves to “foster alliances that serve to bolster state
power”.174 State homophobia and state homoprotectionism can be deployed simultaneously to
this end; and both, Keating argues, are serving to legitimize “political authority both on a
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national and on a transnational scale”.175 To Keating it is clear that both state homophobia and
homoprotectionism are “deeply linked to and embedded in inequitable global relations of
power,” and the related systems of “colonialism, neocolonialism, and capitalist globalization”.176
Simultaneously, current deliberate western (mostly American) religious fundamentalists export a
virulent homophobia that serves their (governance) projects at home.177 Puar articulates this in
relation to the spectre of the terrorist, and the manipulation of queerness, terror and the need for
national security: “…sites of queer struggle in Europe—Britain, the Netherlands—have
articulated Muslim populations as an especial threat to LGBTIQ persons, organizations,
communities, and spaces of congregation.178 Her work goes on to trace the
emergence of a global political economy of queer sexualities
that—framed through the notion of the ‘‘ascendancy of
whiteness’’—repeatedly coheres whiteness as a queer norm and
straightness as a racial norm.179
The role of an intersectional approach to international human rights can only work if its
bounds extend to be able to account for the work it does in this highly charged, militarized and
yet phantasmagoric context. Following suit, the clarity of analysis in Weiss and Bosia’s work
and throughout their edited collection, demonstrates that homophobia, despite its frequent
articulation in terms of religion and culture, is “not as some deep-rooted, perhaps religiously
inflected sentiment, nor as everywhere a response to overt provocation, but [is] a conscious
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political strategy often unrelated to substantial local demands for political rights.”180 Both
intellectually and strategically, the push/pull between the binary of rights and religion sidesteps
and distracts from this fundamental purpose of the contest. Neither uniform applications of IHRL
to LGBT people, nor invocations of both false and misunderstood religious rights get us closer to
an intersectional understanding of their interrelation and implication in the various global power
struggles and security agendas that invoke them.
As we will see in the chapters that follow, the intersectional protections named in the
CEDAW Committee’s newest interpretations of its treaty articles include sexual orientation,
gender identity and religious belief as intersecting grounds of states’ obligations to gender
protection. These same intersections are likewise named in the first comprehensive commentary
on the international protections based on FORB.181 In the view of its authors, “there is serious
risk that women belonging to discriminated religious communities fail to benefit from any antidiscriminatory measures”,182 and, singling out the intersection of this with sexual orientation,
they point out that the human rights protections include a right to an LGBT person’s “freedom of
thought, conscious, and religion”.183
In this context, it is crucial not to overstate the dichotomy between the rights, to
understand the precise nature of the rights themselves, and to understand the intersectional
applications of them that seek to protect the most vulnerable, who are not served by
grandstanding and the spectacle of inaccurate polarities. In their Commentary, Bielefeldt, Ghanea
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and Weiner invoke intersectionality as a frame of reference for understanding this complex area
of rights, and, to some extent, for seeking a truce between their claims and counter claims,
without wishing to deny the “reality of conflicting human rights concerns”.184 Looking at similar
matters as they play out in cases where women seek protection at the intersection with culture
and religion, Pok Yin S. Chow has observed that even within the bodies that administer the
intersectional treaty protections named above, “the binary logic adopted by the treaty bodies is
that it denies that women who engage in or consent to certain cultural practices are legitimate
participants in culture or religious life”.185 As a result, he has concluded that “intersectionality”
does not consistently assist decision makers to understand the “ambivalence” women may hold
toward aspects of their cultures and religions in the context of exercising their rights based on
both religion and gender.186
Chow’s work is an important advancement of the discussion of intersectionality in human
rights contexts. At the same time, his study of intersectionality moves freely between CEDAW,
across EU and UK human rights protections, and, within an overall concern with the limitations
of an exclusively legal approach to culture and religion. It therefore does not concern itself with
the nuances in intersectionality’s development and deployment at CEDAW that I trace in the
chapters that follow.
Nonetheless, the work that follows is indebted to all these scholars and their insights. The
sheer variety of critical scholarship, which challenges law’s relationship to culture, feminism’s

184

Bielefeldt, Ghanea & Wiener, supra note 129 at 371.
Pok Yin S Chow, Cultural Rights in International Law and Discourse Contemporary Challenges and
Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Leiden Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2018) at 217.
186
Pok Yin S Chow, “Has Intersectionality Reached its Limits? Intersectionality in the UN Human Rights Treaty
Body Practice and the Issue of Ambivalence” (2016) 16:3 Hum Rights Law Rev 453.
185

50
relationship to law, and law and feminism’s relationship to plurality, serves to enrich the goals of
intersectionality’s variously articulated projects. In keeping with this, I engage the works
variously of Merry,187 who brings insights from legal anthropology, and its deep understanding
of the contested nature of culture and its interactions with law; Orford, who begins in an express
struggle with feminist international law188 and develops a critical legal theory and methodology
that shapes the insights discussed here;189 and Volpp, whose work decentres the white
protagonist of feminism and the distorted view of multiculturalism that conflates patriarchy with
third world culture.190 Much of this work, however, was published either before or
contemporaneously with the important and express development of the CEDAW Committee’s
own reorientation to take stock of such critiques and provide new guidance to its deliberations
through the adoption of intersectionality, and for the most part, it does not concern itself with
these developments. The scholarship I have explored in this chapter could therefore benefit from
dialogue with this new terrain, just as the governance aims of this new terrain calls out for the
insights of this critical scholarship.
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Since intersectionality derives in large part from a theoretical and philosophical basis,
and arises in international human rights legal discourse and authoritative texts at a particular
juncture in relation to politics and world events, understanding that context, as demonstrated by
the work of Puar as well as Bosia and Weiss is of vital importance to a more complete account of
the role of intersectionality in international human rights law. This method of tracing
intersectionality follows from the observation that “[f]or lawyers seeking to take responsibility
for engaging with the practice of the discipline and for its present politics, it is useful to grasp the
practice of theorizing as itself historically situated and existing in relation to particular concrete
situations”.191 Following this lead, in the chapters that follow, I strive to subject intersectionality
to the same scrutiny others have applied to various international legal concepts in the works here
explored, that is, to “pay close attention to the interventions that particular theories make and the
context in which they were first presented”.192

1.6 What lies ahead
Feminist engagements with international law are often characterized in cheerful tones 193
as a progression in which a direct line between The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,194
CEDAW,195 The Beijing Platform196 and international criminal protections against sexual
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violence in the context of genocide and war is charted.197 The arrival of LGBT rights can now be
added to this canon. And while this dissertation tracks the rise of intersectionality as a partial
answer to the call to join critical international law’s overt concern “with critically theorizing
about international law with a view to its transformation”,198 it also acknowledges that feminist
gains in international law are also sometimes “the product of despair about the apparent
imperviousness of international law to feminist perspectives”.199 The trick is, rather than
adopting the mantel of the outsider’s remoteness from the effects of formal governance power,
on account of this perceived “exclusion”, their work guides a desire to acknowledge that “[t]o
engage governance…is to make use of force”.200 This requires that we not be guided solely by
the moment of despair, but develop a stance of what Halley et al have termed “engaged
ambivalence”201 towards the governance project of feminism. In their view, “[t]his stance is quite
the opposite of deeply at odds with rhetorical renunciation of all feminist will to power”.202 But it
does require us “to think anew about engaging directly with power”.203 Critical insight can lead
to “renunciation”, as the more deterministic moments of TWAILian insight explored above
suggest.
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Orford’s work builds on TWAIL’s insights, stating that TWAIL “argues that imperialism
must still be thought of as part of international law,” but gestures to its limits when she persists
to demand, “the question is how”?204 Orford indicates dissatisfaction with the spectre of a onesize-fits-all response to the meaning and purpose of each new twist in international law, such as
observing a phenomena as merely a “Trojan Horse” for political intervention.205 In partial
response to this risk of imprecision, Orford’s own method entreats international legal scholars,
“rather than [focussing on] the study of disembodied structures, even abstractions”,206 instead to
concern themselves with “the relation between the symbolic and the material dimensions of
authority and of law”,207 and these practices as the concept I have proffered throughout this
chapter, as international authority’s consciousness of itself. In short, this means paying attention
to what law claims about its own operations.
Orford’s work reminds us that legal method trains us to “make a plausible argument
about why a particular case should be treated as a binding precedent, or why it should be
distinguished as having no bearing on the present”.208 This method of creating precedent and
building law from it, is also the structure and process of the international human rights treaty
bodies; in the case of the treaties, the committees charged with administering the obligations
under the treaties build on their prior de facto decisions to create guidance for the future
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interpretation of states’ obligations under the treaty document: this has been characterized as a
“broad remedial approach to interpretation”.209
The sheer proliferation of scholarship investigating intersectionality begs the question of
the reason for its ubiquity. Along with Chow’s declarative query as to whether intersectionality
has reached its limits noted above, others have gone on to ask if the idea of an intersection is the
“right analogy”,210 if we have reached a time to move “beyond” it,211 or if it has come to rely too
much on “identities” and “recognition”, to the detriment of challenging structural inequality and
calling for redistribution,212 or if in Puar’s sense, it requires a critical reassessment of
intersectional models, keeping watch for “global forces of securitization, counterterrorism, and
nationalism”.213 It seems that the sweeping claims of intersectionality have prompted the
accusation that it does not prove its grandiosity through its merits:214 as deployed outside of law,
intersectionality has been accused of being a “project of limitless scope and limited promise”;215
within law, it can likewise be accused of doing the work of liberalism’s optimistic reform,216
narrowly and naively “explaining to the law its mistaken assumptions, [and believing this] will
lead the law/state to a consciousness of its omissions and to rational change”.217
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There is some evidence that the sophistication of intersectionality’s theoretical forms, or
more pointedly its most radical potential, is at best ill understood, and, at worst, undermined by
the legal domestic orders in which it has been deployed and subsequently evaluated by
academics.218 Can the exploration of the international field augment this record with a more fluid
and potent antidote to law’s need to order, discipline and restrict, ultimately advancing the
project of feminism’s ambivalent engagement with law? Importantly, can it allow feminism to
remain armed with some of the self-administered critiques of its own project of reform and
radicalization, as explored here?
There is a conceit at the centre of feminism’s engagement with the promise of
intersectionality, namely that feminism is adequately self-reflective to responsibly manage the
aporia between aspiration and real-world structures and legacies at the centre of all engagement
with the potential of human rights law. In Halley et al’s terms, this is the central risk of
governance feminism and its will to power. Intersectionality at times appears to lay claim to
being able to attend to and detail the imperial foundations of modern international law that
concern Orford and drive my exploration here. At times, it also gestures to “the multiple
trajectories by which that imperialist history can be linked to the ongoing failures of international
law to respond meaningfully to the demands for inclusion made by states and peoples of the
developing world”.219 It appears as a hope and a promise of intersectionality that insight can be
an inoculation against the repetition of the problems of international law, even as we engage its

218

Toni Williams, “Intersectionality Analysis in the Sentencing of Aboriginal Women in Canada: What Difference
Does it Make?” in Emily Grabham et al, eds, Intersect Law Power Polit Locat, Social justice (Abingdon, England)
(Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009) 79.
219
Buchanan, supra note 118 at 446.

56
terms and foundations. It remains an open question that requires constant reflection as to how to
radically transform social relations through engagement in the present restrictive terms of law,
without either abandoning the possibility of change or falling prey to law as technique and
sentinel to the status quo.
Anne Orford warns of the foundational fault line in legal scholarship—that of a practicebased approach, “premised on unarticulated theories”.220 My work attempts to unearth and
articulate the theories that animate decision-making at the international level, particularly the
uses intersectionality is put to at CEDAW. I am guided by an “endeavour to link theory to
practice, and a search for ways to practice theory” that Orford finds “pervasive” among those
who engage the law.221 This quest is conditioned by a skeptical optimism, and a hope not fully
supported by the existing record, for a “more egalitarian, inclusive, peaceful, just and
redistributive international order”.222 In other language, I approach intersectionality as a form of
praxis that its deployment at CEDAW shows promise of evidencing. At its most ambitious,
intersectionality can be seen to do the work of the aborted grand theory projects of earlier
feminist scholarship, which tried to marry Marxism and feminism with the insights of anti-racist
movements; in the view of Joanne Conaghan, it does not inherit this legacy gracefully.223 Kathi
Weeks summarizes the loss of the grander terrain of feminism’s aims as a stripping of context, in
which “we end up with an impoverished model of the subject, that overestimates its capacities
for self-creation and self-transformation”,224 or conversely, see her as over-determined and
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without agency.225 In this critique, intersectionality emerges as a thin stand-in for the full critical
consideration of the structures of inequality and social transformation at the heart of feminist
engagements with law. Conaghan summarizes this transformational impulse in feminism as the
standard against which intersectionality must be measured:
feminist legal engagement is a practical activity designed to
engender, directly or indirectly, socially transformative processes
and effects. In this, it may be understood as part of broader
feminist commitment to praxis, that is, to the convergence of
theory and practice, a productive coming together of thought and
action, ideas and strategies, scholarship and politics. It is, I would
contend, against this standard that the value of intersectionality, as
a theoretical and strategic approach, should be measured.226

It is possible that the continued appeal of intersectionality as a theoretical project
represents “a dose of academic feminist guilt for having ‘abandoned’ the activist field”. 227 It
may represent nostalgia for what Weeks calls the “project of totality” (as distinct in her work
from a totalizing theory).228 Crenshaw herself resists this grand narrative of intersectionality’s
life outside her work, provocatively narrowing the use of the concept to the original employment
law context in which she first introduced it:
Some people look to intersectionality as a grand theory of
everything, but that’s not my intention. If someone is trying to
think about how to explain to the courts why they should not
dismiss a case made by black women, just because the employer
did hire blacks who were men and women who were white, well,
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that’s what the tool was designed to do. If it works, great. If it
doesn’t work, it’s not like you have to use this concept.229

Victoria Browne wonders why we gave up theorizing patriarchy for greener post-modern
pastures.230 I end this chapter, therefore, in a similar manner to how I began it, by noting that
taking intersectionality as a starting point, despite extensive exploration of its evocation, does not
necessarily clarify the theoretical terrain one is on. As we will discover in the chapters ahead, nor
does it necessarily provide guidance as to the correct intersectional approach to concrete
situations. Toni Williams’ work on the deployment of intersectionality as an incomplete
recognition of Indigenous women’s social realities reveals the problematic neutrality of an
intersectional approach when it becomes a tool of law and policy.231 This is in line with what
Crenshaw calls the “problem of complexity”, in that, “intersectionality can get used as a blanket
term to mean, “‘[w]ell, it’s complicated.’ [And that s]ometimes, ‘It’s complicated’ is an excuse
not to do anything”.232 In this sense, an intersectional analysis of subject positions “need not
even be particularly critical or used to improve the lives of targeted groups”.233
Jennifer C. Nash, like Puar, although in quite different ways, speaks of the necessity of a
reform to intersectionality in order that it continue to “grapple with the messiness of
subjectivity”,234 a messiness surely augmented by the works explored above. At the same time,
just as its sun appears to be setting, Grabham warns against moving away from intersectionality
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“without careful thought”.235 Kathy Davis has argued that it was the alleged weaknesses of the
concept, “its ambiguity and open-endedness that were the secrets to its success and, more
generally, make it a good feminist theory”.236 Nevertheless, after accounting for all its
embellishments and detractions, can it help make good law? In pursuing this question in the
chapters that follow, I seek to trace “the vital connection between practical innovation,
theoretical elaboration, and social transformation, both in relation to the political
instrumentalization of theory in practice and in the search for a critical practice of international
law in its different articulations”.237 The connective tissue of this search in the case of
intersectionality lies in CEDAW, which, as both text and committee, grounds the historical,
normative, discursive, institutional and practical application of the concept, giving us a view of
its conditions, limitations and operations as law.

1.7 Conclusion
In the chapters that follow, I engage Orford’s methodology to trace the development of
women’s rights at the UN in the “shadow of empire”, its normative and textual advances and
limitations, and the structure of the treaty body system, to comprehend the fertility of the milieu
intersectionality is proposed within, and the work it is observed to be doing. The guidance on
intersectionality that now characterizes the treaty system, explored in further chapters, arose out
of a legacy of contestation at the heart of the meanings, situations and projects attributed to
women and gender in all its intersections as I have explored above. The mechanisms I will

235

Grabham et al, supra note 11 at 15.
K Davis, “Intersectionality as Buzzword: A Sociology of Science Perspective on What Makes a Feminist Theory
Successful” (2008) 9:1 Fem Theory 67.
237
Orford, Hoffmann & Clark, supra note 19.
236

60
explore in the international human rights realm that have engaged these debates now provide
jurisprudential heft to the deliberations and exchanges among and between various UN
institutions, NGOs, and women activists from the Global South at public forums238 and through
the academy.239 Collins and Bilge,240 Henne,241 Merry,242 Nazela Ghanea,243 Johanna Bond,244
Nila Yuval-Davis245 and more recently, Pok Yin S. Chow246 are among the few scholars who
variously reference or engage overtly with the “intersectional turn” in the international human
rights context. Meghan Campbell and Sandra Fredman tackle this advance head-on in their
crucial work on intersectionality’s interpretation and potential as a form of legal practice.247 The
analysis I have just conducted on the scholarly contemplations of intersectionality will serve to
help to scrutinize the how the promise of intersectionality traverses the road from critique to
technique, and I will return to the challenges and advances in the conceptualization of
intersectionality throughout what follows.
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2 Transmissions: The Institutional, Textual and Normative
Grounding of Women’s International Human Rights at
CEDAW
We the peoples of the United Nations determined, to save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in
our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of
nations large and small, and […] to employ international
machinery for the promotion of the economic and social
advancement of all peoples, [….]248
Promotion of human rights is a widely accepted goal[.] … Further,
it is one of the few concepts that speaks to the need for
transnational activism and concern with the lives of people
globally. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in
1948, symbolizes this world vision and defines human rights
broadly. While not much is said about women, Article 2 entitles all
to “the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.” Eleanor Roosevelt and the Latin
American women who fought for the inclusion of sex in the
Declaration and for its passage clearly intended that it would
address the problem of women's subordination.249
It would seem that the creation of specialized machinery and
procedures is necessary in order to ensure that the human rights
codified in international instruments are interpreted and applied in
such a way that women are guaranteed their full enjoyment.250
Building on the Universal Declaration, women’s movements
appropriated the universally agreed language of human rights and
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transformed the international human rights framework to address
their concerns. The evolution of women’s history, especially since
1970s, has revealed the commonalities and the global
connectedness of women’s local resistance. The United Nations
provided a platform for women to network and integrate the
common elements of this history into the work of the Organization,
which has resulted in the growth of a well-established gender
equality and women’s rights regime. Most important in this regard
is the adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women (1979) by the General
Assembly.251
Although the Universal Declaration in its own terms guarantees the
enjoyment of human rights without gender distinction, the rights of
women and the specific circumstances under which women suffer
human rights abuses have in the past been framed as different from
the classic vision of human rights abuse and therefore marginal
within a human rights regime that aspired toward universal
application. This universalism, however, was firmly grounded in
the experiences of men.252

2.1 Introduction
To establish the ground and potential of intersectionality as an approach to women’s
rights within international human rights law, it is necessary to trace the institutional, instrumental
and normative grounding for its adoption in the human rights approaches of CEDAW,253 both as
treaty and treaty body. The CEDAW is seen as the principal instrument for the delineation and
protection of women’s human rights; it is often referred to as the “Women’s Charter”. But it was
a relative latecomer to the first generation of human rights254 and although it has made some
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significant breaks from the established order, its genesis is also shaped by preexisting norms and
approaches, making it a conflicted and contested terrain for the establishment of an intersectional
approach to human rights protections.255 In this section we will explore the legality, normativity
and institutional drivers in the framing of CEDAW, highlighting its potential for the elaboration
of intersectionality.

2.2 Before CEDAW
Women’s rights have been explicit in the UN family of human rights since its founding
human rights document, the Charter of the United Nations (The Charter, 1945), affirming the
“equal rights of men and women” and prohibiting discrimination on the basis of “race, sex,
language and religion”.256 This was followed closely by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR, 1948),257 which, although rife with indications of faux universality through
references to “mankind” and “brotherhood”,258 names sex as a prohibited ground for
“distinction” in the granting of its enumerated rights and freedoms. The important scholarship
that distinguishes sex from gender was not yet in currency; a shift in attribution of characteristics
from sex (biology, immutable) to gender (socially assigned, changeable) was only brought into
the official framework of women’s human rights after the creation of CEDAW, in 1979 (adopted
1981).259
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Although CEDAW retains the language of “sex”, it is infused with the implicit
conceptual transition to gender through its mandate of cultural change in the assignment of
gender attributes.260 In General Comment (GC) 25, CEDAW moves explicitly to the use of
“social construction” as the approach that guides its work and accounting of gender, pointedly
referencing it as a “social stratifier”, on par with “race, class, ethnicity, sexuality and age”.261
Certainly the explicit deployment of “gender” drives the examination of rights under the treaty,
according to its members. 262 In GC 25, gender appears alongside, rather than enmeshed with
other social stratifiers, such as we might expect to see in later expressly intersectional
approaches.
Lars Adam Rehof, the scholar of CEDAW’s documentary origins (referred to as the
traveaux preperatoires), traces elements of international protections for women as far back as
1904, when early iterations of anti-human trafficking instruments were being developed.263 That
the preeminent traveaux scholar marks this as the first instance of women’s distinctly articulated
international human rights, alerts us to a genesis story embedded in Victorian-era anxiety about
prostitution and the fight against so-called “white slavery”.264 One official history of this thread

260

Riki Holtmaat & Jonneke M M Naber, Women’s human rights and culture: from deadlock to dialogue
(Cambridge [England]: Intersentia, 2011) at 56.
261
General recommendation No. 25, on article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, on temporary special measures (Adopted at the Thirtieth Session of the Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 2004[GR 25]) at para 6.
262
Frances Raday, “Culture, Religion, and CEDAW’s Article 5(A) in Beate Schopp-Schilling & Flinterman” in
Beate Schopp-Schilling, ed, Circ Empower Twenty-Five Years UN Comm Elimin Discrim Women (The Feminist
Press, 2007) 68 at 69.
263
Lars Adam Rehof, Guide to the Travaux Préparatoires of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993) at 369.
264
Kristiina Kangaspunta, “A Short History of Trafficking Persons”, online: UNICRI Freedom Fear
<http://f3magazine.unicri.it/?p=281> She writes: “In Europe, white slavery was discussed at a conference organized
in Paris in 1895, followed by similar conferences in London and Budapest in 1899. International Conferences
against white slavery were organized in Paris in 1899 and in 1902. In 1904 an International Agreement for the

65
in IHRL credits the use of the term “slavery” as purposely evocative of the Abolitionist
movement’s increasing success at halting the global slave trade in Africans.265
To many feminists of colour, these analogies to specific historic suffering of others as
metaphor are an indication of the foundational racism inherent in dominant women’s rights
discourses.266 Perhaps it is no surprise that women’s international human rights shares a pedigree
as well as inherent value framing with many other official documents of this era.267 It adopts a
posture of colonial shock at the ‘barbarism’ of ‘other’ cultures, and by analogy, draws
comparison to the assumed ‘slavery’ of women in prostitution. In this sense, European women’s
emerging sense of injustice is embedded in what has been referred to elsewhere as an agenda of
“social cleansing” of “undesirables” at home, and conquest of “the uncivilized” abroad.268
The title of the early international anti-human trafficking agreement Rehof refers to as
foundational to women’s international human rights makes no attempt to hide an exclusive
concern for white, European and North American women. In this sense, women’s rights emerge
on the international scene with a set of preoccupations that affirms the role of protective
mechanisms to ensure the rightful place of a particular view of white, middle class European and
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North American womanhood. These limitations in the early vision of protections as essentially
paternalistic, Eurocentric and class bound are certainly not limited to women’s rights within the
international human rights arena;269 nevertheless they foreshadow the ghostly appearance of
similar concerns in the women’s rights documents we explore below.
In addition to this trajectory of protections, the Convention of the Political Rights of
Women, 1953,270 pre-dated the International Convention of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR,
1966),271 marking a forward-thinking commitment to women’s formal civil and political rights.
In addition, various committees and sub-committees, special rapporteurs and specialized
agencies, such as the Sub-Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) of the Commission on
Human Rights, were charged with addressing women’s political equality, civil equality, and
subsequently, social and economic equality. Between 1952 and 1962, the CSW sponsored a total
of three international conventions, two of which, The Convention on the Nationality of Married
Women272 and The Convention on the Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and
Registration of Marriage,273 signaled a departure from the strict parameters of civil and political
rights by delving into the sphere of family law as it limited civil and political rights. In 1962, the
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) initiated a long-term vision and program with
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respect to the advancement of women’s rights,274 with the establishment of CEDAW’s closest
relative and most important antecedent, the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women (DEDAW),275 being one of its most significant outcomes.
Notwithstanding critiques of their effectiveness, DEDAW, together with the earlier
development of political rights, show that a spectrum of rights for women had been enumerated
prior to CEDAW. In political science terms—and of particular import to the emerging women’s
movement campaigning around the slogan “the personal is political”—these enumerated rights
crossed the traditional barrier between public and private concerns going back to the Greeks; 276 a
bifurcation seen through emerging feminist analysis as a cornerstone of patriarchal social
relations.277 The Convention on Eliminating all forms of Discrimination Against Women,
building on DEDAW, arguably takes human rights farthest into the private sphere of all the
treaties, finding in Ms. A.T. v Hungary that: “[w]omen’s human rights to life and to physical and
mental integrity cannot be superseded by other rights, including the right to property and the
right to privacy”.278 In GC 28, the Committee articulates this as a warning to states: “Article 2
also imposes a due diligence obligation on States parties to prevent discrimination by private
actors. In some cases, a private actor’s acts or omission of acts may be attributed to the State

274

Lars Adam Rehof, Guide to the Travaux Préparatoires of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993).
275
Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, A/RES/2263(XXII) (22nd Session [DEDAW],
1967).
276
Arendt, supra note 1.
277
‘The personal is political’ emphasized that the protection of women’s rights required understanding the role of the
private sphere in codifying women’s inequality, and the need to scrutinize the private sphere through responses at
the political/public/legal level. See Patricia Jagentowicz Mills, Woman, Nature, and Psyche (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1987).
278
AT v. Hungary, CEDAW/C/36/D/2/2003 (2005), para 9.3.

68
under international law”.279 This “due diligence principle” has become the cornerstone and
rallying cry for a number of global women’s rights organizations seeking legal sanction for
failures of state protection in cases of domestic violence.280 While its legal enforceability,
explored further below, remains tenuous at best, this principle in international human rights law
emboldens and gives focus to women’s rights activists who continue to experience state
complacency or even complicity in the forms of violence that women experience in the privacy
of their intimate relationships.281
In a further elaboration of this principle, the Committee provides a compendium of its
meaning and legal authority in its 2017 update to the obligations of States parties with respect to
what it now refers to as gender-based violence.282 Here the Committee asserts that the obligation
of due diligence “underpins the treaty as a whole”, and that “failures or omissions constitute
human rights violations”.283 CEDAW thus extends the range of states’ obligations with respect to
protection of women’s rights into both the private sphere and over non-state actors. In
international human rights law terms, CEDAW’s elaboration of women’s rights has pushed
beyond the so-called “first generation”, strictly civil and political rights, to incorporate “second
generation” social, economic and cultural rights, finding the former curtailed within family
arrangements and general cultural norms.
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Women’s rights, and CEDAW in particular, have tended to “suffer from the brunt of
international skepticism toward ‘second generation rights’”.284 While canonical commentators
hold that the schism and the resultant hierarchy between civil and political rights on the one
hand, and economic, social cultural rights on the other, has been overcome in IHRL generally,285
CEDAW, as a treaty comprised of a blend of both types of rights, continues to experience
resistance from commentators and states for simultaneously extending too far into proscriptive
admonishments that infringe on state’s right to social policy self-determination;286 for not
adhering to the proper scope of IHRL qua law;287 and for being a program so broad it is “not
realistic”.288
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2.2.1 A mandate to broaden the provision and protection of women’s
human rights
Prior to CEDAW, the UN’s approach to women’s rights had been informed by classically
liberal legal preoccupations with respect to the de jure or black letter aspects of law, “to raise the
status of women, irrespective of nationality, race, language or religion, to equality with men in
all fields of human enterprise, and to eliminate all discrimination against women in the
provisions of statutory law, in legal maxims or rules, or in interpretation of customary law”.289
The famous United Nations Economic and Social Council Resolution 75(v), which had declared
that the then Commission on Human Rights had “no power to take any action with regard to any
complaints concerning human rights”, was accompanied by a parallel resolution that declared the
Commission on the Status of Women likewise “had no power to take action in regard to any
complaints concerning the status of women”.290 International conventions created before
CEDAW had focused on these categories of rights and concerns, and were now judged by their
critics to have a “restricted scope” along with the “lack of […] provision for international
review”.291 Thus, both the mainstream human rights protections offered through the ICCPR and
the separate instruments on women’s rights were, by the 1970s, seen to “have remained
extremely limited in their ability to affect the condition of women”.292 For example, although the
Human Rights Committee (HRC) did adjudicate women’s rights matters under ICCPR, those
advocating for CEDAW judged the Committee to have placed exclusive emphasis on “legal,
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rather than de facto situations”, revealing their grounding in a foundational feminist critique of
law as abstracted from the lived experience of the women who seek its benefit.293
In 1979, the existing paradigms of minority rights, civil and political rights as well as the
“social development” orientation of the CSW, were beginning to be acknowledged as inadequate
to the violations women were experiencing globally. To the framers of CEDAW, it left an
enormous gap that women around the world were daily falling through.294 Despite formal
recognition of women as a protected group within the family of existing instruments, there was
no practical mechanism that was equipped to screen for their particular rights violations.
Subsequent developments in the family of treaties failed to address the gaps in understanding
regarding women’s rights. The limitations of the available instruments gave rise to CEDAW; it is
a period well summarized in practical terms by Kimberlé Crenshaw in her paper introducing
intersectionality to the UN in 2000:
[W]hile women’s enjoyment of human rights were formally
guaranteed, these protections were compromised to the extent that
women’s experiences could be said to be different from the
experiences of men. Thus, when women were detained, tortured,
and otherwise denied civil and political rights in the same fashion
as men, these abuses were clearly seen as violations of human
rights. Yet when women were raped in custody, beaten in private,
or denied access to decision-making by tradition, their differences
from men rendered such abuses peripheral to core human rights
guarantees.295
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In addition, committees, such as the HRC were, in 1979, still made up exclusively of men
(a fact that remained the case in 2000)296 who were judged by their contemporaries advancing
the women’s human rights agenda to have neither knowledge of nor expertise in women’s rights,
nor any links to national women’s rights groups who could challenge the rosy views of domestic
legal rights invoked by States parties.297

2.3 Women’s human rights?
The engagement with the UN system of rights protections was itself a contested terrain of
activism. Both those from outside the UN mechanisms and from NGOs, as well as those within,
expressed their ambivalence in briefs, fliers, memos and discussion papers, as well as in the draft
notes for the treaty itself.298 Although faith in the existing UN mechanisms was not particularly
strong, the scholars and activists engaged in the elaboration of the treaty still preferred the
framing of women’s rights as the human rights of women “to emphasize the globality and
indivisibility of all human rights, and their full applicability to women as human beings”.299 They
nevertheless concurrently feared “relegation to structures endowed with less power and resources
than the general human rights structures”..300
Despite the uncertain normative and institutional terrain, they saw it as a risk worth
taking, since it appeared to them that the overall project of human rights promised belonging in
“one of the few moral visions subscribed to internationally”, although they understood the
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fragility of its consensus, concluding that “its scope is not agreed on universally”[…].301
Because of its normative anchor in the best game in town, it was seen as strategically expedient:
“Human Rights is a widely accepted goal and thus provides a useful framework for seeking
redress of gender abuse”.302 The CEDAW was to expressly recognize the limitations of the civil
and political rights of traditional concern to IHRL. The CEDAW’s proponents pushed these legal
boundaries in the resulting convention. This normative struggle also took place in the context of
many institutional obstacles, which early members of the Committee keenly recall. 303
The genesis of CEDAW occurred at a time of “superpower confrontations and battles
between ideologies”304 and amid hesitation about economic, social and cultural rights, codified in
the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),305 for what
they owed to socialist ideals. The project of drafting CEDAW set out to answer the criticism that
the “root causes” of discrimination against women had been neglected in previous instruments.
The existing gender protections within the UN machinery had failed to highlight, respond to or
adequately acknowledge either the fact or the scope of the ongoing violations of women’s
specific human rights in either their deliberations or conclusions.306
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This orientation, identifying multiple “roots” and manifestations of gender
discrimination, plowed the ground for the subsequent intersectional challenge. The CEDAW’s
articulation of discrimination, as embedded in overall social conditions and institutional
responses, casts discrimination, in important part, as the result of a social process as well as
visible through a single event, allowing for the complex structural viewpoint on discrimination
that intersectionality promises.307

2.4 CEDAW: an instrument in, but not solely of, the UN
The Convention on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women was
adopted and proclaimed on December 18, 1979 by the General Assembly by Resolution
34/180(1979). Open for signature in 1980, it came into force in 1981. At the time of this writing,
189 States are parties to it, while 109 have signed its 1999 Optional Protocol.308 This latter
fortification of the treaty was seen to address its relative weaknesses in the firmament of human
rights treaties, and brings it in line with other human rights mechanisms, by allowing those
individuals or groups of individuals residing in states that have signed and ratified it to bring
forward claims once domestic remedies have been exhausted. Beyond the adjudication of
individual cases, it additionally grants the Committee the power to conduct inquiries into
situations of grave or systematic violations of women’s human rights.309
As with all United Nations bodies excepting the Security Council, enforcement of its
terms is restricted to the moral suasion inherent in being part of an international community, and
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the relative power that inheres therein. For example, for states requesting entry to the
international community as part of seeking other benefits, “[h]uman rights have come to be seen
as central to the assessment of states of underdevelopment” and “an essential prerequisite in the
facilitation of societal, legal economic and political progress”.310 Being a signatory to CEDAW
is a hallmark of progress for those states (formerly) considered to be “backward”, and
compliance with its terms a form of measurement as to their progress away from their “premodern” past.
The convention’s closest advocates heralded it outside the UN system as premier among
treaty bodies for its consideration of civil society views and engagement of NGOs.311 At the time
of drafting, this newest treaty was expressly crafted from “comments from governments,
specialized agencies and NGOs on a text which would be prepared by a working group set up by
the CSW”.312 In the end, multiple working groups were struck to create the treaty over the course
of its development and the travaux reflect the involvement of many NGOs in the drafting
process: the All-African Women’s Conference; the International Council of Social Democratic
Women; the International Federation of University Women;313 and the World YWCA.314 From
early in its evolution, CEDAW involved specialized agencies and NGOs in publicity activities to
advance receptivity, awareness and adoption of women’s rights among States parties.315 It has
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also had an active and specialized NGO monitoring group with links to women’s grassroots
communities around the world.316
Sally Engle Merry, the CEDAW scholar and legal anthropologist, holds that among treaty
bodies CEDAW remains outstanding for its collaborative approach.317 The UN’s official history
of its advancement of women’s rights traces this extraordinary partnership with advocates
outside the UN institutions back to the early CSW days, making it explicit that the international
grassroots movement for women’s rights helped shape the UN’s frameworks for advancing
women’s rights.318 The previously identified need for a new mechanism for enforcement of
women’s rights resulted in a broadening and codifying of earlier statements on marriage and
family rights because, “discrimination arising from customary law, from traditional institutions
and practices, or from other forms of oppression not specifically defined in the covenant
[ICCPR] tend to be neglected”.319 This focus on redress is plainly represented in the treaty’s
final text for Article 2(f), which requires of signatories that they undertake: “To take all
appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations,
customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women[.]”320
Thus, present at the conception of CEDAW was the identification of the roles of
“custom”, “culture” and “traditional practice” as at once responsible for the invisibility
(appearing as natural or given) of women’s human rights violations and as an engine of their
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reproduction (justification of violations based on cultural defences).321 The CEDAW broadened
and solidified a framework of setting women apart as a group in the UN protections. It followed,
rather than led the particularization of delineating rights for identity groups (ICERD led the way
in 1966 by specifically codifying protections on the grounds of race). It did so, however, in a
new and contentious way: while some rights were specified in earlier frameworks, CEDAW was
to have the force of a treaty, and as such, it was to have powers of obligation to reach into states’
“cultures” where discrimination against women was embedded, causing concern among states
for their cultural integrity.322 This spotlighting of culture became a flashpoint for the debate over
the meaning of an intersectional approach to women’s experiences of discrimination, with
CEDAW’s tone on culture appearing to limit its flexibility to adopt an intersectional posture in
adjudication.323
The CEDAW has remained every bit as contentious as it was at its initiation.324 At the
time of writing, 58 countries have registered reservations or made declarations to CEDAW.325
The definition of a reservation is taken from the Vienna Treaty of 1969: ‘“reservation’ means a
unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying,
accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the
legal effect of certain provisions of the Treaty in their application to that State.” 326
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Most reservations to the CEDAW are related to Articles 2 and 16, 327 which the
Committee deems central to the object and purpose of the convention, and which pertain to
discrimination that takes place in the family, or as an outcome or purpose of culture, tradition
and custom. Many states make reservations so sweeping as to effectively nullify state
accountability; others are unilaterally asserted on religious grounds with no canonical (religious
or legal) justification offered. International legal opinion holds such reservations, subjecting an
entire treaty to religious or domestic law, are “incompatible with the object and purpose of the
treaty”, and thus, nullify the objecting states’ adherence.328 Moreover, such objections, couched
in terms of “competing” rights to freedom of religion or belief (FORB), fundamentally
misconstrue the nature of those rights in international human rights law. “Afterall”, as scholar
Nazela Ghanea-Hercock and Special Rapporteur Heiner Bielefeldt have both pointed out,
“FORB, as a human right, ‘does not protect religions per se (e.g., traditions, values, identities,
and truth claims) but aims at the empowerment of human beings, as individuals and in
community with others. This empowerment component is something that freedom of religion or
belief has in common with all other human rights.’”329
Despite the clarity in international legal protections for FORB as applicable to individual
rights holders, and the duty bearers as the states, many human rights scholars and the community
of practitioners continue to characterize states’ evocation of this set of rights as a “clash” of
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rights, rather than as an incorrect reading of those rights.330The incongruity of states’ objections
on these grounds, compounded with their incompatibility with the object and purpose of the
treaty itself, thus is often not effectively disputed, and most frequently it does not result in clear
sanction.
States’ claims that a cultural or religious practice requires a reservation to CEDAW are
often also disputed by the women active for women’s rights within that state’s boundaries, either
from the dominant culture or from within another, minority culture. The feminist-egalitarian
interpretations of Islam reflected in the shadow reports of Morocco to CEDAW, for example, are
but one version of the complexity of potentially intersectional claims opened by the reservation
system.331 I attend to the work done by “culture” in this context briefly below.

2.4.1 CEDAW’s competing discourses
CEDAW’s drafting and ultimate ratification were the culmination of advocacy by women
within and beyond the UN; its genesis and normative grounding is both embedded in and
arguably limited by what it owes to the “women in development” discourse that emerged in the
late 1960s and 1970s.332 This “developmental discourse” is grounded in an implicit acceptance
of the unequal relations of international political economy,333 while the variants concerned with
gender relations posit a social development role for women who, rather than appearing as rights
bearers, are viewed as “indicators” of a community’s capacity to advance toward a more
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“developed” state. This legacy is evident in the Convention’s preamble, which declares,
“discrimination against women … hampers the growth and prosperity of society”.334 This
discourse has remained dominant both within international NGOs and within the UN, where
women’s “advancement” on a whole raft of “indicators” joins other measurements to track
states’ progress.335 This grounds women’s equality as a legitimate endeavour not on its own
merits, but on the basis of some other, more expedient principle based in shared benefit,
obfuscating the fundamental and potentially unpalatable power shifts—locally and globally—
required for its attainment. This recalls Puar’s cultural studies normative critique of western
attempts to expand “the statistical fold that produces appropriate digits and facts toward the
population’s optimization of life and the ascendancy of whiteness”.336 It is a form of
“sisterhood”, as Orford succinctly asserted two decades ago, “aimed at producing new female
subjects of development without unsettling the priorities of globalization”.337 As Sundhya Pahuja
has pointed out, “[i]nterventions directed at bringing about ‘development’ are assessed primarily
by reference to the intentions of the ‘developer’, rather than the effect of those actions on the
‘developing’”.338
A striking, and a yet more compromised, example of this is the international concern with
the situation of women in Afghanistan. Since the NATO invasion of that country in 2001, there
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has been approximately 1.5 billion dollars invested in activities that were intended to benefit
women.339 Instead, a 2015 report by the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women
concluded that the aid “commitments have not translated into concrete improvements in the lives
of the majority of women, who remain marginalised, discriminated against and at high risk of
being subjected to violence”.340 The Special Rapporteur’s report is itself an example of the
contradictory hybrid of critique and complicity the international approach to women’s rights can
elicit.
The CEDAW is at once legally radical and normatively conservative: through its
contextual reading of women’s rights it articulates an expanded definition of human rights that
integrates civil and political rights with a structural understanding of economic, social and
cultural rights; it does so however within the context of an unchallenged framework of the
human rights machinery itself, leaving unexamined the unequal terms of global engagement
which is in-and-of itself the source of a great deal of the discrimination the globe’s women
experience.341These mutually contradictory frames condition much of the UN human rights
discourse, and have not gone un-noticed by those most embedded in their operation.342At the
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time of CEDAW’s drafting, the “developmentalist” discourse sat alongside the influence of the
new post-colonial states, which prior to CEDAW influenced the first new human rights standards
developed after the UDHR, especially through CERD (1965), reflecting the concerns of the
formerly colonized.343 A similar influence is “also clear” in the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, of 1960, which acknowledged “the evils of
colonialism and the importance of the right to self-determination”, and the strong “condemnation
of Apartheid in General Assembly Resolution 1761 of 1962”.344
The drafters of CEDAW followed a “lull” in this spate of new post-colonial instruments
(that is, developed during the independence era of formerly colonial states),345 in 1979, during
which period, the “human rights discourse developed as a counterpoint to the developmentalist
discourse”.346 The CEDAW’s preamble reflects this history as well, stating: “the eradication of
apartheid, all forms of racism, racial discrimination, colonialism, neo-colonialism, aggression,
foreign occupation and domination and interference in the internal affairs of states is essential to
the full enjoyment of the rights of men and women”.347
The Convention sits still in some discomfort on the cusp of these differential approaches,
with the “women in development” origins holding an ontological tension with the rights-based
institutional framework that informs its status as a stand-alone human rights treaty with an
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enumerated set of protections. The CEDAW’s framers were influenced by emerging theories of
women’s subordination, grounded in critiques of the ontological frameworks of all cultures, on
the basis that they shared some dominant and dominating forms of gender assignment.348 In the
scholarship emerging outside the UN machinery, but influential on it, this was summarized in the
term “patriarchy”, which newly expanded its conceptual reach to go beyond strict
anthropological application. The long-observed universal organization of human cultures into
kinship and reproductive units was now being reexamined with the insight that there was a
differential outcome for men and women vis-à-vis equality: “men have certain rights in their
female kin, and women do not have the same rights either to themselves or to their male kin”.349
The compulsory assignment of heterosexuality and of the subordination of women
through cultural kinship and marriage systems was gathered under the concept of patriarchal
power. To paraphrase the American legal feminist Catherine MacKinnon, while great differences
obtain over history and across cultures, from the perspective of women’s role vis-à-vis equality
with their male compatriots, “bottom is bottom”.350 This pithy reductionism, however, reveals an
essentialized “woman” that is now considered problematic in complex international and
multicultural contexts where, in fact, shifting power and social locations alter profoundly what
constitutes “bottom”, and patriarchal culture can become easily conflated with culture per se.
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Holmaat and Naber have argued that the explicit language of cultural feminist scholarship
was slower to enter the public international relations texts;351 however, its influence can be felt in
the norms and frameworks of understanding of the treaty open for signature in 1981. By 2004,
CEDAW was interpreting the treaty in explicit terms against this cultural feminist broad
definition of universal patriarchy:
Despite variations across cultures and over time, gender relations
throughout the world entail asymmetry of power between men and
women as a pervasive trait. [Gender] helps us understand the
social construction of gender identities and the unequal structure of
power that underlies the relationship between the sexes.352

A central insight of the intersectional approach will be that the “bifurcation of race and
gender leads to the mistaken conclusion that the goals of multiculturalism and feminism are
antithetical”, setting them on an ideological collision path.353 Class, racialization, ability, sexual
orientation, etc., alter the position of women vis-à-vis men and other women. Yet, CEDAW qua
document was devised at a time when “[c]ultural feminists developed the modern construct
‘woman’ by privileging sex differences over any other basis of oppression and asserting the
existence of universal gender subordination across time and space”.354
This form of gender essentialism, despite its intended internationalism, builds
commonality of gender identity at the expense of context that might differently shape a woman’s
experience and agency. As we have seen, the marker on conceptualizing identity has since
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moved far from CEDAW’s unproblematized “woman”, with the most radical critiques of
essentialism challenging the category of “woman” as an “ontological joke”,355 not at all useful
due to its historical, cultural and “performative” variations and specificities, 356 and more
recently, its fundamental biological instability.357 This latter development has particularly
troubled the Committee charged with overseeing the treaty’s interpretation, as we shall see
ahead. By 2003, Radhika Coomeraswamy, the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women
(SRVAW), addressed the matter of women’s multiple affiliations in international human rights
protection with the following, more practical, disclaimer:
Identity is not an essential immutable, permanent status, it has
many constituent elements. Future experiences often transform the
nature and direction of personal identity. Identity is often
composite, made up of multiple selves, often contesting,
contradicting, and transforming the other. Identity therefore
reconstitutes itself, reacting to and negotiating ideology and lived
experience.358

Coomaraswamy is articulating how an operating theory of gender allows the richness of lived
experience, and particularly of not only violations, but also of resistance, to be seen, understood
and supported by the instruments charged with the role of protecting women from harms; and,
specific to international human rights contexts, how this contributes to remedy. It is also the
central challenge of the intersectional turn.
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2.4.2 The CEDAW Committee
Articles 17-30 of the Convention govern the Committee’s mandate and the administration
of the Committee. In a formula similar to all nine core human rights treaties of the United
Nations,359 the implementation of CEDAW by States parties is overseen by a committee of 23
“experts” of “high moral standing and competence in the field covered by the Treaty”,360 put
forward by their governments, but elected by the Committee through secret ballot. They receive
reports on a schedule of every four years, and engage the States parties in what is termed
“constructive dialogue” for the implementation at the national level of the Committee’s program
for implementation.361 Despite the lack of concrete enforcement capabilities, the Committee’s
utterances are referred to as jurisprudence, with debate as to their status as binding or “soft law”.
Nonetheless, its General Comments are considered direct interpretations of the treaty’s legal
meaning; its Concluding Remarks on country reports, no less so, although it must rely on a
system of “good faith” implementation on the parts of states.362
Similar to the Committee on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination
(CERD), the CEDAW Committee has gone out of its way to establish itself as the custodian of a
“living document”.363 It has therefore adopted its definitional scope in Article 1 of “all forms of
discrimination”, and its mandate under Article 21 of the convention to “make suggestions and
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general recommendations based on the examination of reports and information”364 to identify
new and emerging forms or patterns of discrimination, whether named or not in the original
document.365 For instance, the Committee has read a core protection against violence from state
and non-state actors back into the articles of the treaty, despite the original document’s silence on
the matter.366
At the time of CEDAW’s establishment, treaty committees were becoming increasingly
self-critical about the sources of their information on the status of a country’s compliance with
its respective obligations: it was the CERD that first went on record as requesting that
“corrective information from sources other than states” be sought in the review processes, which
had not yet fully integrated the alternative reports from civil society organizations into their
deliberations.367 The relationships with women’s INGOs that characterized CEDAW’s framing,
continue unabated, with official histories recording, in dizzying detail,368 world conferences,
special meetings and special discussion sessions on women’s international human rights that
have mapped the rise of the treaty as a core part of the human rights firmament. 369 These
activities have given rise to, established and tautologically confirmed women’s international
human rights’ norms, topics and legal status.
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For Annalise Riles, these relationships are exemplary of a discernable international
human rights’ aesthetic, such that relations between the UN and women’s advocates in civil
society have become part of a ubiquitous production of networks and documents, each
comprising artifacts on par with one another, and worthy of study unto themselves, as
ethnographies of international human rights law.370 While Riles’ work is informative of the
extent to which the UN systems for engaging women’s rights have become their own hermetic
world, her work is a deep study of its own, and takes us in an ethnographic direction, not
immediately pertinent to this legal study of the grounds for intersectionality.

2.4.3 Limiting the normative scope: Reservations to CEDAW
Clearly, CEDAW has attracted a “large number of reservations and reservations of a very
general type”.371 In her previous Working Paper on Reservations to Human rights Treaties,
Francoise Hampton observed that “[c]ertain treaties are more affected than others [by
reservations], the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of discrimination Against Women
being a notable example”.372 In Article 28, paragraph 2 of the Convention, CEDAW adopts the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties regarding the “impermissibility principle”, stating
that any reservation that is incompatible with the “object and purpose” of the convention shall
not be permitted.373 Likewise, “[a]general reservation subjecting a treaty as a whole to a religious
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law or to domestic law is likely to be found incompatible with the object and purpose of the
treaty”.374
While the legal debates with respect to reservations is not the principal subject of this
paper,375 the reservation regime is worth noting because of its close relationship to potentially
intersectional interpretations of women’s rights and the overall efficacy of the instrument. On the
one hand, the broad social change required by states in order to be in strict adherence to the
treaty may excuse qualifications in the name of “progressive realization” of its requirements, an
accepted form of IHRL compliance;376 on the other hand, generally weak enforcement
mechanisms, combined with the number and extent of reservations to CEDAW, have occasioned
much reflection on the reservation regime generally, and its implications for CEDAW in
particular.377 The development of the Optional Protocol to CEDAW of 1999 (December 22,
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2000),378 allowing communications on behalf of individuals and groups, was hoped to have
improved state accountability379 by providing an additional check and balance on reservations
through jurisprudence on the meaning of state obligations for individual claimants in situations
of reservations. 380 The matter, Hanson opines, is “legally complex”.381 Since March 2006, there
is also the State-driven Universal Periodic Review, monitoring the “universality,
interdependence, indivisibility and interrelatedness of all human rights” to add to the arsenal of
accountability of states to their human rights obligations.382
Konstantin Korkelia describes opinion on the reservations regimes for human rights
treaties as swinging between the belief that consent by the state remains the fundamental
principle in international law, and that therefore legal consequences of inadmissibility should be
“taken by the reserving state alone”; and, on the other hand, that supervisory organs should “be
competent to decide on the admissibility of reservations and to determine consequences of
inadmissible reservations”.383 Jennifer Riddle summarizes this in the pithy formulation of
“integrity” (of the treaty’s norms) versus “universality” (of coverage). She traces the climate of
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reservations for IHRL as having “moved from a unanimity rule to a reservations regime that
places universal acceptance of multilateral treaties above preserving the integrity of each
individual document’s provisions”.384 The disassembled meaning of universality in this context
is an obvious question to raise. While there is now general agreement that “the human rights
treaty bodies have the competence to determine if a reservation is incompatible with the object
and purpose of the treaty”,385 it is widely acknowledged that there are problems establishing
invalidity in a climate of “constructive engagement”. 386 CEDAW itself maintains that:
Although the Convention does not prohibit the entering of
reservations, those which challenge the central principles of the
Convention are contrary to the provisions of the Convention and to
general international law. As such they may be challenged by other
States parties.387

As with other treaty bodies, CEDAW currently has limited responses open to it: its
report-receiving function (under Article 18) allows the Committee to interrogate the meaning and
suggest time limits to reservations as part of monitoring States parties’ progress toward
compliance with “a view to narrowing its content and/or withdrawing it”.388 To date, few
reservations to Article 2 have been withdrawn or modified by any State party and reservations to
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Article 16 are rarely withdrawn.389 Ultimately, the monitoring bodies represent “the interests of
all states when they exercise their functions”.390 Official weight, however, is granted to other
States parties, whose objections to incompatible reservations need to be registered. Nevertheless,
according to the ICJ Genocide Convention decision, such objections can stand side-by-side with
a state’s continued status as a signatory to the treaty, only “if the reservation is compatible with
the object and purpose of the Convention”.391
In and of themselves, the existing state objections are of little use and reveal no helpful
pattern that would empower the CEDAW committee.392 In practice, a reserving state can be a
party while considering itself exempt from the central tenets of the treaty, weakening the
normative force of the treaty as a tool for practical protection and accountability. 393 Although the
reservations to CEDAW have been characterized as “haphazard and subjective”,394 there is, in
fact, a pattern: it is most frequently to those articles aimed at discrimination that takes place
within the family, or as an outcome or purpose of culture, tradition and custom.395 One powerful
tool a treaty body has against reservations is the accepted non-derogability of certain rights. The
law around women’s rights internationally is inching toward an assumed status of international
customary law, particularly when the matter of VAW within state boundaries is at issue.396 Nonderogability in international human rights law applies generally to the following conditions:
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No State party shall, even in time of emergency threatening the life
of the nation, derogate from the Covenant's guarantees of the right
to life ; freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, and from medical or scientific
experimentation without free consent; freedom from slavery or
involuntary servitude; the right not to be imprisoned for
contractual debt; the right not to be convicted or sentenced to a
heavier penalty by virtue of retroactive criminal legislation; the
right to recognition as a person before the law; and freedom of
thought, conscience and religion. These rights are not derogable
under any conditions even for the asserted purpose of preserving
the life of the nation.397

There have been suggestions that VAW be cast as a matter of the integrity of the person,
to test the possibility of this as one indisputable international standard in the protection of
women’s rights.398 This has been referred to variously as the incoherent act of reading coverage
by analogy to other, formally recognized, IHRL norms;399 as “not yet” the status of international
customary law”,400 and more recently, in more progressivist language as part of “a growing call
to redefine customary international law in gender sensitive terms, [that] could eventually bring
violence against women within jus cogens.”401
The Committee itself addresses VAW’s non-derogability status obliquely in paragraph 11
of GC 28 by stating that: “[t]he obligations of States Parties do not cease in periods of armed
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conflict or in states of emergency resulting from political events or natural disasters”, and that
they are required to attend to “the particular needs of women in times of armed conflict and
states of emergency”, gesturing to the context of VAW in such circumstances.402 These previous
and various statements about the nature and role of violence against women in both the evidence
and construction of violations that fit the bill of non-derogability and, ultimately, of a protection
guaranteed by customary international law, are gathered in the most recent update on the
obligations of states with respect to violence against women in GR 35 on gender-based violence
against women, updating GR 19.403 In this context, the Committee states baldly that:
For over 25 years, the practice of States parties has endorsed the
Committee’s interpretation. The opinio juris and State practice
suggest that the prohibition of gender-based violence against
women has evolved into a principle of customary international
law.404

In GR 19, the Committee delineates “gender-based violence” as comprising the
nullification of the following universal rights and freedoms:
a. The right to life;
b. The right not to be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment;
c. The right to equal protection according to humanitarian norms in time of
international or internal armed conflict;
d. The right to liberty and security of person;
e. The right to equal protection under the law;
f. The right to equality in the family;
g. The right to the highest standard attainable of physical and mental health;
h. The right to just and favourable conditions of work.405
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In GR 35, the Committee extends this observation through a compendium of decisions to
date which together, underscore this evolving area of non-derogability in customary international
law, by redefining torture in “gender sensitive” terms:
The Committee endorses the view of other human rights treaty
bodies and special procedures mandate-holders that in making the
determination of when acts of gender-based violence against
women amount to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment, a gender sensitive approach is required to understand the
level of pain and suffering experienced by women, and that the
purpose and intent requirement of torture are satisfied when acts or
omissions are gender specific or perpetrated against a person on
the basis of sex.406

In paragraph 25 of this GR, CEDAW makes a declaratory statement about the status of at
least some forms of gender-based violence as jus cogens:
In addition, both international humanitarian law and human rights
law have recognised the direct obligations of non-State actors,
including as parties to an armed conflict, in specific circumstances.
These include the prohibition of torture, which is part of customary
international law and has become a peremptory norm (jus
cogens).407

Most attempts from outside the Committee to delineate a minimum international standard
of “non-derogability” with respect to protection from VAW remain unconvincing. Many weaken
the treaty’s normative force by instrumentally extracting acts of violence from their crucial
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context as part of a continuum of inequality that underscores and reproduces it,408 a complexity
the Committee has been at pains to maintain, pointing out “the close connection between
discrimination against women, gender-based violence, and violations of human rights and
fundamental freedoms”.409 In GR 35, the Committee once again makes this point:
The Committee considers that gender-based violence against
women is one of the fundamental social, political and economic
means by which the subordinate position of women with respect to
men and their stereotyped roles are perpetuated. Throughout its
work, the Committee has made clear that this violence is a critical
obstacle to achieving substantive equality between women and
men as well as to women’s enjoyment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Convention.410
At heart, CEDAW is a treaty about non-discrimination, and holds this context central to
its consideration of violations. To lay the groundwork for a later discussion of CEDAW’s
relationship to the elements of intersectionality, a committee-based definition of discrimination is
necessary.

2.4.4 CEDAW: Equality and non-discrimination
As with ICERD, non-discrimination is the broad rubric under which CEDAW’s articles
are gathered. It has been noted that there is “little overall convergence or congruence”411 among
the treaty regimes as to the meaning and consequence in the use of “non-discrimination”.
Instruments range from naming non-discrimination within a sequence of rights of which nondiscrimination is but one, to the ICCPR, which contains a self-standing prohibition of

408
409
410

Xanthaki, supra note 128.
CEDAW, supra note 366, para 4.

note 282, para II(10).
Wouter Vandenhole, Non-Discrimination and Equality in the View of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies
(Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2005) at 29.
411

97
discrimination.412 Some contain only an ancillary right to non-discrimination; others contain an
explicit guarantee for equality between women and men (ICCPR and ICESCR),413 and still
others, as we have seen, refer to sex as one of the prohibited grounds. The list of prohibited
grounds itself differs from treaty to treaty.414 The CEDAW and ICERD are set apart for their
overarching focuses on non-discrimination, and for their self-contained definitions of
discrimination. It has also been noted that legal scholars have often held that non-discrimination
and equality are equivalent concepts, “two sides of the same coin”, or “negative and positive
forms of the same principle”.415 The CEDAW treaty body in fact holds them to be “different but
equally important”416 terms that set out the positive, remedial and preventative obligations on
States parties. As such, “a right to equality (in the enjoyment of human rights) is broader than
non-discrimination in that the latter prohibits discrimination only on certain grounds”.417
Discrimination is defined in Article 1 of CEDAW in nearly identical terms to ICERD’s
with respect to racism. CERD states that discrimination is defined as:
Any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race,
colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose
or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or
exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other
field of life.418
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In CEDAW, discrimination is:
Any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their
marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural, civil or any other field.419

The Treaty names prohibition of and protection against distinction for the purposes of
diminishing equality as its core value and purpose, which is then elaborated in its subsequent
articles. In the view of the Committee, a joint reading of Articles 1 to 5 and 24 “form the general
interpretative framework for all the convention’s substantive articles”, and “indicates that three
obligations are central to States parties’ efforts to eliminate discrimination against women.”420
Article 1 is thus referred to as the “chapeau” article, meaning that it “caps”, guides and
fundamentally shapes all other articles within its terms.
The Committee’s GC 25 names the related states’ obligations as:
Firstly, States parties’ obligation is to ensure that there is no direct
or indirect discrimination against women in their laws and that
women are protected against discrimination—committed by public
authorities, the judiciary, organizations, enterprises or private
individuals—in the public as well as the private spheres by
competent tribunals as well as sanctions and other remedies.
Secondly, States parties’ obligation is to improve the de facto
position of women through concrete and effective policies and
programmes. Thirdly, States parties’ obligation is to address
prevailing gender relations and the persistence of gender-based
stereotypes that affect women not only through individual acts by
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individuals but also in law, and legal and societal structures and
institutions.421

Furthermore, and most importantly to establishing a definition of equality, these
obligations should be implemented in an integrated fashion and extend beyond a purely formal
legal obligation of equal treatment of women with men. Read through the lens of Article 4.1,
providing for temporary special measures, CEDAW “goes beyond the concept of discrimination
used in many national and international legal standards and norms”.422 It is quoted here in full:
Adoption by States parties of temporary special measures aimed at
accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not
be considered discrimination as defined in the present Convention,
but shall in no way entail as a consequence the maintenance of
unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be
discontinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and
treatment have been achieved.423

Leaving aside the determination of what constitutes temporary in this regard, for our
purposes what is important is that equality in CEDAW’s terms does not imply identical
treatment, or sameness in treatment; if a distinction in treatment can be justified on the grounds
that it will contribute to substantive (de facto rather than de jure) equality, then it will not be
considered discrimination.424 Read through the elaboration of Article 4, CEDAW proposes a
definition of non-discrimination that moves from formal non-discrimination to positive equality.
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It requires positive action on the part of the state; it creates duties and obligations that go beyond
those of restraint to those of active change; from the prohibition of breach to the requirement of
both redress and moreover, “provision of general conditions in order to guarantee the civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights of women and the girl child, designed to ensure for
them a life of dignity and non-discrimination.”425 The Committee elaborates this mandate as
follows:
The Convention targets discriminatory dimensions of past and
current societal and cultural contexts which impede women’s
enjoyment of their human rights and fundamental freedoms. It
aims at the elimination of all forms of discrimination against
women, including the elimination of the causes and consequences
of their de facto or substantive inequality. 426

As Vandenhole describes it, both ICERD and CEDAW hold that “[d]iscriminatory intent
is not a necessary element of discrimination”;427 both refer to “effect or purpose” with equal
weight.428 The Committee’s elaboration of the treaty’s intent with respect to discrimination
therefore, while clarifying the conceptual and manifest differences between direct and indirect
discrimination, makes no particular distinction between the obligations of states where intended
or unintended discrimination occurs. As we have seen, in the view of the Committee, “cultural”
and “societal contexts” that are discriminatory are, in fact, a “target” of the convention. Thus,
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their intent is not, in the Committee’s view, particularly relevant. It is their impact on substantive
equality that matters. Notwithstanding, the important question as to the relationship between
religion and culture (CESCR GC 21 embeds “religion or belief systems” in the inter alia
definition),429 underscoring the point at hand regarding interpretations of equality, the
Committee’s response in 2008 to the argument made by Saudi Arabia that complementarity of
rights is equivalent to equality in “Islamic culture”, is:
The Committee is concerned with the State party’s distinctive
understanding of the principle of equality, which implies similar
rights of women and men as well as complementarities and
harmony between women and men, rather than equal rights of
women and men.430
In 1994, CEDAW had already made this point in relation to all states:
States parties should resolutely discourage any notions of
inequality of women and men which are affirmed by laws, or by
religious or private law or by custom, and progress to the stage
where reservations, particularly to article 16, will be withdrawn.431
Noting the inherent “progressivism” discourse, we can nonetheless see the view of
discrimination as more holistic than the traditional “same as” notion of equality critiqued as
endemic to western liberalism.432 Vandenhole specifies that in the case of indirect discrimination,
“treating unequals equally leads to unequal results which can have the effect of fostering
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inequality”.433 In the European Commission Human Rights context, Thlimmenos v Greece makes
a similar point, finding that the state “failed to treat differently persons whose situations differed
greatly”.434 In essence, indirect discrimination “deals with institutional and structural biases”,
and the proof of its existence is determined by comparison between groups, whereas the proof of
direct discrimination is determined by comparison between individuals.435
In the Committee’s view, the prohibition on discrimination is against “both direct and
indirect” forms,436 and the elimination of discrimination and the promotion of equality are “two
different but equally important goals in the quest for women’s empowerment”.437 In this sense,
we can see the “discriminatory dimensions” of “cultural contexts” referred to in GC 25 as
comparable to indirect discrimination, with the disparate effect of cultural arrangements having a
discriminatory impact on women as a group and as individuals. While it is discrimination that is
the target of the treaty, the terms “condemn”, “without delay”, “eliminating” and “abolish” with
respect to culture, custom and practices appear to leave little room for a gradualist approach to
change or, importantly, for finding liberation from within culture. Thus, while the foregoing
evidences the conceptual breadth for a fully structural approach to discrimination and equality
within the terms of CEDAW qua text, it is here, in relation to its discourse on culture, that much
of the trouble with CEDAW for an intersectional approach to discrimination begins.
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The CEDAW’s primary consideration is the abolition of discrimination against women in
all its forms. Although there was a UNESCO member present during its drafting, and the treaty
names the right for women to take part in the “cultural life of their countries”438 on an equal basis
with men, it does not take up the meaning and potential weight of culture in international law.439
However, like all treaties, CEDAW does not exist in isolation and, particularly in light of the
numerous reservations on the basis of culture, it benefits from a brief examination in relation to
other considerations of culture and its protection, since ultimately, CEDAW’s interpretation must
take place within the full family of protections.440 As long-time CERD committee member
Patrick Thornberry believes CERD practice has demonstrated, it is a nuanced and full reading of
non-discrimination as a right within culture, as well as a limitation to the claims of culture
against other rights that will open up the debate as to the “reach of human rights prescriptions
into cultural space”.441 In the aftermath of colonial atrocities, any license to “eliminate” any
aspect of culture matters a great deal.

2.5 A note about culture and human rights practice
Culture is a notoriously “spacious” concept in human rights, as Patrick Thornberry has
noted, and “finding a discrete substance for the right” to culture is a “complex undertaking”.442 It
is, in any case, not the primary interest here.443 However, it is worth noting at a minimum, as
Thornberry has, that bundled into the notion are a number of specific and discernible rights that
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might well be named concretely, rather than tackled as an amorphous right.444 Culture as an
umbrella concept is particularly unhelpful in the context of reservations to CEDAW, where,
frequently, from the states’ side “culture is claimed as a justification for practices unlikely to be
consistent with human rights”.445 This appears to be the position of the Committee. Its sole
evocation of culture is as a prohibited ground when used as an excuse for the denial of the rights
of women.
A number of States enter reservations to particular articles on the
ground that national law, tradition, religion or culture are not
congruent with Convention principles, and purport to justify the
reservation on that basis.446

The use of the word “purport” alerts us to a skepticism that, on the one hand, may appear
to close down the debate about “cultural differences” in women’s human rights from the
Committee’s perspective, anticipating CESCR, that “no one may invoke cultural diversity to
infringe upon human rights guaranteed by international law, nor to limit their scope”.447 This is
more pointedly reiterated in the General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
Against Women of 1993, which declares: “States should condemn violence against women and
should not invoke any custom, tradition or religious consideration to avoid their obligations with
respect to its elimination”.448 On the other hand, the short shrift in CEDAW qua treaty that
culture receives begs consideration by the Committee of culture beyond its evocation for the

444

Thornberry, supra note 440 at 5.
Ibid at 6.
446
note 387.
447
note 429, para 18.
448
General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women [48/104], A/RES/48/104 (85th
plenary meeting 20 December 1993), para 4.
445

105
purposes of limiting the human rights of women, especially in light of the Vienna Declaration of
the World Conference on Human Rights regarding the indivisibility of culture from all other
rights,449 and particularly in light of its 2010 exhortation to intersectionality as part of States
parties obligations, explored in a following section.
Defining culture is in and of itself no small task. CESCR’s GC 21 admits it to be
“multifaceted”, but broadly outlined culture
encompasses, inter alia, ways of life, language, oral and written
literature, music and song, non-verbal communication, religion or
belief systems, rites and ceremonies, sport and games, methods of
production or technology, natural and man-made environments,
food, clothing and shelter and the arts, customs and traditions
through which individuals, groups of individuals and communities
express their humanity and the meaning they give to their
existence, and build their world view representing their encounter
with external forces affecting their lives. Culture shapes and
mirrors the values of well-being and the economic, social and
political life of individuals, groups of individuals and
communities.450

This definition invites consideration of the woman who faces gender discrimination from
within a culture of which she generally wishes to remain a part. In this sense, culture leads
swiftly to the thorny matter of group and individual protections. Minimally, we could ascribe the
concept of collective rights to individuals enjoying rights collectively as part of a culture or
minority, where the individual may still be a rights bearer but the rights are oriented toward
collective notions of social organization.451 Group rights per se obtain where the group as entity
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corporately holds the right, and can hold its right against the individual members of the group.
Even with the so-called “‘saving clauses’ designed to support more individualistic conceptions of
rights and particular categories of persons”,452 women’s negotiations at the intersection of these
rights and affiliations are complex and painful. Culture in this sense must be examined more
critically to “understand the link between culture and relations of power and domination” that so
frequently pits a woman as a bearer of individual rights against the claimed requirements of
culture, particularly in cases of violence.453
The CEDAW’s conception of rights is firmly individual. However, “cultural rights are an
integral part of human rights, which are universal, indivisible and interdependent”.454 Often,
when speaking of culture, CEDAW is exclusively evoking, as in the following extract from GC
19, “stereotyped roles [that] perpetuate widespread practices involving violence or coercion,
such as family violence and abuse, forced marriage, dowry deaths, acid attacks and female
circumcision”;455 practices that are, to be sure, real and discriminatory, but about which some
perspective and context are required to avoid descent into racist stereotypes. Such commentary
has “reinforced the notion that metropolitan centres of the West contain no tradition or culture
harmful to women, and that the violence which does exist is idiosyncratic and individualized
rather than culturally condoned”.456 European forms of violent discrimination against women
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seldom receive the same international attention,457 and the preoccupation with the lurid and with
“alien and bizarre” forms of gender persecution458 among human rights advocates echoes
colonial arrogance,459 and CEDAW can ill-afford to underscore it.
The reasons for CEDAW’s preoccupation with such manifestations of discrimination are
at once straightforward and importantly complex.

2.5.1 Culture as discrimination
The CEDAW is concerned with discrimination, lifting women out of legal obscurity as
adjuncts to husbands and family into personhood and thus individual rights protection.
Therefore, in referring to culture, it is by necessity referring to those aspects of group norms that
rankle or violate its mandated individual protections. Importantly, this is often in the context of
responding to states’ unilateral evocations of culture as a defense to non-compliance. While this
is surely different from protecting an individual woman’s right to cultural expression, or her right
to be protected as a member of a group, it is not unrelated. Both the state and CEDAW are
invoking a vision of culture that is at once partial and totalizing. Bearing in mind the UNESCO
concept of culture that is not “a series of isolated manifestations or hermetic compartments”,460
“but […] a living process, historical, dynamic and evolving, with a past, a present and a
future”,461 we can support CEDAW’s vision of culture as changeable, against states’ evocations
of fixed homogeneity. But, culture is also “the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual
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and emotional features of a society or group, [which] encompasses, in addition to art and
literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs”,462 which
CEDAW neglects in its singular focus on discrimination expressed through or as culture.
Changeable does not necessarily equate with must be changed; and where it does,
culture’s relation to the similarly spacious concept, “self-determination”, is relevant; that is, it
matters how culture is altered and by whom. In the seesaw between the polarities of cultural
relativism and universality that have so exorcised the human rights community, most successful
détentes between the camps are brokered on some version of the concept of culturally selfdefined human rights that appeals to universal values. Christof Heyns calls it “the struggle
approach”, locating the compelling power and central meaning of core human rights values and
goals in the non-institutional manifestations of all cultures’ struggles against indignity and
oppression;463 Thornberry speaks of “universality, not uniformity” and of “’importation’, rather
than ‘exportation’ of human rights”;464 and Merry speaks of “the right to difference” as
potentially being “a positive, transcultural basis for human rights”.465 Sally Seyla Benhabib flips
the problem, and speaks of the fear that universalism is ethnocentric as a “widespread anxiety”
that rests on “false generalizations about the west” and “ignores elements of non-western
cultures that may be perfectly compatible with and may even be the root of the west’s own
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‘discovery’ of universalism”.466 Ultimately, we see the question arise as to the “extent to which
the Convention’s discourse of equality can be married with the discourse of cultural diversity”.467
The answer to this in the case of the CEDAW, in part, is determined by the treaty’s normative
framework, which, in its more heavy-handed moments, conflates its central insights into the
inner workings of patriarchy with the operations of culture per se.
Paralleling the broad parameters of the oppositional positioning of culture and gender
rights, CEDAW, while not alone in this matter, has been singled out by some commentators as
exemplary of the “opposition of international law to local culture”.468 The notoriously high
numbers of reservations that have accompanied ratifications of the Convention—frequently on
the basis of cultural difference—mark it as the “first among the human rights treaties” in this
regard,469 prompting questions as to its efficacy as an international instrument at all.470At the
heart of this debate is the Treaty’s Article 2(f), which calls for States parties to “take all
appropriate measures, including legislation to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations,
customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women”.471
Exploring CEDAW’s approach to culture is necessary to determine if the intersectional
turn instructs and allows CEDAW’s normative framework to stretch sufficiently to embrace the
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possibility of culture as not just infringement and harm, but as access to other, intersecting rights,
or even as sources of grounded social justice struggle. Studies such as that of Rikki Holmaat and
Jonneke Naber,472 have queried the Treaty Committee’s choice to focus on violations as a result
of culture and custom, and have suggested new avenues to broaden acceptance of women’s
rights by focusing on framing infringements differently, under language contained in other
articles. Specifically, they suggest that focus on Article 5 regarding gender stereotypes, speaks to
many of the same concerns with culture without evoking the colonial legacies of the specific
language of custom and culture.473 Their work, however, was published contemporaneously with
the important and express development of the Committee’s own reorientation to take stock of
such critiques and provide new guidance to its deliberations in GC 28 on intersectionality. The
examinations that follow engage with this new terrain.

2.6 The rise of intersectionality
The CERD GC 25474 and CEDAW GC 28475, while written a decade apart, both arose out
of the legacy of contestation regarding the universality, coverage and meaning of the treaties’
protections for those who experienced multiple grounds of discrimination simultaneously. Both
documents were intended to provide jurisprudential heft to the deliberations and exchanges
among and between various UN institutions, NGOs, and women activists from the Global South
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at public forums and through the academy, by deploying the language of intersectionality. 476 We
will now turn to the question of to what degree this “intersectional turn”—in CEDAW in
particular—addresses the normative restrictions in the treaty proper, to prepare the ground for a
later consideration of to what extent and in which ways has it guided the adaptation of the
Committee’s rulings. We will do so first by examining the ways in which intersectionality came
into the treaty’s considerations through assembling a view of its antecedents.
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3 Transmissions to Impacts: Intersectionality at CEDAW,
Antecedents and Applications

The acceptance of an intersectional vocabulary at the international
level opens up a space for feminist engagement. It offers the future
possibility for feminist dialogue within the law—as opposed to one
that merely focuses on the law. Such an approach keeps with
intersectionality’s counterhegemonic impetus by offering an
epistemological guide to engage law’s political, symbolic and
structural limits and how structural conditions inform them.477
Clearly, contemporary social theory needs ways to explain how
ideas, practices and institutions circulate and how they come to
ground. It is in these processes of movement, incorporation and
resistance that culturally embedded concepts become visible.478
Ensuring that all women will be served by the expanded scope of
gender based human rights protection requires attention to the
various ways that gender intersects with a range of other identities
and the way the intersection contributes to the unique vulnerability
of different groups of women.479

3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I made the argument that CEDAW’s normative scope for
examining women’s experiences of discrimination was simultaneously spacious and constrained
by the framers’ reliance on fixed perspectives on the properties of culture, contained in Article 2.
I examined the origins, limits and possibilities represented by the framing of CEDAW as part of
the IHRL family of protections—assessing where it has advanced the capacity of law to make
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visible the violations of women’s rights, and where that project of visibility has extended
colonial prejudices and approbation. In contrast to my assessment, prominent commentators on
IHRL480 and CEDAW in particular,481 have seen CEDAW’s Article 2 in precisely the opposite
light, as providing “a firm textual basis requiring the state to appreciate and account for all the
identities, experiences and factors that contribute to gender discrimination and inequality.”482 In
order to weigh these different perspectives on the treaty qua text and the developing
intersectionality story at CEDAW, we will now turn to the antecedents of intersectionality per se
in the lifecycle of the treaty.
This chapter will explore the extent to which intersectionality coheres around any
definitional, institutional and practical understanding that can illuminate its potential
contributions to human rights law. I will point to the evidence that receptivity to intersectionality
emerges out of UN deliberations about its institutional failures in the face of contemporary
genocidal conflicts that mobilized sexual violence against racialized women as their primary
means. Through these explorations, I will begin to discern the exact nature of the concept we are
tracing, its operations and its promises, including its transmissions into a legally discernable
concept. In this sense, I engage intersectionality in the work of “norm clarification and
elaboration” common to IHRL projects that engage in standard setting.483
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The story of intersectionality in this chapter is assembled from the threads and fragments
of intersectionality’s many avenues into IHRL. In one important respect, there is the selfconscious adoption of the language and positioning of intersectionality. This can be found mostly
in UN statements, press releases and documents, as well as meeting notes. Then there is the
related scholarship and discourse, which observes this particular intersectional turn, and through
which we find textual, theoretical and legal interpretations of its significance.484 Additionally,
other IHRL explorations of intersectionality outside the UN provide analogy and clarity to the
discussion of intersectionality’s legal contours and meaning.485 I will discern the origins and
weight of each source in context in order to build a picture of intersectionality’s origins and
impacts in the UN context. Tracing the legal development of intersectionality from these
fragments and into a framework that guides IHRL deliberations at CEDAW takes us back to the
limitations and possibilities of framing, discussed above, and requires us to find clarity in the
multitude of phrases, building block concepts and other precursor indicators of intersectionality’s
acceptance in IHRL. Tracing this trajectory also requires a telescoping in and out of simple
representation to critical distance, querying the project of governance that intersectionality is
thereby made party to. In Henne’s words, “[u]sing intersectionality to frame an international
legal agenda is therefore not about refining variables and correlations between them, but about
embracing how feminist debate might inform an intersectional sensibility within law.”486
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Intersectionality, as we have seen in Chapter 1, has played an important intellectual and
activist role in many fields of study. As a legal concept, and especially as international human
rights law, it has a distinct pedigree that requires attention to context, precedent and fact-specific
usages. There are, nevertheless, aspects of intersectionality’s arrival on the IHRL scene that
remain entangled with its life as a concept outside the legal realm, embedded in the intellectual
genealogies explored in Chapter I. In this chapter, I will attempt to relate and distinguish these
uses, highlighting intersectionality’s arrival qua travelling idea, and legal concept; this twin
materialization is the focus of my work in this section.

3.2 Intersectionality: mapping how the idea travels
In contrast to the foregoing thesis about the limitations of CEDAW as embedded in a
single axis understanding of women’s oppression, with a legacy of colonial views of culture,
Meghan Campbell advances the argument that CEDAW is, by virtue of its framing qua text, a
naturally occurring proto-intersectional guide to rights protection.487 Whereas I, and other
critics,488 have seen CEDAW’s single ground of “women” as an essentializing force in the
treaty’s norms, Campbell contends that it is precisely because the treaty advances a single
ground for discrimination that a full spectrum of women’s identities can be covered by its
protections. She asserts that:
Rather than limiting itself to traditional status based grounds, if
women experience discrimination in relation to an identity,
experience or cross-cutting problem that interacts with and is
rooted in their sex and/or gender they are protected under
CEDAW.489
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Acknowledging the critiques of CEDAW’s essentializing impetus, Campbell, following
Andrew Byrne, argues that its broad definition of discrimination allows it to address those forms
“not explicitly mentioned in the treaty”.490 They, like Fredman, argue that it is the
capaciousness491 of CEDAW’s definition of discrimination and corollary concept of equality that
allows it to support intersectionality as an approach to the Committee’s deliberations. 492
According to Campbell, CEDAW is simply “doing” intersectionality by virtue of an unrestrictive
grounding for the basis of claim; thus, CEDAW qua Committee is applying intersectional
thinking, without a fully articulated reason for that practice. Campbell asserts that “[w]hile the
Committee is in fact addressing women’s intersectional discrimination, the legal basis for this
remains unclear”.493 Thus, Campbell identifies the thinking work of lawyers and scholars as that
of discerning, clarifying and shoring up the legal basis for CEDAW’s intersectional instincts.
Both Fredman and Campbell offer an important if technical read of the jurisprudential
portent of CEDAW, moving the debate about the possibility of its practical application into
current practice contexts with sound evidence; but they are relatively unconcerned with the ways
in which the idea of intersectionality has travelled or landed qua idea, institutional concept or
vector of power. Their work is particularly illuminating and instructive on the legal points that
have made CEDAW the place in law where the intersectionality action is, specifically in the face
of national legal systems that appear to be unable to make the leap from single grounds
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conceptions of rights infringements.494 We will make use of their analysis as we explore the legal
definitions and practical potential of intersectionality below, and in the chapters that follow.
Yet, even within a strictly legalistic or jurisprudential reading of the text of the treaty, a
consistent application of the critical international legal method I have adopted from Orford
demands a contextualization of ideas in relation to their progenitors’ intended meaning and the
changes they undergo in their movement in context over time. As Anne Orford takes stock of
responses to her work on the UN’s international governance project through the Responsibility to
Protect (R2P),495 she provides observations on international legal method that are instructive in
this context:
If we want to understand the work that a particular legal argument
is doing, we have to grasp both aspects of law’s operation—the
way it relates to a particular, identifiable social context, and the
way in which it gestures beyond that context to a conversation that
may persist—sometimes in a neat linear progression, sometimes in
wild leaps and bounds—across centuries.496

Following Orford’s method of tracing the historic shift to R2P doctrine in international
legal governance projects497—a move she painstakingly traces as one that gathered previous
practices into an articulation and justification, rather than one that followed a conceptual
direction—the following two chapters will trace the integration of “pre-existing but dispersed
practices”498 of intersectionality into “a coherent account”499 of its adoption in the consideration
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and adjudication of women’s IHRL. Mine is a much smaller canvass than Orford’s. Hers is a
project to trace the
vital connection between practical innovation, theoretical
elaboration, and social transformation, both in relation to the
political instrumentalization of theory in practice and in the search
for a critical practice of international law in its different
articulations.500

In her work on R2P, Orford uses this approach to study a subset of statecraft, namely,
international legal authority carried out through the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. Thus,
while she is crafting a “history” of the R2P, she maintains this wide lens focus on the context of
the doctrine and the work it is performing, specifically with respect to international law’s
genealogy in empire.501 In the present conceptualization, IHRL is merely a subset of this larger
project of international authority and governance, a matter that we have explored in the previous
chapter. It is worth noting, however, that alongside humanitarian intervention, which specifically
denotes jurisdiction derived from international authority to intervene in the affairs of another
state, and can thus be seen to extend the project of international authority directly while offering
its own (humanitarian) justification for doing so, IHRL likewise contributes to the softer side of
international authority, loaning it legitimacy as it expresses law’s most noble aspirations. In
Orford’s sense, these are not contradictory aims, but part and parcel of a deliberately constructed
vision with roots in time and place, based on the valorization of “free trade, liberalized
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economies, informal empire and benevolent humanitarianism”, justifying “new forms of
international action” based on an idea of a “universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose”.502
In the legal shift to intersectionality at the UN, CEDAW in particular, and the context of
the broader projects of the UN, the framers of CEDAW and the influential feminist ideas of the
time all play their parts. In keeping with Orford’s method, I am attentive to the location of
intersectionality within this genealogy of empire, while tracing the aspiration she notes as
perhaps unique to law as a discipline: a “passionate quest …for the possibility of positive change
or—put simply—a ‘better world’”.503 Thus, I find with Merry that,
[w]hile we focus on the circulation of ideas designed to improve
the human condition, it is important to remember that they include
the modes of establishing and maintaining control of
populations.504

Her work and the work of others work remind us that while “the UN … champions
human rights as a way to counteract violence against individuals”, it also “reflects older
traditions of colonialism and patriarchy that valorize unequal treatments of race, gender, class,
and culture” […].505 As we seek clarity in and expansion of the capacity for law to provide
visibility, reflection and protection for those most marginalized by the power relations of the
world through the elaboration of an intersectional approach, we must attend to the operations of
old narratives made new as they underlay and limit our best aspirations. This is not an act of
cleverness, designed to undermine the project of protection and empowerment, but an act of
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clarity and vigilance in the face of law’s nostalgia and self-regard for its own project of
intervention in the world’s great problems.506 It is Halley et al’s “ethic of responsibility”,
entreating us to “confront, rather than blindspot” that “enchanted engagement” can lead you to
“help your friends”, while hurting “some group of even-less-well-off players”.507 In this sense, I
am following Orford’s method as laid out in the introduction in a different context, by seeking to
trace the practices of intersectionality as international authority’s consciousness of itself 508
through attentiveness to the use of the term intersectionality, its meanings, uses and proxies, and
its emergence in time and place.

3.3 Emerging grounds: Multiple, compound or intersectional
discrimination?
The initial stage of intersectionality’s appearance in the UN’s discussion of women’s
human rights must be traced in part to Beijing in 1995. In that year, The Beijing Declaration and
the Platform for Action: Fourth World Conference on Women 509 was launched. For most
commentators, Beijing is an “immense”510 part of this story; many link its ratification by the
General Assembly to the commencement of an intersectional approach at the United Nations,511
and tie this to the adoption of “Gender Mainstreaming,”512 a UN-promoted approach to public
policy development that “involves ensuring that gender perspectives and attention to the goal of
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gender equality are central to all activities”.513 It is a related and supportive but separate concept
and agenda, advanced in the human rights realm through both the Vienna Conference and
Beijing, which has forced the consideration of gender as an intersection to all areas of UN
concern.514 It is a concept and practice not without its critics,515 but many more agree that it
prepared the ground for intersectionality.516 Beginning intersectionality’s story here secures it, by
association, as a fixed part of a coherent international human rights regime,517 owing to The
Beijing Declaration’s endorsement by the General Assembly Resolution on December 22,
1995,518 since, in the simplest legal sense, “a claim is an international human right if the General
Assembly says it is”.519 Agreeing that The Beijing Declaration “constitutes one of the earliest
translations of the idea of intersectionality … into UN language”,520 Collins and Bilge
nevertheless tie its inception internationally to the World Conference Against Racism, thus
maintaining its link to the activist agenda.521
The General Assembly, through Article 13 of the Charter, is seen as the most “credible
arbiter” of agreement and concurrence among those in the international community on what
constitutes new human rights law.522 In the present reading, I propose The Beijing Declaration
as a proto-intersectional framework. That is, while advancing the agenda of accounting for

513

Gender Mainstreaming: An Overview (United Nations, Office of the Advancement of Women, 2002).
Gender Mainstreaming: An Overview (United Nations, Office of the Advancement of Women, 2002).
515
Charlesworth, supra note 96.
516
Crenshaw, supra note 67; Coomaraswamy, supra note 197; Yuval-Davis, supra note 43; Joseph, McBeth &
Vakulenko, supra note 512.
517
Alston, supra note 287.
518
note 196.
519
“Alston, Philip. ‘Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal For Quality Control’ (1984) 78:3 American
Journal of International Law 607.” at 607.
520
Collins & Bilge, supra note 42 at 91.
521
Ibid at 90.
522
Alston, supra note 287 at 609.
514

122
multiply discriminated women, the Declaration did not use the word “intersectional” once.523
Article 32 of the Declaration stated that governments must, for instance:
Intensify efforts to ensure equal enjoyment of all human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all women and girls who face multiple
barriers to their empowerment and advancement because of such
factors as their race, age, language, ethnicity, culture, religion, or
disability, or because they are indigenous people.524
The declaration therefore stands out for many as the “most important”525 building block
for an intersectional approach to IHRL, and for “including the core elements of an intersectional
approach”,526 but is not the official launch of the concept as gathered under the terminology we
are tracking. In the declaration, the listing of multiple characteristics, which constitute grounds
for protection, signals the intention to complicate the single axis of gender discrimination that
CEDAW was known for protecting, but it requires further analysis to determine if the terms
variously used—such as multiple, compound, cumulative, combined, additive, overlapping, and
complex discrimination527 and intersectionality are synonymous.
In many documents, such as The Beijing Declaration, but also in many other
jurisprudential uses,528 various UN entities appear to use the terms synonymously. In her study of
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the potential for intersectionality to be adopted in the decision making of the EU and its member
states, Sandra Fredman signaled a similar conflation of terminology when she found that the
terms were used “interchangeably although they might have subtly different meanings”.529
Fredman makes the following distinctions in that context, which provide general analytic clarity
to the use of terms within anti-discrimination and human rights’ contexts where forms of
discrimination are contemplated as more complex than those conceived on a single axis.
Fredman distinguishes three main categories of “multiple” discrimination, only the third
of which meets the definition of “intersectional”: the first is “sequential multiple discrimination”,
which occurs when a person experiences discrimination on separate occasions, based on different
grounds or for different aspect of herself, as discrete and sequential events. The second is
“additive multiple” discrimination and this occurs when one person experiences two separate
grounds of discrimination at the same time. This discrimination is “additive’, and therefore is
properly so-characterized because each ground of discrimination can be separately proved. It is
clear in these cases that two separate grounds have been breached. Intersectionality, Fredman
holds, is of a different order: it is not simply additive, but is the synergistic melding of grounds
into a qualitatively new form of discrimination, and thus properly worthy of the metaphor that
names it. Fredman characterizes this as “of a different order in that discrimination does not
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simply consist in the addition of two sources of discrimination; the result is qualitatively
different”, calling it “synergistic.”530
Here Fredman follows Crenshaw’s early analytic distinction, positing a mutually
constitutive form of discrimination which is at once a product of multiple vulnerabilities, but not
simply additive,531 and singles this out as the authentic intersectional approach. She explicitly
does so with the aim of creating a frame of reference for adjudication. Fredman’s work does not
refer to Crenshaw’s “provisional protocol to be followed to better identify the occasions in which
such interactive discrimination may have occurred,”532 proffered in her 2000 paper for discussion
at the UN. In this work, which we explore extensively below, Crenshaw develops an approach to
“anticipate the various ways that race and gender vulnerabilities may intersect”.533 Here
Crenshaw makes the distinction between “under-inclusion” and “over-inclusion” of violations
within the grounds of discrimination when they are based in the binary of race and gender, and
distinguishes from these the intersectional approach. She delineates over inclusion as typical of
the mainstream feminist approach to gender discrimination, where “a problem or condition that
is particularly or disproportionately visited on a subset of women is simply claimed as a women's
problem. It is over-included to extent that the aspects of the circumstance that render it an
intersectional problem are absorbed into a gender framework without any attempt to
acknowledge the role that racism or some other form of discrimination may have played in
contributing to the circumstance”.534 Its mirror approach, under-inclusion, strips the gender
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dynamics of the discriminatory act and renders the gendered dimension “invisible as a matter of
race or ethnicity”.535
It is unclear to what extent Fredman’s categories of “multiple” and “additive multiple”
discrimination can remain legitimate approaches to discrimination, given her acceptance and
promotion of an intersectional analysis, since, in her own estimation, an authentically
intersectional approach refuses to disaggregate aspects of identity and harm. Therefore, as
Yuval-Davis posited in 2006, “whether to interpret the intersectionality of social divisions as an
additive or as a constitutive process is still central” 536 to the debates surrounding at least legal
approaches to women’s experiences of discrimination. At the heart of this distinction is the
insight that for law to be more responsive to the harms intersectionality can assist in
adjudicating, it must formulate its “test” such that “concrete experiences of oppression, for
example, as ‘a Black person’”, can be recognized as “always constructed and intermeshed in
other social divisions (for example, gender, social class, disability status, sexuality, age,
nationality, immigration status, geography, etc.)”.537 We will return to these authors’ work
below.
Building on Fredman, we can see that the multiple barriers approach in The Beijing
Declaration most closely approximates the additive multiple discrimination that she
distinguishes above. As an antecedent, there is no doubt Beijing has a pivotal role in the
development of intersectionality as law. The declaration was influenced by the unique role
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among human rights treaties played by the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), which
is the intermediary between women’s civil society groups, women’s movements globally and the
UN women’s rights machinery. Beijing was pivotal in no small part because of the activist
struggles launched from international women’s organizations to bring a critical race analysis to
the deliberations of the UN women’s gatherings, thereby providing the clarity, grassroots
legitimacy and analytic tools that readied the institutions for the turning point to come.538
Five years after Beijing, the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW), in
collaboration with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the
United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), convened an expert group meeting
on the theme of gender and racial discrimination, hosted by the Government of Croatia. The
Expert Meeting on Gender and Racial Discrimination took place in Zagreb from November 2124. 2000.539 Yuval-Davis traces the official emergence of intersectionality by name to the
contemporaneous emergence of the framework in CERD’s GC 25, and the sequence of the
preparatory documents to the meeting as part of the preparatory process to the UN World
Conference Against Racism in Durban the following year.540
Yuval-Davis notes that Crenshaw’s work “occupied centre stage”,541 and Crenshaw was
asked to introduce the notion in a special session on the subject leading up to the Durban
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conference. The tone of Yuval-Davis’ positioning of this moment signals the unresolved
intellectual debates surrounding the intersectional story, and specifically the dominance of
American feminist critical race scholars in general, and Crenshaw in particular, in the various
retellings. Yuval-Davis continues: “these issues have been debated by European (especially,but
not only, British) feminist scholars since the end of the 1970s but, apparently, without noticeable
effect on policymakers”.542
As we have explored more thoroughly in Chapter 1, to the scholars of intersectionality as
activist and intellectual history, as well as scholarly production, these questions remain hotly
debated: is intersectionality primarily a story of American critical race feminism, specifically the
brainchild of Kimberlé Crenshaw, who is credited with coining the term?543; the initiative of
black British women and women of colour?;544does it begin the moment Sojourner Truth uttered
the words “Ain’t I a woman”,545 in her famous speech about black women former slaves being
left out of the American white women’s suffrage movement?;546 or when bell hooks used the
phrase attributed to Sojourner Truth in 1981, to develop her intellectual and political analysis
that white-dominated feminism creates a topsy-turvy analytic reality where “the word men in
fact only refers to white men, the word Negroes refers only to black men, and the word women
refers only to white women”?547
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In a story about origins, these intellectual and activist histories may matter a great deal.
As a policy outcome, the various retellings of its genesis may be in fact more important than its
intellectual antecedents. As an idea, whose time had come—or more accurately had been
suppressed and had reemerged across the centuries548— intersectionality as an approach to the
visibility of multi-discriminated women has many antecedents and foremothers, all of them
based in critiques of dominant women’s rights paradigms by black women and women of colour.
In other words, as Grace Kyungwon Hong, paraphrased in Henne, has pointed out, “black
feminism (among other women of colour feminisms) recognises that ‘the racial project of
Western civilization was always a gendered and sexualized project’ and thereby has a rich
tradition of analysing the ‘intersections of race, gender, sexuality, and class within the context of
global colonial capitalism’”.549
In the context of the jurisprudential turn to intersectionality at the UN, there is little to
suggest that Crenshaw’s work did not form the original foundation and shape the later
interpretive contours, no matter how far they came to stray from their origins. Even those who
disagree on other important matters of origins agree that her background paper, introduced at
Zagreb, “made a major contribution to intersectionality’s dispersal in global venues”.550
Mirroring the appearance/disappearance/reappearance of intersectionality, travelling back in time
to Sojourner Truth, the official story of the Zagreb moment is captured in the recollections of

548

Hugh Collins, “Social Inclusion: A Better Approach to Equality Issues” (2004) 14 Transnatl Contemp Probs 897;
Brah & Phoenix, supra note 544.
549
Henne, supra note 89, para 7.
550
Collins & Bilge, supra note 42 at 90.

129
those in attendance,551 but the paper itself is missing from all UN catalogues,552 including those
in paper files at CEDAW,553 electronically or otherwise, in both UN libraries in New York and
Geneva. Indeed, the only way to obtain the paper in English at the time of writing is to receive it
directly from Crenshaw herself.554 (This may change in 2018 when Crenshaw is due to publish a
collection of her work that will include a version of the paper.)555
Crenshaw’s paper was delivered at a pivotal conference in Zagreb, meant in part, to both
reckon with the genocidal events of the former Yugoslavia and those of Rwanda. Thus, in terms
of both timing and content, the paper links the story of intersectionality’s recent reappearance at
the international level to some of the most heinous projects of racialized sexual violence in the
20th century.

3.4 What intersectionality owes to the UN failures in Rwanda and
Bosnia Herzegovina
The institutional groundswell responsible for the receptivity of the concept of
intersectionality at the UN can be traced backwards from the meeting in Zagreb, a moment
crucially linked to the mass genocidal failures of Rwanda and Bosnia Herzegovina. An Aide
Memoire of the meeting, at which Crenshaw’s paper was introduced, suggests that ethnic and
racialized forms of sexual violence formed the context that gave rise to the discussion.556
Crenshaw’s paper, prepared to guide this discussion, appears to underscore that this context was
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top of mind, and formed an impetus to clarify the concepts that, had they been in circulation
earlier, might have made such horror visible to UN observers. Specifically, her work attends to
the inability of observers to see the complex role played by racialized gender and gendered
racism:
the tragic events of genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia were
occasioned by ethnically motivated rape and female mutilation. …
Although the assault against the community represented by these
abuses has been decried as ethnic genocide, this outrage does not
signal any solicitude for victims of this abuse, many of whom are
now ostracized as tainted and unredeemably [sic] degraded
women.557

The paper prepared by Radhika Coomaraswamy, the Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women, titled Review of Reports, Studies And Other Documentation For The
Preparatory Committee And The World Conference,558 also points to this context. She starts by
setting out the main problem that intersectionality is proposed to assist with, referring back to the
language of multiple discrimination:
Gender-based discrimination intersects with discriminations based
on other forms of “otherness”, such as race, ethnicity, religion and
economic status, thus forcing the majority of the world’s women
into situations of double or triple marginalization.559

Intersectionality is proposed to assist in making visible the forms of discrimination that increase
“women’s vulnerability to violence and abuse”.560
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Coomaraswamy credits “interlinked and mutually reinforcing trends”, which include
“recommendations of United Nations conferences and summits”,561 as preparing the way for
intersectionality as an approach to women’s human rights. Thus, although she paints a picture of
the impetus for an intersectional turn as coming from many sources, she, like other observers
noted above, specifically singles out the 4th World Conference and the resulting Beijing Platform
as crucial building blocks to this turning tide.562
In Articles 12 and 13, which we explore further below, she further gestures to the context
of ethnic cleansing and war as the raison d’etre of intersectionality, and the authority of the
General Assembly as the anchor for its legitimacy, thereby solidifying attention on “[t]he
combined effects of racial and gender discrimination on the advancement of women and their
achievement of equality”.563
To Coomaraswamy, the General Assembly’s Special Session on Beijing +5 secured
intersectionality’s place in the UN firmament through its demand “that Governments take
measures to address racism and racially motivated violence against women and girls and …
address all forms of violence against women and girls, including that which is race or ethnicbased”.564 The intersectional turn, she announces, “has provided the opportunity for recognition
of the multiple discrimination experienced by women”; specifically, it has allowed legal changes
ensuring that “the statutes of the Ad Hoc Criminal Tribunals, as well as that of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) implicitly recognize the impact of the intersection of gender and racial
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discrimination.”565 She continues this genealogy of the concept as a legal one by setting the
context in the following way: “Historically, gender and other forms of discrimination, including
racial discrimination, have been considered in parallel.”566 However, demand has increased for a
“more comprehensive analysis of the dynamics of discrimination against women”,567 with
particular mention of the Rwandan and Yugoslav contexts:
Notably, the International Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR] has
concluded that rape and sexual assault committed with the specific
intent of destroying, in whole or in part, a particular group
constitutes acts of genocide. In February 2001, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY], holding that
rape and enslavement constituted crimes against humanity,
convicted three Bosnian Serbs for the systematic rape and
enslavement of Muslim women during the Bosnian war.568

In Coomaraswamy’s reading, it was racialized sexual assault and sexualized racial assault
that gave the earlier demand from international women’s groups at the Beijing Conference for an
intersectional approach at the UN a new persuasiveness and interest, and intersectionality in turn
provided the framework for the innovations to the harms considered in the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY). In her speech introducing the background to intersectionality, Special Rapporteur
Coomaraswamy again points to these links:
In today’s world where most of the wars are ethnic in dimension,
the intersection of gender and race during armed conflict often has
horrific consequences. In Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda and East
Timor, the international community witnessed atrocious crimes of
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sexual violence that has shocked the system into taking effective
action against the perpetrators by setting up international tribunals
of justice. These tribunals and the Statute of the International
Criminal Court make it clear that sexual violence during wartime is
a war crime and a crime against humanity.569

In her paper, she specifies that the “the failure of national Governments and the
international community to analyse adequately all experiences of intersectional discrimination”
that ensures “discrimination faced by marginalized women [is]rendered invisible” to the very
mechanisms that should be in place to address it.570
Coomaraswamy’s paper also expressly links two events (the Gender and Racial
Discrimination Expert Group Meeting of November 2000 in Zagreb, Croatia and the World
Conference on Racial Discrimination and Other Forms of Intolerance, 2001 in Durban, South
Africa), which together mark a decided turn toward an “intersectional” approach to multidiscriminated women within the United Nations system of agencies. To Collins and Bilge, the
“importance of Durban for intersectionality’s global reach cannot be overstated”.571 Through it,
they state, “intersectionality gained a global platform for dissemination and development”.572
Coomaraswamy’s document ascribes an expressly intersectional interpretation of the legal
protections women are entitled to under the auspices of the Commission on Human Rights and
through the operations of CERD, CEDAW, and related mandates and agencies.573 Of particular
note, it appears to launch an official adoption of the language of “intersectionality” at the UN
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with the public speech by its author that introduced it setting out “intersectionality” by name as
an emerging lingua franca of international human rights’ approach to women’s protections,
where once there had been separate approaches.574 At paragraph 22 she concludes her summary
of the transmissions of intersectionality, and as I quoted at the start of this chapter, characterizes
the intersectional approach as an expected IHRL framework, resulting in “the expanded scope of
gender based human rights protection”.575
The document directly links to the work of Crenshaw, even if it also displays a certain
bafflement by its central metaphor:576
The “traffic intersection metaphor”, created by Professor Kimberlé
Crenshaw, gives what is considered to be an effective model for
the understanding of intersectional or multiple discrimination. ‘In
this metaphor, race, gender, class and other forms of discrimination
or subordination are the roads that structure the social, economic or
political terrain. It is through these thoroughfares that dynamics of
disempowerment travel. These thoroughfares are sometimes
framed as distinctive and mutually exclusive avenues of power.’
But these thoroughfares often overlap and cross each other,
creating complex intersections at which two, three or four of these
avenues meet. Marginalized groups of women are located at these
intersections by virtue of their specific identities and must
negotiate the “traffic” that flows through these intersections to
avoid injury and to obtain resources for the normal activities of
life. This can be dangerous when the traffic flows simultaneously
from many directions. Injuries are sometimes created when the
impact from one direction throws victims into the path of
oncoming traffic, while on other occasions, injuries occur from
simultaneous collisions. These are the contexts in which
intersectional injuries occur - when multiple disadvantages or
collisions interact to create a distinct and compound dimension of
disempowerment.577
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As Yuval-Davis noted, “the analytic attempts to explain intersectionality in the reports
that came out of this meeting are confusing”.578 Nevertheless, it does appear that the “distinct
and compound” dimension of “disempowerment” is a move away from Beijing’s “multiple
discrimination”, and a step into a new conceptualization.
On the face of it, the work of the SRVAW played a crucial and consistent role within the
institutions of the United Nations to link the failures of Rwanda to other examples of
international failures to protect multi-discriminated and vulnerable women. In her review of the
work of that office, Special Rapportuer Yakin Ertürk repositions, from the margins to the centre,
the suppressed narrative of intersectional violence against women in war:
Although sexual brutality, enslavement, forced prostitution and
forced pregnancy have marked armed conflicts across the globe,
these crimes have long remained invisible in international criminal
and humanitarian law.
[…]The wartime slavery of “comfort women”, and the conflicts in
Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia,
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, as well as accounts of scores
of other conflicts around the world, conclusively demonstrate that
sexual violence is not an outcome of war, but that women’s bodies
are an important site of war, which makes sexual violence an
integral part of wartime strategy.579

Following this, the Special Rapporteur expressly links this to needed legal reform of the
ways in which such crimes could be seen and ultimately prevented. In a surprisingly frank and
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critical assessment of the work over 15 years of the SRVAW’s office, the following summarizes
some of these efforts:
the SRVAW made recommendations to remedy the lack of
capacity of the Office of the Prosecutor and the Sexual Assault
Team to actively prosecute sexual violence perpetrated during the
conflict in Rwanda. In addition to the focus on prosecutions of
sexual violence in their mission reports, both SRVAWs also
addressed the status of women in post-conflict and peace
processes, notably in relation to the status of survivors of violence,
women in detention, the operations of the United Nations agencies,
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
and the reconciliation processes.580

Given the office of the SRVAW’s link with the introduction of intersectionality in
Croatia through the then office holder Coomaraswamy, as noted above, we find Ertürk provides
further weight to the association of violations in war and the readiness for an approach to
women’s rights violations as intersectional. She enumerates the visibility afforded the
intersectional experiences of women in the context of war:
… the mandate holders have continued to… [bring] out the
exacerbated impact of armed conflict when combined with
patriarchy, ethnic and racial marginalization, poor status of
women, and the absence of gender equality in legislation and State
processes.581

Ertürk does not shy away from explicitly naming the UN’s role in perpetuating it, and
ignoring the reports from the mandate holders that sexual violence was endemic to
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“peacekeeping”.582 It is clear from the internal documents, in addition to the public ones, such as
the memoires of Brigadier-General Romeo Dallaire,583 that while the devastation in Rwanda was
pronounced by members of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations
during the 1994 Genocide to be “one of the most abhorrent events of the 20th century”,584 it also
was experienced as a moral and institutional failure on the part of the UN.585 Then Secretary
General Kofi Annan called for an independent inquiry into the events of the Rwandan genocide
and the complete failure of the international community as part of the institution’s reckoning,
declaring that the institutional healing and capacity for future prevention were of equal import to
the accountability to the Rwandan people:
These are wounds which need to be healed, for the sake of the
people of Rwanda, for the United Nations and also for all those …
who are at risk of becoming victims of genocide in the future.586

At the institutional level, the fallout from the Rwanda genocide and the subsequent legal
prosecutions587 may have been the driver for the integration of gender and race in the recognition
and prediction of harms. Underscoring this, the Office of the High Commission for Human
Rights in its press kit for the 2001 Durban World Conference Against Racism, at which the
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concept of intersectionality was formally introduced, issued the following as part of its official
statement as sponsoring host of the conference (although its assessment of the successes of the
prosecution of sexual violence as a crime of war differs notably from that of the SRVAW):
Ethnic or race-based violence against women is considered the
most recognizable example of intersectional discrimination.
Incidents of rape in Bosnia, Kosovo, Burundi and Rwanda
represent race-based targeting of women for an explicitly genderbased violation. Additionally, ethnic conflict produces a large
number of female refugees who then become vulnerable to sexual
violence and gender-related issues. Rape against women picked
because of their ethnic or religious origin has now been recognized
as a weapon of war by both International Criminal Tribunals for
Rwanda and Yugoslavia, and prosecuted accordingly.588

Overall, this “new” lens on the intersectional harms and deliberate targeting of racialized
or ethnically profiled women during war, may have loaned previously resistant institutional
frameworks the legitimacy to consider the intersections of race and gender as worthy of
detection, prevention, remedy and study. Since the time of the independent inquiry, the use of
sexual violence against women as a routine tactic of war has been “mainstreamed”, and the
requirement to understand and combat it has resulted in specific measures to address it, including
the establishment of a new Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for
Sexual Violence in Conflict (SRSG-SVC).589 Crenshaw, in her Zagreb paper, makes it plain that
the intersectional agenda is linked to the bald examples of “intersectional oppression” that are the
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“most recognizable”—those that have taken place in the genocidal contexts we have been
discussing:
The most recognizable examples of intersectional oppression are
often the most tragic: ethnic or race based violence against women.
This violence might be usefully framed as intentional intersectional
subordination in that the racism and sexism manifested in these
rapes reflects the race or ethnic-based targeting of women for an
explicitly gender-based violation. Recent tragedies in Bosnia,
Rwanda, Burundi, and Kosovo sadly illustrate that the long history
of ethnically based violence against women has not been relegated
to the distant past. While these are the most recent and widespread
examples of intersectional violence, this particular vulnerability
has played out not only in armed conflict, but also in other contexts
as well.590

Interestingly, these forms of intersectional violations are also the most easily reduced by
the law to single axis discrimination, even in the face of express guidance to consider the mutual
constituency of the harm. The rape of women and the prosecution of the rape of women as a
form of genocide and a crime against humanity formed an important aspect of the legal process,
both in its attempts to address rape in a pioneering way, and in its failures to do so, briefly
considered here specifically in Rwanda.591 Express strategies to prosecute mass rapes as
intersectional harms have been critiqued for their legal erasure of women as subjects of the
violence, and agents in their own narratives of harm and remedy. The dominant frameworks of
criminal prosecution required an overarching adherence to ethnic identity as the targeted
category; this meant in some cases, the rape of women who were not identified as part of the
“targeted group”, required the violation to be defined in terms of, for instance their husbands’
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(acknowledged to be targeted) ethnicity; her rape becomes a (property) crime against him.592 It is
a legal strategy that practitioners might regard as inventive, creative and even ingenious, as it
works to move around law’s narrow conceptions to find another avenue for remedy. It is,
however, ironically, the opposite of an intersectional approach. As Yuval-Davis’s forewarning
helps us see, such attempts to adhere to the grounds of discrimination, force an essentialization
of identity. In this way, the effort of an intersectional analysis breaks apart into its constituent
elements as specific forms of additive oppression. This approach,
inevitably conflates narratives of identity politics with descriptions
of positionality as well as constructing identities within the terms
of specific political projects. Such narratives often reflect
hegemonic discourses of identity politics that render invisible
experiences of the more marginal members of that specific social
category and construct an homogenized ‘right way’ to be its
member.593

Moreover, it can also serve to reinforce the original harms. As Ertürk underscores
violence against women in armed conflict has been couched in
terms of ‘protection’ and ‘honour’. Article 27 of the 1949 Geneva
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War treats violence against women as a crime of honour rather
than as a crime of violence. By using the honour paradigm, linked
as it is to concepts of chastity, purity and virginity, stereotypical
concepts of femininity have been formally enshrined in
humanitarian law. Thus, criminal sexual assault, in both national
and international law, is linked to the morality of the victim. When
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rape is perceived as a crime against honour or morality, shame
commonly ensues for the victim594

It appears that the UN’s adoption of intersectionality outside CEDAW is, in some
important respects, cut from the narrow prosecutorial cloth of war crimes, and consequently
suffers from the under-inclusion of gender. These structural shortcomings and patriarchal values
embedded in the very design of the protections, instead often get represented in racist terms as
shortcomings of the ‘cultures’—“because they are considered tainted and promiscuous”595— of
the communities in which women seeking redress. In this sense, “legal discussions presume
rather than interrogate the processes by which conflict is deemed to be ethnic, and violence
becomes sexual”.596 Within CEDAW, as I explore shortly, the tendency is to disengage gender
from its mutually constituted formations along race, class and most persistently, along cultural
axes. Clearly, the intersection metaphor doesn’t immunize those employing it against reverting to
studying the separate ontological bases of social division, tracing individual identity markers
rather than the confluence of complex social formations. In this use of the term, rather than
accounting for the construction of a social process of discrimination, where an individual’s
experience of it is unintelligible without the context of complex group disadvantage and
exploitation, “intersectionality” merely restates in new words the experience of personal
exclusion (or inclusion) during a one-time event of discrimination. This ipso facto characterizes
discrimination as an aberration from the regular functioning of (assumedly non-discriminatory)
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social and institutional relations. Without analytic rigour, the radical promise of intersectionality
as offering structural analysis of the intersectional process of discrimination collapses into the
mutually exclusive identity-based and narrow grounds of discrimination that it superseded.
Casual deployments of the term for already entrenched approaches to antidiscrimination law
reduce what is essentially a radical analysis of social stratification, providing for both recognition
and redistribution, to one of identity recognition only; what Crenshaw envisioned as a structural
project becomes individualized.
This is what Yuval-Davis had forewarned; the UN, she feared, was conflating the
“positional and discursive,” remaining “on one level of analysis, the experiential, [unable to]
differentiate between different levels.”597 The result, she contends, “is actually fragmentation
and multiplication of the wider categorical identities rather than more dynamic, shifting and
multiplex constructions of intersectionality”.598 How these analytic hazards play out in the
adoption of the terminology in the human rights treaties at the primary intersection of race and
gender is explored in the initial incorporation of an intersectional vocabulary at CERD and
CEDAW set out below.

3.5 The “intersectionalization” of human rights treaty protections:
What CEDAW owes to CERD
In her 2001 paper, Coomaraswamy refers to the adoption of the CERD GC 25,599 which
had been released that same year, as CERD’s first clear statement on its self-conscious
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obligations to consider gender within the terms of its norms,600 although it had modified its
reporting procedures in the previous Session, to incorporate information on the gendered aspects
of racial discrimination.601 General Recommendation 25 was the first statement of an
intersectional position at one of the main human rights treaty bodies, although the word, again,
was not used. Its framing is elegantly brief, or, in light of intervening years, maddeningly thin,
depending on your perspective. In Article 2, the context of racialized sexual violence is once
again expressly indicated as the definitional example of discrimination that this new directive to
interpretation is trying to capture. In directing itself to account for gender, CERD is trying to
better detect, protect and hold states accountable for:
… sexual violence committed against women members of
particular racial or ethnic groups in detention or during armed
conflict; the coerced sterilization of indigenous women; abuse of
women workers in the informal sector or domestic workers
employed abroad by their employers. Racial discrimination may
have consequences that affect primarily or only women, such as
pregnancy resulting from racial bias-motivated rape; in some
societies women victims of such rape may also be ostracized.
Women may also be further hindered by a lack of access to
remedies and complaint mechanisms for racial discrimination
because of gender-related impediments, such as gender bias in the
legal system and discrimination against women in private spheres
of life.602
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In total, the GR is a mere six paragraphs, occasioning Hilary Charlesworth’s scathing
dismissal of it as “brief and desultory”. 603 Its brevity may be particularly noteworthy to those
who, like Charlesworth and Coomaraswamy, are familiar with CERD’s long and frustrating
history of following “some committee members” who “suggested … gender issues did not fall
within its mandate”.604 However concise and late to the game it may be, it is far from random.
Modest, not properly catalogued, and still in a changeable format,605 CERD GR 25 nevertheless
has many of the core elements of an intersectional call to action, showing off the Committee as
exhorting itself to operate with “a more systematic and consistent approach to evaluating and
monitoring racial discrimination against women, as well as the … obstacles … women face in
the full exercise and enjoyment of their civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights…”.606
Its language lacks the convolution of some of the later UN documents, which try to grapple with
the explicit language of intersectionality, but it nonetheless wrestles with the core distinctions
that have preoccupied the intersectionalists I have traced through the literature.
From the foregoing, we can see that CERD sees the intersection of race and gender
operating at structural as well as individual levels; below we see that CERD perceives
discrimination as operating in public as well as in private, the latter being a unique insight
brought into the human rights fold through the advent of CEDAW. From the very abrupt
beginning of CERD’s GR 25, we see the Committee describing a synergistic, mutually
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constitutive form of discrimination that is not merely the additive exercise of putting two
vulnerabilities together. In its opening paragraph, CERD simply posits:
The Committee notes that racial discrimination does not always
affect women and men equally or in the same way. There are
circumstances in which racial discrimination only or primarily
affects women, or affects women in a different way, or to a
different degree than men. Such racial discrimination will often
escape detection if there is no explicit recognition or
acknowledgement of the different life experiences of women and
men, in areas of both public and private life.607

Ten years later, this language is lifted almost wholesale into the guidance that CEDAW
crafts for its own turn to intersectionality. While Charlesworth decries the late and miserly
arrival of CERD to the gender table, CEDAW waited until 2010 to make plain its commitment to
incorporating an intersectional analysis, with General Comment 28.608
In GC 28, the CEDAW Committee sets its jurisprudential guide to the treaty’s
interpretation back into the context of its chapeau Article 1, and the approach to discrimination
and equality we explored in Chapter 2. In paragraph 5, the Committee states that:
…identical or neutral treatment of women and men might
constitute discrimination against women if such treatment resulted
in or had the effect of women being denied the exercise of a right
because there was no recognition of the pre-existing gender-based
disadvantage and inequality that women face.609
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Interestingly, however, intersectionality is expressly read back through Article 2,
referencing the obligations of States parties, and the language discussed earlier of “condemn”,
“eliminate” and “abolish” customs or practices that discriminate against women, rather than
through Article 1, governing the interpretation of discrimination itself:
Intersectionality is a basic concept for understanding the scope of
the general obligations of States parties contained in article 2. The
discrimination of women based on sex and gender is inextricably
linked with other factors that affect women, such as race, ethnicity,
religion or belief, health, status, age, class, caste and sexual
orientation and gender identity. Discrimination on the basis of sex
or gender may affect women belonging to such groups to a
different degree or in different ways to men. States parties must
legally recognize such intersecting forms of discrimination and
their compounded negative impact on the women concerned and
prohibit them.610

Andrew Byrnes maintains that Article 2 has the distinction of being seen by the
Committee as the “very essence of the Convention”;611 indeed we have identified it above as
central to the treaty’s object and purpose. However, in arguments about the changed nature of the
conceptualization of discrimination as a result of an intersectional interpretation, it seems odd not
to position the interpretation in that definitional Article (1). Rather than expressly expanding the
definition of discrimination by reading intersectionality as the overarching meaning of the treaty
and the grounds of discrimination per se, intersectional awareness is now to be seen as part of a
suite of state obligations, or a form of discrimination to be likewise “eliminated” and
“abolished”.612 In his excellent exploration of the jurisprudence of Article 2, Byrnes makes the
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case for the use of the language of “abolish” and “eliminate” as likewise embedded in the terms
set out against racism in CERD as “a powerful expression of the international community’s
attitude towards discrimination against women—the language of condemnation is also used in
the context of racial discrimination,”.613 Thus while the denunciation may be equivalent to that
articulated against racism, the specific context of culture as its location raises other important
and cross-cutting rights for an intersectional approach. The difference is a subtle but revealing
one: reading intersectionality through Article 2, positions “intersectional” as on par with
“cultural”—part of a list of characteristics, or in Yuval-Davis’ sense, identity markers—and
these are lumped in with factors that are ipso facto infringements on the rights of women.
Byrnes, one of most widely agreed upon preeminent scholars of CEDAW as a living document,
has characterized the intersectional turn at CEDAW within the auspices of Article 2 in the
following manner: “intersectionality [is the Treaty Committee’s] approach to discrimination
against particular groups of women—such as ethnic minorities or Indigenous peoples, migrant
workers, and women with disabilities and other cross-cutting themes.”614
The posture adopted by the CEDAW intersectional turn is thus, in many ways, in keeping
with its core contestations with culture as the primary site of the manifestation, reproduction and
experience of discrimination. In that context, “intersectional” becomes an additional event of
discrimination based on multiple and specific grounds, identities or vulnerabilities. In contrast,
we have seen that rather than being merely an additional ground, intersectionality is an approach,
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a conceptualization and a frame of analysis that operates on many levels to challenge the very
basis of traditional grounds-based conceptions of discrimination.
From Crenshaw we learned that an important aspect of the intersectional turn is that is
requires us to consider the structural and group identity aspects of discrimination, in addition to
the vulnerabilities that attract the overt discrimination and marginalization of individuals. To
Crenshaw, these form the “background” systems that sustain and maintain systems of
subordination in a dynamic and ongoing way. These are distinguished in her background paper
for the UN as not being simply additive or “multiple” in the ways that continue to appear in the
various IHRL approaches; nor, importantly, is this form of discrimination like other
conceptualizations in law, the result of a one-time temporal event, as I have argued above.
Instead:
The conjoining of multiple systems of subordination has been
variously described as compound discrimination, multiple burdens,
or double or triple discrimination. Intersectionality is a
conceptualization of the problem that attempts to capture both the
structural and dynamic consequences of the interaction between
two or more axis of subordination. It specifically addresses the
manner in which racism, patriarchy, class oppression and other
discriminatory systems create background inequalities that
structure the relative positions of women, races, ethnicities,
classes, and the like. Moreover, it addresses the way that specific
acts and policies create burdens that flow along these axes
constituting the dynamic or active aspects of disempowerment.615

It is this structural aspect of intersectionality that is the most difficult for the law to grasp
and administer. Ertürk pins this down in a global context that very much includes the peacetime
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structures of discrimination in Nordic democracies—considered bastions of equality—
specifically “the need to address root causes, including avoidance of gender and cultural
stereotypes”, as well as adherence to gender-mainstreaming agendas which produce “genderneutral State responses to domestic violence, as well as the cultural essentialist responses to
violence among immigrant communities”.616 Crenshaw, and Yuval-Davis, might counter
Fredman’s categories of discrimination that retain additive formulations of multiplicity, in all but
an explanatory or lay language sense. To Crenshaw, the importance of the structural informs all
considerations of temporal discrimination. For instance, she says, harms from one form of
discrimination may make a person vulnerable to another form; at other times, two forms of
discrimination are indistinguishable, and simultaneously occurring: in both instances, “[t]hese
are the contexts in which intersectional injuries occur—disadvantages or conditions interact with
preexisting vulnerabilities to create a distinct dimension of disempowerment.”617
As an example, Crenshaw returns to the war crimes context, and points out the important
ways in which both what comes before and what comes after such violent outbreaks of atrocity
are immanent to the operation of intersectional discrimination; indeed there are both structural
precursors, allowing such violations to occur, as well as continuing conditions which make the
remedies for intersectional atrocities impossible to achieve. This is especially so without having
considered this defining feature of intersectionality’s unique analytic contribution: “Propaganda
against poor and racialized women may not only render them likely targets of sexualized
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violence, it may also contribute to the tendency of many people to doubt their truthfulness when
they attempt to seek the protection of authorities.”618
Here Crenshaw is positing a different approach to intersectional discrimination than that
which has arisen out of the mass atrocity context, by pointing out that such eruptions of targeted
violence “draw upon preexisting gender stereotypes” but are also based in “distinctions between
women”, and on “racial or ethnic stereotypes”.619 In this way, she points out, race or ethnic, as
well as class and gender stereotypes work to characterize some groups “as sexually
undisciplined”.620 It is precisely the intersection of these preexisting and powerful social tropes
that has dire consequences for women: making them “particularly vulnerable to punitive
measures based largely on who they are”.621
The direct and deliberate nature of mass atrocity-based intersectional harms against
women can make them too event-based and sensational, and therefore an inaccurate template, for
the structural analysis intersectionality requires, unless a much longer view of the background to
the crisis is engaged. That this eruptive set of pre-mediated violations dominated the introduction
of the term and its contours is made more evident by Crenshaw’s overt insistence that even
“[t]argeted acts of intentional discrimination are not limited to sexual violence.”622 In
Crenshaw’s elaboration for the Croatia meeting, she emphasizes the particular form of
“structural intersectional subordination”,623 which has been seen in intersectional theory as
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critical to its potential to assist adjudication to reach past the elaboration of additional
enumerated and restrictive grounds, and reach into transformative, “counter-hegemonic”, lawmaking.624 This requires attention to larger structural issues, such as the uneven global power
relations that leave, for instance, African migrants at a relative disadvantage to other migrants,
but also so-called passive or benign forms of intersectional discrimination, which are “not in any
way targeted toward women or toward any other marginalized people; [but] simply intersect…
with other structures to create a subordinating effect”.625 Crenshaw cites the “burdens placed on
women by structural adjustment policies within developing economies”626 as one such example.
This pivot back to the radical roots of intersectionality’s potential recalls the TWAIL
critiques explored in Chapter 1; these have called into question the authority of the international
systems we have in place to arbitrate forms of discrimination that grow out of the very authority
being claimed to do so;627 authority, as Orford pointed out in the text we explored in Chapter I,
that found its succor in the “shadow of empire”,628 and still suffers from “the apparent inability
of the international human rights system to address what many feminists see as the major human
rights issue facing women in the post-Cold War era: the threat posed to human rights by
economic globalization”.629 In apparent recognition of these criticisms, CEDAW’s 2017 GR 35,
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offers the following enhancement to its focus on gender-based violence, linking its concern with
“culture” in a continuum of harms that culminate in the effects of globalization:
An erosion of legal and policy frameworks to eliminate gender based discrimination or violence, often justified in the name of
tradition, culture, religion or fundamentalist ideologies, and
significant reductions in public spending, often as part of “austerity
measures” following economic and financial crises, further weaken
the state responses. In the context of shrinking democratic spaces
and consequent deterioration of the rule of law, all these factors
allow for the pervasiveness of gender-based violence against
women and lead to a culture of impunity.630

In the context of CEDAW, which is, of course, both text and institution, we see the
struggle with the full range of intersectionality’s role as both “outside” social critique and
“insider” practical legal guide; it is based on a struggle built into the walls of the treaty document
and arising out of the nature of the state-populated committee, which mirrors the tensions of its
founding text, between the more structural approach of the USSR and newly independent nations
and the more individual protection approaches of liberal western democracies.631 CEDAW
seesaws, as we have seen in the previous chapter, between its stance as a fully integrated treaty,
with a view to cohering the binary formations of rights that have characterized the introduction
of international human rights generally, such as de jure/de facto; civil and political/ social,
economic and cultural; public/private, and one that falls prey to the old habits of colonial
formulations of the oppressed “other”. These layered tensions also come alive in the
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deliberations of the Committee through the individuals who populate it, and bring to it their
beliefs, influences and adherences.
Byrne fairly credits CEDAW qua deliberative body with operationalizing an unusually
expansive definition of equality, in which “both legal and non-legal measures” lead to
transformation which can “cover all fields of life”, “ensure that all branches and levels of
government are appropriately engaged in implementation”, with “particular emphasis on the
groups of women who are most marginalized and who may suffer from various forms of
intersectional discrimination” are able to “participate actively in the development,
implementation and monitoring of the policy”, with the end-goal that all women “have access to
information about their Convention rights and are able to claim them”.632 Far from a strictly
legalistic approach, CEDAW demands positive equality that imposes forward-thinking public
policy outcomes among its States parties:
The Committee has also drawn on analyses of the nature of human
rights obligations developed under other treaties to explicate the
meaning and scope of Convention obligations. Of particular
importance has been the tripartite framework developed initially in
relation to economic, social, and cultural rights, but now applied to
civil and political rights as well: the obligations to respect, protect,
and fulfill/promote the rights guaranteed.633

In the next chapter, I explore, through interviews with a cross-section of current and past
CEDAW and one CERD member, the ways that the individuals who help to define the
operations of intersectionality as a technique of IHRL think of the concept, as well as the task of
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its application. I will do so in the context of a brief review of methodology and jurisprudence,
with the benefit of the approaches and frameworks I have elaborated so far. As Crenshaw has
insisted:
the intersectional problem is not simply that one discreet form of
discrimination is not fully addressed, but that an entire range of
human rights violations are obscured by the failure to address fully
the intersectional vulnerabilities of marginalized women and
occasionally marginalized men as well.634

Maintaining Orford’s approach, I will take the insights from the present chapter and
examine the interaction of the Committee’s consciousness of itself next to the decisions it has
taken on individual communications and countries’ concluding observations (CO). In the final
chapter, I will examine the forward-looking aspects of intersectionality’s social vision in the
hands of the treaty body, and scrutinize the space for social agency the Committee members’
vision allows for the subjects of the protective frame they administer. The foregoing analysis
augurs the need to be attentive to the core paradox of intersectionality at CEDAW—that to
render it fit for praxis, it simultaneously instrumentalizes the concept into a tool of law that
curtails its insights, thereby impoverishing its social vision where the treaty’s own expansiveness
could instead be fertile ground.
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4 Intersectionality and the CEDAW Committee’s
Consciousness of Itself
Studying travelling ideas often requires travelling with the people
who are carrying them.635
It can be more revolutionary to work on the small rules than to issue thumping
denunciations.636
You know, that CEDAW is not so much an academic debating
club [laughs]. No, you know it’s important always to emphasize
members have various backgrounds in CEDAW so the point is
always to come up with terms that are understandable for all
members in the committee.637
[L]awyers theorize on the run, in response to particular problems
or doctrinal dead-ends, and yet in doing so often come back to
shared themes or conceptual dilemmas.638

4.1 Introduction
So far, in tracing intersectionality’s promises, transmissions and impacts considering the
Orford challenge to create a feminist reading of international law that does not simply advance
imperial ambitions, I have illuminated, in a literature review in Chapter I, the promises of
intersectionality’s intellectual and activist contributions to feminist law and feminist governance.
I held out the complex theoretical and praxis roles intersectionality is asked to occupy, and the
challenges of holding its radical critique in balance with its ambitions to create positive legal and
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social change through governance engagement. In Chapter 2, I traced the institutional, textual
and normative grounding of women’s IHR in the CEDAW treaty, revealing an ambiguous legacy
of rights advancement in the context of fixed notions about culture that owe much to an imperial
past, making it simultaneously hostile and receptive to intersectionality’s insights. In Chapter 3, I
explored the antecedents of intersectionality as a quasi-juridical practice while maintaining
awareness of IHRL as part of the project of international law that, in Orford’s sense, is embraced
as a vehicle for wide-ranging public projects designed to reorder
the world, from dividing up Africa at the end of the nineteenth
century, to ending the scourge of war, managing decolonisation,
humanising warfare and liberalising trade in the twentieth
century.639

As an overarching approach, maintained throughout these chapters, I centred out Orford’s
use of the concept of law’s “consciousness of itself” to explain my approach to the materials and
texts I was analyzing. Specifically, I invoked it to indicate a methodological approach to
international legal scholarship that can “develop a legal analysis that is also critical, idiomatically
recognisable and politically useful”.640 In my introduction, I presented my position that despite
the differences in scope between Orford’s project of tracking the exercise of authority in
international law generally through the rise of the concept of Responsibility to Protect, and my
interest in a critical feminist view of the development of women’s international human rights
through the rise of the terminology of “intersectionality”, applying Orford’s methodology to my
topic is consistent with her project of tracing law’s consciousness of itself. Indeed, I traced how
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Orford’s own methodological journey grew out of her early work in critical feminist
international law, making my project consistent with the scope and development of her method.
In this chapter, I take the reader through the dissertation’s most literal deployment of
Orford’s sense of consciousness of itself. Recalling that this method is principally one of
embedding critique in the act of tracing origins, with a renewed emphasis on the study of actual
practices, including discursive practices, rather than the abstract study of disembodied structures.
Orford, we saw, specifically starts from the practices of law as they appear and operate, but at the
same time as they reflect upon themselves and become rationalized. As outlined in the
introduction, this chapter of the dissertation will follow Orford’s distinction of an international
legal method that examines the history of its own concepts and ideas, based on the authority of
juridical interpretation.
In the pages that follow, I present the findings of my research into the operations of the
CEDAW Committee, probing its responses to place them in the frame of the dissertation’s
primary concerns with the promises, transmissions and impacts of intersectionality as key
aspects of women’s human rights protections. As an aspect of law’s consciousness of itself, the
CEDAW Committee members’ reflections constitute information about the transmission of the
idea of intersectionality. But importantly, it shows us the key players’ understanding of not just
the ideas, but their relationship to the structures they work in and the authority they inhabit. The
Committee’s utterances for this purpose take two forms in this chapter: I analyze the documents
they author as Committee members, seeing them as transmissions of the idea of intersectionality.
That is, I review Committee members’ statements, interpretations of the treaty and personal
reflections in the public domain that bring clarity to the meaning of intersectionality primarily
because it is they who are in the position to administer it as an aspect of international legal
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authority. To this already available research, which I have gathered in an Orfordian manner in a
method outlined above and explored further below, I add my analysis of the transcripts of
original interviews I conducted with CEDAW members. The interviews fulfill a key aspect of
the Orfordian project, that is to take the radical obviousness of what is said about an idea from
the mouths of its main proponents, and probe what this offers to our understanding about the
extension and meaning of the concept as an embodiment of international authority. In this case,
of course, the interest is in intersectionality as an approach to women’s international human
rights protections.
The practice of this method in this chapter thus combines document analysis with the
analysis of semi-structured interviews I conducted in person with particular policy experts during
CEDAW’s fall 2016 session in Geneva, and via video interviews with additional informants no
longer part of, or situated outside of, CEDAW. Here I followed practices supported by various
scholars whose work advocates for the role of such interviews in a broader exploration, where
policy expert interview data complements the primary research methods.641
In the chapter that follows, I will place the reflections of the particular policy experts on
the origins and impacts of intersectionality in combination with a review of the decisions they
have made using the concept (or its proxies). Thus, their personal accounts will be examined in
this chapter in advance of the next chapter, where I will examine the jurisprudence of individual
representations adjudicated through Optional Protocol, and Concluding Observations of
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primarily CEDAW committee members, past and present, in light of insights in this and previous
chapters.
My semi-structured key informant or particular policy interviews assist me to determine
if and how specific aspects of “intersectionality” actually came to be instituted as aspects of
women’s human rights, and what they mean to the participants who are the proponents and who
negotiated the texts, as well as how they are implementing these ideas at the UN level. In
previous chapters, I have explored the academic, broad geopolitical and institutional factors that
were pushing and impeding the use of recent developments in international human rights’
protections for multidiscriminated women. I will explore the context of these emergent norms,
including what causal links, if any, their proponents believe they hold to political problems the
UN’s turn to intersectionality might have been seen to address, and how this “back story” of
intersectionality connects to implementation jurisprudentially.

4.2 CEDAW interviews as an aspect of legal method
While Orford discusses her method of gathering materials as being not dissimilar from a
sociological method,642 it is important to point out that this method is not engaged as part of a
sociology dissertation, but as part of a legal one. In tracing the account law tells itself about the
meaning it is making, it is necessary to trace proponents and adherents purposefully. Likewise,
my work tracing the concept of intersectionality through the UN archives, decisions and memoirs
of CEDAW members followed a deliberately selective route to the utterances of
intersectionality’s meaning and traced the work it was simultaneously doing throughout the
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period of its acceptance. The objective was not to see what a random selection of Committee
members, or other UN authorities, might think of intersectionality, but rather to trace its
authoritative pathways and appearances: in short, its decisive transmissions.
In carrying out my research, I attended the opening of the 65th Session of CEDAW (Oct
24-Nov 18 2016), from October 24 until October 28.643 My principal reason for attending was to
observe the working methods of the CEDAW Committee, and to attain access to committee
members, as the opportunity presented itself, in order to conduct field interviews644 with them
while they were stationary in Geneva, since prearranging interviews had proven impractical, with
the exception of one interviewee, whom I was able to prearrange a meeting with through my
professional connections as a non-profit executive in Canada. While this person was not
previously known to me, I was able to seek their agreement through my networks.
Once in Geneva, I attended the organizing meetings of Canadian NGOs that were there to
present their findings to committee members in advance of Canada’s appearance at the
Committee on the first day of the proceedings, October 24, 10am to 1pm.645 My access to
Committee members to ask them about the role of intersectionality in their deliberations was
facilitated by a purposive snowball technique of building on recommendations of NGO
colleagues,646 and from each of those interviews, a further recommendation of whom else on the
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Committee the interviewee would recommend or be able to connect me to.647 If they chose to
participate, an interview was set up. I developed a protocol that aimed to interview
representatives on CEDAW who came from a range of geopolitical locations; while CEDAW
itself is not a globally representative entity per se, there are members from Global South as well
as Global North countries, so-called high, medium and lower income countries. Within my
purposeful sample of those who were known to be or were likely to be proponents of
intersectionality, I tried to ensure global representation.
As the Committee engaged in constructive dialogue with each country presenting during
the week, I observed from the NGO seating area. Those most active on the files in the week I
was there were most likely to be the ones to agree to be interviewed by me. Additionally, each
interviewee would suggest the next interviewee I approached, offer their introduction so that the
new recruit would be more likely to agree to meet with me. These recommendations were based,
presumably, on a combination of the new recruit’s area of expertise, and how that dovetailed
with my topic, but also with their familiarity and possibly like-mindedness with the person I was
already speaking with. The exception to this among the in-person interviews was my first
interviewee, with whom I had a separate connection. This person elected to remain anonymous,
fearing some controversy in their country of origin for their answers to the kinds of questions I
would ask. (Additionally, former or non-CEDAW members who had things to add to my
research were also approached; this is described further below.) The person who remained
anonymous did not refer me directly to any other interviewee. The rest of the pool of current
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CEDAW interviewees came from the snowball technique I describe above, based on an initial
introduction as part of the observing NGO delegation.
The conditions under which interviews took place were far from private, with members
coming in and out of the room we used, which was a room set aside for Committee members to
take breaks and make tea; although it was less than ideal, it was the only room available to us for
this purpose. Three interviews were exceptions to this pattern; two interviews were conducted by
video well after the week in Geneva, one with the past Chair, Cees Flinterman, about whom I
make an especial notation below, and the other with past CERD member, Patrick Thornberry.
Both are professors emeritus who teach and research in the areas of human rights law. Both have
reflected on their work on their respective treaty committees in their publications.648 Patrick
Thornberry was also the advisor of my Masters of International Human Rights Law thesis at
Oxford, and thus his interview followed from prior familiarity. The other exception was the
interview with Simon Walker, a manager who oversees OHCHR’s support to some of the UN
human rights treaty bodies. He was interviewed in person in Geneva in the cafeteria of the Palais
Wilson. I sought his views to round out the aspects of the research that had a more institutional
basis, such as the institutional life of intersectionality as a concept in UN human rights discourse,
and to test his view of the origins I was discovering in the mass human rights violations, as
explored in previous chapters. All interviewees signed ethics reviewed consent forms (available
at Appendix 1), indicating what types of questions they might be asked and allowing them to

648

Cees Flinterman, “Eight Years in CEDAW” (2011) 29 Neth Q Hum Rts 8; Flinterman, supra note 193; Cees
Flinterman, “United Nations Human Rights Reform: Some Reflections of a CEDAW-Member” (2003) 21 Neth Q
Hum Rts 621; Raday, supra note 262; Flinterman, supra note 382; Thornberry, supra note 440; Thornberry, supra
note 424.

163
indicate their preferences for how their interviews would be incorporated into my dissertation. I
found, without exception, the interviewees to be candid, forthright and eager to share the stories
of their engagement with the complex deliberations of an intersectional approach to women’s
human rights at the United Nations.
In my interviews, I asked Committee members what they had read, what the precipitating
events were that led to their interest in the concept, and what they understand by the keywords
we have explored as building blocks to an intersectional approach, including the term
intersectionality itself. Though “intersectionality” was implemented in the jurisprudence by this
name and others, what did they understand by it? How did they feel about it, and how has this
influenced their use of the concept? What did each participant think of the various ideas
advanced in the literature (as opposed to the impetus for the contentions in the literature)?
As we have seen in the preceding chapter, the scholar Yurval-Davis traces the official
emergence of intersectionality by name to the contemporaneous emergence of the framework in
CERD’s General Comment 25, and, she along with others649 see it origins at the UN in the
sequence of the preparatory documents to the Expert Meeting on Gender and Racial
Discrimination that took place in Zagreb in November 2000 as part of the preparatory process to
the 2001 UN World Conference Against Racism.650 In these meetings, as we have explored, the
American legal scholar, Kimberlé Crenshaw, was asked to introduce the notion in a special
session on the subject leading up to the Durban conference. Her background paper, which I have
explored extensively in the preceding chapter, thus formed one of the key documents advancing
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the intersectional turn at the international level.651 In my interviews I have explored committee
members’ familiarity with Crenshaw’s role and her work on intersectionality, to trace the role of
the concept as originating or post hoc justification for the advancement of the concept.

4.3 Intersectionality through the eyes of CEDAW members:
Originating concept or retrospective attribution?
I have stated elsewhere that my questions were in the style of semi-structured particular
policy field interviews, designed to follow the thoughts of the interviewee rather than follow a
standardized set of “test” questions.652Nevertheless, I began each interview with a version of the
same framing of the project and an initiating question that went something like this: “Have you
heard of/do you have a working definition of the quasi-legal concept of intersectionality”?
My interview results support and augment the line of inquiry based in Orford’s insight
into the centrality of consciousness of itself as the backward-facing gathering of practices into a
more or less coherent account of the operations of international law, offering ex post facto
intellectual clarity. Not one of the informants attributed the origins of intersectionality to the
work of Kimberlé Crenshaw, or the paper she introduced in Croatia. Two informants seemed
variously aware of other critical race scholars, referring at times to the work of Angela Davis653
and Patricia Williams.654
Interviewer: Have you heard of/do you have a working definition
of the quasi-legal concept of intersectionality?
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From Committee member Patricia Schulz, I received a plain-spoken summary of the
academic or conceptual basis of her understanding of intersectionality:
No, I have no clue.
Interviewer: Okay, but from your perspective of the Committee,
it’s useful and it’s embedded in your work?
Schulz: Yup.655

And again, from Silvia Pimentel, we see a live laboratory of Orford’s characterization of
international legal authority as based in the repurposing of existing concepts for the proximate
justification:
We didn’t invent intersectionality. We didn’t invent [it]. This term
was already around … and [in] writing feminist writings so we
didn’t invent [it].656

Ruth Halperin-Kaddari articulated the Orfordian view of legal method and international
legal authority as backward facing and precedent based:
The thing is that from our view on the Committee, many of our
operations are happening without attributing such, you know, deep
plannings and intentions.657

She also characterizes it as retrospectively gathered and justified:
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it’s the historical...the later, broad historical perspective, may
attribute more to that activity than...than what really took place in
real time, ok? That’s what I am trying to say, so …658

And she adds that it is only identifiable as part of a retrospective articulation of authority’s
consciousness of itself:
And it is […] not to say that this is the wrong analysis but, it may
actually demand the passage of time allowing to see these broad
developments and put them together. 659

Cees Flinterman, the Committee member credited with driving the articulation of the
intersectional approach at CEDAW, likewise downplays the import of any particular conceptual
framework and, nonetheless, distinguishes an approach to women’s human rights that articulates
an intersectional approach that approximates what I have developed in previous chapters:
At the time, it must have been influenced also by academic writing
at the time. But I don’t recall exactly what at the time. But still I
like the term intersectional because it’s maybe even clearer, in
cases of multiple forms of discrimination; there I think the
confusion can be that there is already gender, there is both gender
discrimination and racial discrimination whereas intersectional
discrimination indicates that women belonging to a particular race
may be differently impacted by gender discrimination than other
ways, without necessarily that they are also discriminated because
of their race in a particular situation.660
While I have advanced a reading of these perspectives based in Orford’s international
critical legal method, on the face of it my informants’ perspectives on the intersectional approach
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of the Committee could also be seen to support the views of, respectively, Byrnes, Campbell and
Fredman. As Byrnes puts it, “although the Convention does not explicitly refer to multiple
discrimination”,661 CEDAW qua committee, exercises a “fluid approach to intersectional
discrimination”,662 making it “possible to construe existing grounds sufficiently capaciously to
address the confluence of power relationships which compounds disadvantage”.663
Where Byrnes, Campbell and Fredman justify intersectionality through fidelity to the text
of CEDAW, Orford’s method adds the element of gathering the practices and utterances of
intersectionality to construct a picture of their meaning and purpose. That is, taken in its time and
context, as well as in light of its travels, the focus on textual embeddedness broadens out to
provide a fuller picture. The reflections of the Committee members support the view that the
articulation of intersectionality is based on existing practice, not on conceptual clarity, that is, in
the way of legal method as articulated by Orford, consolidating precedent and authority into a
retrospective gathering and systemization of practices already underway. In the words of Patricia
Schulz:
It’s [intersectionality is] a development of the reflections of the
committee on multiple discrimination. ... and I sometimes have the
impression that we use one or the other, without making a
difference and I’m not really sure that we have to make a
difference but I’ve, I have read some legal papers sometimes, I
couldn’t quote any just like that, that make a very, that make a
difference [between multiple and intersectional discrimination],
but, what I would think is that the committee has seen repeatedly
and has addressed more and more repeatedly, the situation of

661

Byrnes, supra note 209 at 68.
Campbell, supra note 247 at 481.
663
Fredman, Sandra, supra note 480 at 35.
662

168
women who are, barred from their rights because of their
belonging to various groups.664

What she is clarifying here is that the authority of naming an interpretation intersectional
accords to the Committee’s recasting of the Committee’s previous decisions. Likewise, without
citing any of the academic authorities I have explored in previous chapters, the Committee
members operationalize approaches based in intersectional understanding:
Some say multiple discriminations, but they are categories….the
intersectional lens produces the categories—if there was not an
intersectionality on the basis of health, for instance, we wouldn’t
name disability. The same for older women.665

Outside the Committee, Simon Walker likewise eschews any reliance on academic
authority, and instead advances a definition that is operationalized in other UN treaty protections:

I’ve always understood the notion to be a compounding effect of
discrimination. ...I guess also I have a background previously to
this position I was disability advisor I followed the negotiations for
the CRPD [Convention for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities]
that has an article on women, and women with disabilities. So in a
sense, this is also, you can build on, I don’t think they use the term
multiple forms of discrimination, but it was very clear, even during
negotiations that women with disabilities might face double or
multiple forms of discrimination on the basis of sex, and on the
basis of disability, and of course possibly on the basis of race... or,
any other grounds... and that this was a compounding effect.666
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And finally, in the words of Cees Flinterman, intersectionality gathers previous practices
and gives them new clarity and articulation:
Speaking for myself, I did not have a specific definition of my own
[for] intersectional discrimination. But I like the term and I do
think it still is a very clear indication of what we have in mind, and
that is that gender discrimination may impact women in a different
manner, dependent on the question of whether they belong to a
certain class, or group in society, such as race and also caste.667

As an aspect of this retrospective enunciation, we see informants as practitioners
expressly mixing the terminology that the academic literature has been so careful to parse out.
Thus, the categories of multiple, compound and intersectional discrimination are being used
interchangeably, and in Walker’s description, the concept of grounds is still a live concept for
how discrimination is being conceived of, regardless of Fredman and Campbell’s view that
“single ground” approach of CEDAW is distinct from the traditional grounds-based limitations
of most other anti-discrimination frameworks.668 To Schulz, “we are contributing to a, a broader
view of issues of discrimination by state parties”.669

When pushed, her views become more elaborated:
Interviewer: So is it, is it, in your view, kind of a broadening of the
grounds or is it a different ground? Or is it a bit of both?

Patricia Schulz: I think it’s a bit of both. … I don’t, I don’t see it
so far as a completely separate ground I mean, I, I look at
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discrimination against women and discrimination based on... race
or ethnicity or, disability status or whatever and…, it helps me
work that out, work that package together, put the package
together. […] I think also what’s interesting with the concept of
intersectionality is that, is that it helped move away from women
as a group vs. men as a group. I mean, which is the language of the
convention which is, generally, the language of constitutions that
say gender equality, between women and men. All women, all
men.670

Here Schulz is providing a critique of the single axis criteria I named as being the textual
basis of the CEDAW Treaty. She continues:
we know that both groups [men and women] are extraordinarily
diverse. What makes me nuts, is lumping women with, the poor,
the young, the old, the migrants, the disabled, the elderly,
whatever. As if there weren't..., whereas, apart from the group of
men, women are in every other group.671

But in her wrap up to the question, she returns to precedent as the source of authority for
a changed meaning in a new context:

… but I really think it was a result and, and... a result of the
previous work. Or based on the previous work, but it has then
helped,... the continuing to develop this and our thinking on this.672

4.4 Cees Flinterman: Intersectionality at CEDAW
In Orford’s account of international law’s consciousness of itself, the Swedish diplomat
Dag Hammarskjold became a central character in R2P’s consolidation as an international legal
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framework; his vision and approach shaped the outcomes that Orford traced. In the account of
intersectionality that I have traced through CEDAW, Cees Flinterman, the Dutch member of
CEDAW and its Chair from 2003-2010, emerges in a similar role with a smaller canvass and a
less grandiose stage presence than Hammarskjold, whose vision reshaped the world order aimed
at the “protection of life” and the “maintenance of order” in the decolonized world.673 In
contrast, Flinterman is humble and restrained in his ambitions, but his sense of purpose was cited
by many as the impetus to the articulation and documentation of intersectionality as the official
approach to women’s international human rights at CEDAW. As explored in the previous
chapter, Article 18 of GR 28 sets out CEDAW’s express conceptualization of intersectionality as
part of the Committee’s interpretation of the treaty. In exploring its development with the
Committee members, it became clear that Flinterman, had been its quiet proponent:
OK, so I am 99% certain that it was in fact Cees Flinterman who
started it.674
And, even more emphatically,
He was the Chair, and not only a formal chair, but a Chair!675

These interviews also underscored the role a particular individual can play in the
development of a direction in IHRL, a point Orford felt compelled to defend in the controversy
that surrounded her choice to feature Dag Hammarskjold in her work on R2P. In the age of
bureaucratic processes that may seem inherently anti-individual —“ a governance by faceless
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experts”— focusing on the role of an individual in the transmission of ideas may seem
anachronistic.676 In answer to her critics, Orford states that focusing on the individuals who
shaped the shifts in international law allowed her to determine “which historical figures and
authors we might properly make reference in order to develop a legal analysis that is also critical,
idiomatically recognisable and politically useful.”677 In this way Orford was able to determine
“the ways in which those practices of governing and that form of authority had been
represented”.678 My conversations with Ruth Halperin-Kaddari illuminated this methodological
point about the idiomatic nature of international legal authority:
For instance, the General Recommendation that I led was number
29, on the economic consequences of family dissolution. It was
just my own specific ambition, and my own knowledge of this
field, and understanding that there is a great lack in CEDAW's
jurisprudence, in this area.679

The Committee members’ emphasis on the leadership and visionary role of Flinterman
led me to arrange an interview with him, which took place by video conference one year after the
original interviews in Geneva. With him I explored in more detail his view of the origins and
impacts of intersectionality at the Committee and through the originating GR 28. His interview
underscores the accuracy of taking as the methodological starting place that the descriptive
accounts of intersectionality gather more or less incoherent practises into a more coherent
account of it ex post facto:
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In the framework of the general recommendation we saw that it
would be important to introduce a term—intersectionality—as a
term for the kind of work of the committee. But I am sure that
since that time, the committee has also used the term multiple
discrimination and maybe even other terms.680

Both Foucault, and Orford following him, make a crucial decision about the role of the
concept as consciousness of itself in the consolidation of bureaucratic practices: in their approach
to authority’s “consciousness of itself”, it is the interest of power in consolidating concrete
conditions that shape the advancement of the idea, rather than the (Hegelian)681 notion of the
idea shaping the conditions for practice and inviting the dialectic of transformation. Orford
explains that for Foucault the “state did not appear first as an elaborated concept or idea—rather,
its origin lay in the development of governmental practices and their subsequent transformation
into concepts such as sovereignty or statehood”.682 Particular people (in Orford’s account of the
consolidation of the concept of international authority it is UN Secretary-General, Dag
Hammarskjold; in this account of intersectionality, it is Flinterman) can play a central role in the
transformation of practices into systematized articulations.683 Although we have fruitfully traced
both the promise and the transmission of Crenshaw’s concept of intersectionality, it is not
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necessarily the case that her concept of intersectionality has opened the way for the practice of
intersectionality. In transcriptions of my interviews with members of the Committee, we can see
that the transmission of the idea of intersectionality has a more complex trajectory, both shaping
practice, and in the genealogy of its legal life, naming and consolidating existing practices, and
above all conferring authority. In the words of one member,
the concept was important to consolidate the authority of the
Committee to name certain forms of discrimination: Because it’s
named it gives us a threshold and legitimacy. There is a nonnegotiable.684
Once named, intersectionality additionally extends that authority beyond the original
frame it works to consolidate:
And, I think that it has been helpful to discuss certain issues. For
instance, issues that meet with a lot of resistance. ... like, sex
workers or L[esbian]G[ay], L[esbian]B[isexual].685
And again:
I mean it doesn’t mean that they always agree with that, but at least
to help some delegations understand what we mean and why we
address those issues, also…Because, when you read the text of the
convention, I mean a state party could think ‘hey, I have never
ratified anything that protects the rights of sex workers and/or
LBTs.’686

In these informants’ views, and emerging from below the surface of the answers from all
the informants I spoke with, was the identification of the need for a definitional “nonnegotiable”, not so much about ensuring that the intersections of race and gender were fully
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accounted for in states’ obligations to the treaty’s overarching non-discrimination framework,
but rather that gender identity and sexual orientation were made visible and accounted for. So,
although committee members classify Article 18 in GR 28 as a consolidation of existing
practices, it is equally an express and deliberate articulation of a new understanding of gender
identity; it took the original treaty framers’ implicit social rather than scientific categorization of
sex and gender, as explored in Chapter 2, and enriched it to account for sexual orientation and
gender identity through the vehicle of intersectionality. In this way, we can see intersectionality
as the mechanism for the expansion of the authority of the Committee to hold states accountable:
…clearer terms such as lesbians or intersex or transgender, and all
the other references to the LGBT LQGBTI. And most often, again,
reference to them would raise a question that runs in the line of
intersectionality gender protection commitments.687

In the treaty, we have protections based on “sex”, which is represented in the final text
through an implicit understanding of gender as malleable and more expansive than “sex”
generally connotes; gender becomes the pertinent category not only of protection, but also of
social change through changed (gender) roles, which are expressly credited as a means to
achieving women’s gender equality. With the introduction of intersectionality (notwithstanding
other “intersections” that are also newly expressed, such as religious belief), we have gender
identity and sexual orientation newly expressed as aspects of previously articulated gender
protections. As we see further below, to those who opposed it, this line of reasoning represents
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an expanded authority for the Committee vis-à-vis States parties’ obligations. “Gender”, though
implicit in the treaty, comes to do new work in the intersectional era.

4.5 Sexual orientation and gender identity at the intersections of
International Human Rights Law
Flinterman’s interview underscored other informants’ view that the approach to
intersectionality was organic, backward facing—a consolidation of existing legal practise—and
bore only fragile connection to academic representations of the concept. His interview confirmed
the legacy of the mass human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda that we
explored as conducive to the adoption and articulation of intersectionality at the UN generally.
I was the head of the Netherlands government delegation to the
World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993. In Vienna,
not far from the war theatre, not far from the concentrations where
sexual violence was used once again in the context of warfare and I
am sure that what happened then, in the former Yugoslavia, has
had tremendous positive impact on the recognition of women’s
rights to human rights; the recognition of violence against women
as a general human rights issue, as an issue of discrimination. And
later developments in this respect, in the context of such countries,
as well the prosecutions of Bosnia/Herzegovina and the later
prosecutions also in relation to Serbia, and what has happened in
Rwanda certainly had an impact, at the back of our minds on also,
in the formulation and the drafting of General Recommendation
28. Maybe not in an explicit manner but it was implicit that this
issue should be addressed and that it should also be addressed from
a human rights perspective.
I think that looking back, that was one of the most important
outcomes of the United Nations World Conference on Human
Rights in 1993.688
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While confirming this pedigree of intersectional protections at the UN, his interview and
others’ also indicated that the original meaning and utility of the concept at the time it was
introduced, in the context of grappling with unbridled and unmanaged genocidal gender-based
violence, had morphed over time. Intersectionality was now called upon to do new work in a new
global context. Flinterman’s interview, while confirming the time, place and meaning of
intersectionality’s introduction as I have traced it in previous chapters, simultaneously
underscores the central role of the term intersectionality in consolidating the important and
controversial expansion of the Committee’s interpretation of the protections against the rapidly
evolving area of lesbian, bisexual and trans rights. All the informants I interviewed pointed out
to me this specific work done by intersectionality, both implicitly:
And, ah, no problem to use the intersectionality as Angela Davis
propose... and others and race, the difficulty was the other
aspects... yes.689

And explicitly:
And the biggest part, … which held up the adoption of the General
Recommendation, was the whole issue, at the time, of gender
identity and sexual orientation. Those were difficult words at the
time, in the framework of introducing the term of
intersectionality.690

In Chapter 1, I began to explore how globalized homophobia and its characterization of a
globalized agenda of LGBT human rights combine to produce a complicated picture of the
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instrumental role human rights play in consolidating positions of power domestically and (human
rights) superiority internationally. This is a dynamic that Flinterman, as CEDAW Committee
chair was certainly alive to:
you could say there was a certain politicization of the committee's
work. In general, you hardly feel that in CEDAW but in here, in
this particular issue [LGBT rights], there was certainly some, how
do you say that in English, reverberations of the general
discussions in the General Assembly.691

What Flinterman is obliquely referring to here, is that the period during which CEDAW’s
GR 28 was being written, between 2005 and 2010, was one of the most active periods in a
rapidly expanding range of efforts in various UN settings designed to force the recognition of
LGBT rights as inherent and explicit in existing IHRL protections.692 As with the express
development of intersectionality, this period of international LGBT rights development at the
UN can be traced to fractious exchanges during the Beijing World Conference, singled out as “a
high point for international activism on women’s human rights and status”.693 Here, sexual
orientation and gender identity were raised from the floor as rights that should be expressly
accounted for in the resulting Platform for Action.
In both the case of intersectionality, and sexual orientation and gender identity, the
official documents prepared after the event are silent on the matter; the World Conference
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however, again in both cases, played a pivotal role in galvanizing the groundswell for later
achievements.694 During the period Flinterman refers to, the Human Rights Committee and other
fora were expressly grappling with the meaning and impact of recognizing LGBT rights as an
aspect of international protections. Most pertinent to Flinterman’s statement regarding the
General Assembly, is that on the December 18, 2008, Argentina presented the General Assembly
a Joint Statement on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, signed by 66
states.695 Following this, Diane Otto696 traces the October 26, 2009 report by Martin Scheinin,
the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, to the General Assembly.697 Her analysis lends itself to
an underscoring of Flinterman’s perception of the “reverberations” felt at CEDAW during the
drafting of the Committee’s direction on intersectionality.
As I explore through these documents below, the turmoil over sexuality and gender
identity was at a peak of “epic transnational contestation”698 during this period. While both
events mentioned above followed the Yogyakarta Principles of 2007,699 and the Organization of
American States Statement of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, in 2008,700 the latter two
did not come with a challenge to the UN General Assembly to use its authority to endorse them.
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While there are important differences in weight and import between the action of states within
the General Assembly presenting a statement to be endorsed by other states and a Special
Rapporteur report being received by the General Assembly, both invoke the GA’s authority and
both actions exemplify similar operations of gender and gender identity in international human
rights.
As I traced in Chapter 2, the General Assembly has primary authority to make binding
legal advances in IHRL.701 The Joint Statement presented by Argentina on December 18, 2008,
provoked an immediate Arab League statement, signed by 60 countries, denouncing it.702 Both
statements—for and against— remain technically “open for signature” before the UN General
Assembly, a symptom of the posturing and the impasse. This specific confrontation, referenced
by Flinterman in his interview, is not taken up by Weiss and Bosia’s volume, but it fits the
pattern of their analysis. That is, while the Argentinian statement called for the decriminalization
of same sex consensual relationships, and the end to the death penalty for homosexuality, the
states responding to it decried the “social normalization … of pedophilia”.703 In Weiss and
Bosia’s analysis, “the pressures of globalization” come to be addressed by the consolidation of
state authority through the evocation of a “spectral sexuality…where a threatening, perverted
and/or sick sexualized body or group of bodies are continually incarnated in discourse but never
fully instantiated in the flesh”.704 Likewise, the modest demands of ceasing criminalization and
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execution are morphed into fully-fledged western demands for equal marriage, etc., “drawing
more on imported than domestically sourced language, agendas and strategies”.705 Scheinin’s
report, though not directly referenced by Flinterman, also falls within the same time period he
cited as having influence on the development of an intersectionality GR at CEDAW.
Specifically, Scheinin’s definition of gender in his report on terrorism, included reference to
intersectionality’s transmissions, namely that
International human rights law, including the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
requires States to ensure non-discrimination and equality (de jure
and de facto) on the basis of gender, sex, sexual orientation and
gender identity, as well as to address instances where gender
inequality intersects with other prohibited grounds of
discrimination, such as race, colour and religion.706

Citing the authority of CEDAW on this matter in the year before Flinterman was
successful in having GR 28 completed, further entangles the transmissions of the new gender
protections in the web of UN documents and processes I have been tracing. Certainly, as he cites
here, Scheinin is relying on the advances made through the Yogyakarta Principles with respect to
gender identity and sexual orientation. His intersectional approach to gender takes up a structural
account of the violations he is concerned about in a specifically global understanding of power
balances and imbalances:
Those subject to gender-based abuses are often caught between
targeting by terrorist groups and the State’s counter-terrorism
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measures that may fail to prevent, investigate, prosecute or punish
these acts and may also perpetrate new human rights violations
with impunity. This squeezing effect is present for example, in
Algeria, where women have been arrested and detained as potential
terrorists after they report sexual violence and humiliation by
armed Islamists. In Nepal, the counter-insurgency campaign that
was defined with reference to terrorism was characterized by
attacks on meti (effeminate males or transgender persons) by both
sides, with reports that the Maoists were abducting meti and the
police were taking advantage of the counter-terrorism environment
to attack meti as part of a “cleansing” of Nepali society. A recent
report by Amnesty International exemplifies the extent to which
women may be targeted by all entities, noting that in Iraq, “crimes
specifically aimed at women and girls, including rape, have been
committed by members of Islamist armed groups, militias, Iraqi
government forces, foreign soldiers within the US-led
Multinational Force, and staff of foreign private military security
contractors.707

Otto traces the reception of Scheinin’s report at the GA Third Committee through the lens
of Puar’s work, linking the global “queering” of “terrorism”, and terrorizing queers, all in the
service of global security agendas that link the authoritarianism of homophobic and sexualized
counter terrorism with the terrorists such actions are meant to counter. Otto articulates, a succinct
Puarian formulation of the GA’s reception of Scheinin’s report, which I quote at length as proxy
for the events Flinterman discussed in his interview with me:
The reception to his report can be read as a single story of an
intractable divide between liberal and illiberal states, between
civilisation and barbarity, and between freedom and tyranny.
However, I have argued that the tale can also be read in a number
of other ways, which make visible new opportunities for queering
international law, as well as their attendant paradoxes. Another
reading of the struggle over the meaning of ‘gender’ is made
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possible by its resonance with the imperial tropes of perversely
gendered and sexualised colonial peoples used to legitimate the
‘civilising mission’, which would interpret illiberality alternatively
as resistance to western hegemony. A different reading of the
refusal of hostile states to use the identity categories of sexual
pride and liberation makes visible the spaces left for gender and
sexual freedoms beyond the domesticating reaches of the law. It
creates another opportunity to undertake the important work of
seeing how discursive and performative practices give meaning to
gender and sexuality in specific social and cultural contexts, and
resist the emergence of new paralysing dichotomies between the
west and the rest.708

These same politics and proxy wars through sexuality and gender identity, as Flinterman
alludes, plagued the CEDAW committee as it attempted to craft General Recommendation 28,
Article 18 on intersectionality. When I asked the Committee members I interviewed for the
source of the delay between the 2000 CERD General Recommendation acknowledging the
gender dimensions of racial discrimination, and the 2010 CEDAW General Recommendation 28
on intersectionality, the issue of embedding lesbian and trans rights into the definition of gender
protection as an imperative was invariably cited as the element that slowed the progress of the
interpretation. Silvia Pimentel recalls:
But what is important, I was from the working group, and I told
Cees Flinterman and he was very open. And I told, Cees please,
let’s not push too much to the committee to approve this without
[bangs the table] the insertion of the issue of the rights of the
LGBT people.709
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At the same time as the Arab League and the Argentina group of states were battling
about LGBT rights at the General Assembly, and Martin Scheinin was weathering a storm of
controversy over his report on the links between human rights abuses of LGBT in the name of
terror as well as counter-terrorism, the small committee at CEDAW, charged with crafting its
first direction on intersectionality—10 years after CERD crafted an essentially intersectional
recommendation without expressly using the word—ground to a halt under the protest of a
coalition of members allegedly brought together by the member of the Committee from Egypt.
One of the most compelling opponents of an explicit reference to
gender identity and sexual orientation, in the context of this
particular general recommendation, was [the member] from
Egypt.710
And:
It was interesting maybe to note that uh a colleague, I love her a lot
... she’s from Algeria … she was … she and the colleagues, the
Muslim colleagues … yes, was the most most confront[ational], no
doubt, no doubt… But not only them, in the beginning, also,
colleagues from Europe711…

This account of the slow progress of the adoption of intersectionality for the legitimacy it
loaned LGBT rights, underscores the microcosmic effects within CEDAW of the battles being
waged globally and through the General Assembly. In one member’s recollection, Egypt
becomes Algeria (although there were members from both states at that time on CEDAW, the
Algerian colleague was not cited by others recalling this incident), and the drama at the General
Assembly between the Arab league and Argentina is seen to play out in CEDAW’s midst.
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During this period, a confrontation with Committee members from Muslim majority states plays
out directly mirroring the more overtly political battles waged in the General Assembly. So much
so, that the final success of intersectionality as a harbinger of LGBT rights is attributed to the
absence of the member ascribed responsibility for carrying on this mirrored campaign:
She was away for some time during that last session that I attended
and so she was not able then to express her opposition once again
and to find any sort of coalition against the adoption of the General
Recommendation or what was also being discussed at the time, to
have the footnote to the recommendation on the issue, making it
clear that some members of the committee opposed an explicit
reference to gender identity and sexual orientation.712

Thus, in exploring the main tool of backward-facing consolidation at CEDAW—the
General Recommendation 28, in which Article 18 outlines the Committee’s approach to
intersectionality—a further twist of embedding the controversially new within the consolidation
of the status quo, emerges. This reflects the paradoxes I traced through the literature on
intersectionality in Chapter 1—what I referred to as the aporetic nature of feminist engagements
with the law more generally. At this level, feminist governance is by its very nature a complex
and often contradictory enterprise, using the instruments of power to extend freedoms.713 In this
case, intersectionality does the work of extending gender protections to those whose identity as
women challenges the very core of fixed gender identity, and yet its proponents attribute the
resistance to this to part of a fixed notion of culture:
We are seeing entrenched positions as far as gender roles and
norms are concerned. It [intersectionality] names race, class,
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ethnicity, gender identity, which is a flashpoint for countries and
the committee as well. It names it and makes clear an obligation
for the state. … We see push-back on the basis of culture and
religion, from states but also within the committee.714

As we have seen, objections to the extension of human rights’ protections of LGBT
people can be usefully seen as “as a conscious political strategy often unrelated to substantial
local demands for political rights”,715 and therefore a further example of how the reified and
timeless notion of “culture” does the dirty work of contested temporal politics in human rights
discourse, evoking “a ‘spectral’ sexuality” locally, “[e]mbedded in Western imaginaries, but
exported and adopted alongside economic and technological practices”.716 The interviews
certainly bore this analysis out:
There [are] sometimes, also in my opinion, too ambitious
proposals in the fora of the United Nations, relating to the whole
issue of gender identity and sexual orientation. Which had this
somewhat negative effect, as if, some of my colleagues from
Islamic countries had a feeling that once again they are being told
by western experts what to do in this respect.717

In this way, as I examined in the previous chapters, homophobia is not so much cultural,
as something that “brings to mind a range of ‘globalized localisms’ […] that arise in the West
but grow roots in the rhetoric and policies of powerful actors much farther afield.”718 Resistance
to the rights of women and LGBT peoples becomes an entrenched expression of resistance to
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globalism, cosmopolitanism and the remaking of the world in the image of the idealized
cosmopolitan western individual, while the promotion of these rights by other states (as opposed
to grass roots activism, which “fosters alternatives to state-centered configurations of sexual
justice”719) is steeped in hypocrisy inherent to the claim by the West/Global North/First World to
have achieved them. In the words of one of my informants:
and then, I find, you see this also with sexual orientation but...how
much of the motivation behind protecting women’s rights and
protecting against discrimination based on sexual orientation in the
global sphere is a cultural way of picking the weakest points, of
some of these countries to say that they’re superior. […] there is
this cultural superiority in human rights generally......it’s exactly,
[a] colonial mindset… the ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ world. And
also... ‘well we can go and bomb you, and we can commit awful
atrocities, but we have to grab hold of something to make us feel
good’. 720

Diane Otto, citing Jasbir Puar’s work, observes this very same phenomenon in the pithy
assessment that: “sexual liberalism has emerged as a new marker of civilisational superiority.”721
Both Christine (Cricket) Keating, and Jasbir Puar, comment on the stance of superiority
vis-à-vis LGBTI rights, and the alliance-building strategies of the states that deploy it; Keating
specifically developing it under the title of State “homoprotectionsim”,722 while Puar is more
interested in “homonationalism”.723 They see it not as an opposite to state homophobia we have
been tracing in the literature, but rather its counterweight, deeply entwined with it, stating that
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“these two approaches are closely linked and that political authorities rely on a complex interplay
of both approaches in order to mobilize consent (or at least to minimize dissent).”724
As we saw in Weiss and Bosia’s work, homophobia is one of the
typical tools for building an authoritative notion of national
collective identity, for impeding oppositional or alternative
collective identities that might or might not relate to sexuality, for
mobilizing around a variety of contentious issues and empowered
actors, and as a metric of transnational institutional and ideological
flows.725

For Puar, it is even more deeply implicated in the national security agendas of the
dominant western states, such as the United States, (Canada, although not named by her) and
Europe. In her reading, these state manufacture “queer consent”, a specific form of LGBT racism
founded on “queer Islamophobia”, by citing the specter of the Muslim terrorist homophobe, and
positioning themselves as homoprotectionist allies in their full security regalia.726 These dramas
are not just nationally orchestrated, but are played out to best effect on the world stage. Human
rights protections are quite clearly the currency in circulation for these “wars”. Keating argues
that the notion of homoprotectionism plays a similar role—sometimes at the same time as—state
homophobia, in “consolidating collaborations on which state power rests”.727 It is, like state
homophobia, instrumental and purposive, serving to “legitimate political authority on both a
national and transnational scale”.728
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Exploring the very dynamics my informant speaks of, Keating observes the 2011 speech
by Hilary Clinton on International Human Rights Day, in which Clinton positions the US in what
Keating terms “classic homoprotectionist terms”, positioning “the state as the vehicle for antihomophobic social transformation, arguing that ‘progress comes from changes in laws. … Laws
change, then people will’”. Even while criticizing states that engage in homophobic abuses,
Keating argues Clinton’s speech “occludes state homophobia as a mode of governance”,
redirecting responsibility to “the way that the people use ‘religious or cultural values as a reason
to violate or not to protect the human rights of LGBT citizens.’”729
It is important to counter-weigh this cynical bartering of the protection of some
vulnerable groups as pawns for the dehumanization of others in states’ larger struggles for
power. Clarifying the terms of a structural approach to intersectionality and to its inclusion of
religion and belief may help widen the view of what is at stake. It bears repeating here that
despite, or perhaps because of the instrumental manipulation of human rights in wider economies
of dominance and security, clarity about the interdependence and mutually reinforcing nature of
all human rights is particularly important. In the face of world-stage posturing embedded in
security agendas that in their totality undermine human rights for all, “it remains important not to
turn concrete conflicts between human rights issues into an abstract antagonism on the normative
level itself.”730 Much of what is laid at the feet of religion, on both sides of the binaries that
instrumentalize it, is simply not attributable to a human rights reality: “FORB is a right like any
other. FORB is neither a right of ‘religion’ as such nor an instrument for support of religiously
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phrased reservations and limitations on women’s [or others’] rights to equality.”731 In the view of
Beilefeldt, Ghanea and Wiener, as we saw in Chapter I, intersectionality must be expansive
enough in its grasp of these wider aims of states and global trends to hold the protections of
FORB and sexuality and sexual identity in its grasp.732 In her own work, Ghanea is at pains to
underscore that it is “essential to (re)vitalize the synergies between FORB and women’s equality
in order to advance each of these rights, to be able to address overlapping rights concerns, and to
adequately acknowledge intersectional claims”.733
Keating concludes that “[b]oth homophobic and homoprotectionist approaches to
governance are deeply imbricated in processes of colonialism, neocolonialism, and capitalist
globalization”, and that there is a “close relation of homophobia with formulations of power
within and between states that continue to privilege the Global North over the Global South”; in
short, “[l]ike homophobia, current homoprotectionist discourses and policies are also deeply
linked to and embedded in inequitable global relations of power.”734
In a less legalistic or scholarly context, the forgoing struggles being waged in and
through LGBT rights can be seen plainly in the official UN representations of them: the
opposition of culture, religion, traditions and rights; the “traditionalist” State homophobia
juxtaposition of “real” human rights and these “abominations” (spectral sexuality); the global
economic system of tying human rights’ achievements to the support by rich states of poor
states:
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The United Nations and some Western nations are urging African
governments to protect lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered
(LGBT) rights. But recent decisions by the US and UK to tie those
rights to foreign funding has had unintended consequences on the
continent.
In reaction, homophobia is now on the rise in Africa, and much of
it is state-generated. Several African leaders have instructed law
makers to stiffen laws against same-sex acts and same-sex
marriage.
…
Ambassador Fode Seck of Senegal, as leader of the Africa group at
the council, refuted the notion that gay rights are part of global
human rights: “We categorically reject all attempts to hijack the
international human rights system by imposing social concepts or
norms, in particular certain behaviours, that have no legal grounds
in the human rights debate. Such an initiative would be perceived
as a flagrant disrespect for the universality of human rights”.
…
According to Navi Pillay, the human rights commissioner, such
incidents constitute a grave human rights challenge that the council
has a duty to address. “As always, people are entitled to their
opinion,” she said. “They are free to disapprove of same-sex
relationships, for example … [and] they have an absolute right to
believe and follow in their own lives whatever religious teachings
they choose. But that is as far as it goes. The balance between
tradition and culture on the one hand and universal human rights
on the other must be struck in favour of human rights”.735

This passage illustrates what Weiss and Bosia contend in their volume, that positioning
the protection of LGBT people as caught in the see-saw of polarities between culture and
tradition on the one hand, and human rights on the other, continues to stunt the analysis and
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accurate observation of the true vectors of power and influence; occluding state maneuvering in
Keating’s sense, and, in Orford’s, the exercise of international authority—both of which travel
along these well-worn, trope-littered pathways. In the complex history of the present, the selfrepresentation of the most virulent forms of homophobia marshaled in national contexts (most
often) have their basis in ideologies imported through western religions, in either the colonial or
neocolonial contexts, and sometimes both. Neocolonial policies likewise marshal
homoprotectionist narratives to consolidate both state power and international dominance, and
what at first seems an opposite position, comes, in Keating’s analysis, as linked:
A first link between them is that state homophobic rhetoric and
policy help shape the “traditionalist” politics that are the object of
state homoprotectionist intervention. Second, although one
approach or the other might be rhetorically dominant, both
approaches are often concurrently pursued. Finally, both
approaches help foster alliances that help to bolster state power.736

Keating points to the internal hypocrisy of the states that operate the agenda of
homoprotectionism, in much the way one of my informants did above. As he said to me:
And it’s the mauvais foi,737 of a lot of the arguments behind it …
it’s so flagrant … Because, quite frankly 20 years ago … actually,
10 years ago! I mean the US in 2004 was voting against…738

As Keating explains,
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While homophobic rhetoric and policy are geared toward
engendering the collaboration of dominant groups,
homoprotectionism works to garner support from those who hope
to put the state in the service of reform, obscuring the ways that the
state helped to generate sexual hierarchies and its own stake
(sometimes submerged) in their continuation.739
Several members of the CEDAW Committee mentioned their own imbrication in the
(global) battle between states conducted through these issues, and carried out within the
discussions at committee level; most identified a layered, overlapping and ambivalent
relationship with the state’s positioning of itself and their indebtedness to the state for their
nominations:
All of us are government approved. My nomination was put
forward by a ministry.740

This is played out in the tensions the Committee members experience between their role
as state-approved members of what is at its core an agreement among and between states, and the
potential of their role to hold states accountable to advance civil society and activist critiques of
state policy and conduct. Committee members are aware of being part of the contradictory
statecraft conducted through the instrumentalization of women’s rights and the LGBTI human
rights debate that we have explored above, and that Halley et al explore as “governance
feminism”.741 As Sally Merry has noted, “[t]he human rights system challenges states authority
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over their citizens at the same time as it reinforces states power: both agent of reform and
culpable if not a direct violator.742 As Silvia Pimentel discussed with me:
I am here just because the Brazilian NGOs indicate my name to the
government. … So, what I would like to say is that really I don't
know if I have, ahem, a wrong perspective because I feel myself as
NGO, but I believe really that the main force, yes? here in the
United Nations human rights system, that this what goes forward
not only in the case of the CEDAW but the other committees on
human rights...the nine committees um is the force the presence in
each tied more close of the NGOs…and this is interesting. Because
we know that… this received direct responses from the states.
Because there are some states that really are very [uncomfortable]
by the presence of the NGOs. And we listened the frequently
[frequently hear that] that we should be very careful with
alternative sources ... so it’s interesting this how to say, tension
between … The State parties … And the civil society … but of
course not all state parties, not all state parties. Some state parties;
it’s interesting. Interesting. And this reflects of course inside the
committee sometimes.743

Or, as one member put it, more simply:
On the Committee, we go into blocks for and against, with those
who broker the discussion between.744

The interviews with informants confirm that there is little doubt that intersectionality is
experienced as one of the vectors along which these global dynamics travel. We have seen that
those who use it reflect on its existence along multiple lines: as conceptual tool, as conduit of
global debate and contention, as consolidator of existing practice and the advancement or
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extension of the same in new ways. It is likewise a legitimation in all these contexts and put to all
these uses, for the articulation of new areas of rights protections and to hold states accountable
by national actors.
Intersectionality and GR 28 give me a threshold I can push back
with my government. We can use our government’s ratification to
say ‘you must find a place within [Religion] not to exclude’. It
gives us leverage.745

This mirrors Merry’s findings that national women’s groups find that international human
rights “provide social movements a kind of global law ‘from below’: a form of cosmopolitan law
that subalterns can use to challenge their subordinate position”.746 The complex chemistry
between states, national civil society groups, INGOs, and the CEDAW Committee members that
is evidenced during the state reporting sessions and during individual communications that I
have referenced in this chapter, reveals a microcosm of the broader themes explored in the
literature, including that by Merry, Orford, Weiss and Bosia, as well as Keating. The exchanges I
am scrutinizing reveal the vectors of global inequality and their discontents, the
instrumentalization of human rights, the identification of state homophobia and state
homoprotectionism and all that this entails; in short, the reinterpretation of past obligations of the
treaty, gathered under new nomenclature and put to new uses in the present. For instance, in my
interview with her, Ruth Halpern-Kaddari traces some of these byways:
I clearly remember that the critique brought by NGOs, that country
which I don’t remember what it was but it was exactly based on
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[…] that the law, or even the constitution...like it demanded
bringing separate cases—discrimination based on “A”
discrimination based on “B”...and did not allow the concept of one
claim, which is the intersection...747

The question that remains is what light can this complex deployment of
intersectionality’s life at CEDAW shed on the decisions made by committee members with
respect to States parties’ obligations? Are there material impacts one can point to that result from
CEDAW’s adoption of intersectionality? Acknowledging the imperial phantoms, facile
polarities, global inequities and legal vagueness that travel along with intersectionality in its life
as international human rights law, what can we expect from its implementation? In the next
chapter, I turn to the decisions made by the CEDAW Committee in light of intersectionality’s
implementation as a framing approach to Article 2 of the treaty, which outlines states’
obligations.
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5

Intersectionality and Consciousness of Itself in the
CEDAW Jurisprudence

Take for example the communication I sent under the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women. I died in court that day the rapist
was acquitted. But the knowledge that there was recourse to justice
outside of Philippine courts brought me back to life. … In
subsequent years there was a series of exchange[s] between my
lawyers and representatives of the government of the Philippines.
…The official stand of the Philippine government was that it was
not obligated by the views of CEDAW… .748
[I]nternational law has long been a methodologically unique and
theoretically engaged field of law. It articulates a horizontal, rather
than vertical, normativity in which there is no universal sovereign.
Its traditional sources bind it to the reality of inter-state relations,
yet it is also meant to constrain and configure those relations.
Dispute resolution in international law inevitably also raises
questions about the grounds of jurisdiction and the particular
normativity that is to apply in a given situation.749
National courts continue to struggle on how to properly evaluate
and take account of the qualitatively different intersectional
discrimination […]. At the same time, the CEDAW Committee has
quietly been transcending these challenges and pioneering a
promising approach to protecting women with multiple and
intersecting identities against discrimination.750
For us the concept [of intersectionality] is extremely useful
because it helps understand that... it’s not just an addition of
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problems and discrimination, I mean, you sort of add this and that
[otherwise].751

5.1 Introduction
The extent to which a profound reworking of the limitations of women’s
international human rights that I have traced in previous chapters has translated into the
knowledge and practice of the Committee’s decision-making, is a matter for examination
to which I now turn.
In order to explore the Committee’s decision-making in light of intersectionality, I
note its transformation from the various iterations explored in previous chapters—where
intersectionality appears as discourse in UN documents (Chapter 3), as a metaphor for
domestic human rights critiques (Chapter 1), as a concept in sociological and activist
legal analysis (Chapter 1), and as an heuristic device for theoretical examination of the
dynamics of power (Chapters 1 and 4)—to its role as a legal tool in international
jurisprudence. To clarify the role intersectionality plays at CEDAW, I will briefly
recapitulate and augment matters referred to in Chapters 2 and 3, regarding the decisionmaking powers of the Committee. The comments, pronouncements and decisions of the
Committee are both circumscribed by the legal bounds of the treaty system and extend
legal meaning and authority through their role as authoritative interpretations in
international human rights law.

751

Interview of Patricia Schulz, CEDAW Committee (26 October 2016), supra note 655.

198

199

5.2 Background to treaty body decision-making
Like other treaties, CEDAW is constructed of a self-limiting proposition: the
international human rights treaty system is an agreement among states to be held to the
ratified terms of each treaty by a fraternity of mutual obligation, legally accountable to
each other only by each other. As we saw in the previous chapter, international law is “a
form of law conceived to represent, constitute, and govern the modern system of
territorially based nation-states, [and has] has always been seen both as a function of the
powers that be and as governing those powers…”.752 In this context, the treaty
committees play a role as both authority on the interpretation of the treaty and an
appeaser to states parties, encouraging the fulfillment of the obligations. The ultimate
legal authority that binds states is one of mutual agreement between the states
themselves.
In Chapter 2, I explored the limits to the universality of obligations as evidenced
by the reservation system, which allows states to reserve those aspects of a treaty that it
determines do not apply to its context. Despite legal limits on the nature of those
obligations, recourse by the Committee to enforce those limits are circumscribed to
dialogue and “constructive engagement”, a notion and approach to international human
rights enforcement explored further below. In the previous chapter, I explored the role of
the individual committee members charged with the responsibility to administer this form
of law, and, within its terms, oversee states’ compliance; I outlined their relationship to
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state authority and how intergovernmental and global politics affect their decisionmaking and independence.
Nonetheless, the Committee’s pronouncements on the proper interpretation of the
treaty play a quasi-judicial role, with the mechanism for individual communications in
particular, creating human rights jurisprudence (if practically non-binding).753 The
Committee’s interpretation of the treaty is collectively made up of the “language of the
article in question and the general recommendations [GRs], concluding observations
[COs] and case law under the Optional Protocol, through which the Committee has
interpreted and applied the Convention”.754 While traditional legal hierarchy sees the
individual communications as the authoritative or jurisprudential aspect of treaty
decision-making, such legalistic valorizations obscure the central role that social context
and public policy outcomes—or systemic change—play in distinguishing the
advancement of intersectionality from other approaches to discrimination. Since the
Committee placed its interpretation of intersectionality at the heart of state obligations as
set out in Article 2 of the treaty, concluding observations and special inquiry, which lie at
the heart of the “constructive dialogue” process (explained further below), will therefore
form a measure of the impact of the treaty’s understanding of intersectionality. Thus, it is
to a mix of these pronouncements I will turn in determining the place that
intersectionality now occupies at CEDAW.
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As I set out in Chapter 2, at the time of this writing, 189 countries have ratified
CEDAW, while 109 have signed its 1999 Optional Protocol.755 This latter fortification of
the treaty was seen to address its relative weaknesses in comparison to other human rights
treaties, and brought it in line with other human rights mechanisms, by allowing those
individuals or groups of individuals residing in states that have signed, ratified or acceded
it to bring forward claims once domestic remedies have been exhausted. The seven UN
member states that have not ratified or acceded to the convention are Iran, Nauru, Palau,
Somalia, Sudan, Tonga, and the United States (which signed the Convention on 17 July
1980).756 Beyond the adjudication of individual cases, it additionally grants the
Committee the power to conduct inquiries into situations of grave or systematic
violations of women’s human rights.757
As with all UN bodies excepting the Security Council, enforcement of its terms is
restricted to the moral suasion inherent in being part of an international community, and
the relative power that inheres therein.758 Individual representations and the conclusions
and recommendations the Committee draws from them, are the case law of the treaty,
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although they are neither the only, nor the primary, means through which States parties
are held to account for their adherence to the terms of the treaty; rather:
Countries who have become party to the treaty (States
parties) are obliged to submit regular reports to the
Committee on how the rights of the Convention are
implemented. During its sessions the Committee considers
each State party report and addresses its concerns and
recommendations to the State party in the form of
concluding observations.759

Put another way, “the primary role of all the committees … is to review the
reports submitted periodically by State parties in accordance with the treaties’
provisions”.760 In this respect, the notion of “constructive dialogue” characterizes the
Committee’s engagement with States parties: all signatories are obligated to send high
level state representatives to the international forum overseen by the Committee of
experts that administers that the treaty to attend “a rigorous, but constructive, dialogue on
the state of human rights implementation in their countries”.761
In this process with the Committee of experts, States parties submit a report in
advance; “[t]he reports must set out the legal, administrative and judicial measures taken
by the State to give effect to the treaty, and should also mention any factors or difficulties
encountered in implementing the rights.”762 The Committee examines the report and
structures its questions based on this report in relation to the past COs, which would have

759

“OHCHR | Introduction of the Committee”, online:
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/Introduction.aspx>.
760
United Nations Human Rights Fact Sheet 1 (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2012).
761
United Nations Human Rights Fact Sheet 1 (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2012).
762
Ibid.

202

203
entailed recommendations for implementation towards “progressive realization” of
compliance with the treaty, testing for advances on past concerns. Progressive realization
is a principle “requiring that there must be a continuous, gradual improvement in the
realization of … rights by virtue of taking concrete steps to the maximum of their
available resources”; its grounding as a principle is traced to Article 2 of the ICESAR.763
The Committee also relies on the “alternative” reports and dialogue with civil
society organizations (CSOs), where active, from the national context of the reporting
state. Civil society is defined as “organizations and individuals that voluntarily engage in
public participation and action around shared interests, purposes or values that are
compatible with the goals of the United Nations”.764 Often they are human rights
defenders, NGOs, and individuals. Where there are no active civil society groups, and/or
where there is repression of the same, alternate processes are put in place, for instance
accepting reports through INGOs such as Amnesty International, and providing
anonymity for national activists and NGOs by holding in-camera meetings without
naming sources, a process I witnessed in my research during the fall 2016 session of
CEDAW with the reporting process for Belarus. As mentioned in the previous chapter, I
attended the opening of the 65th Session of CEDAW (October 24–November 18, 2016).
The Committee’s concluding observations to the Belarus report, explored below, make
express reference to the dangerous context for human rights defenders and NGOs.765
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Meghan Campbell’s work has shown that “state report and civil society
organization submissions to the CEDAW Committee in the periodic reporting process are
influential in ensuring an issue is included in the concluding observations”.766 Nongovernmental organizations are not parties to the treaty, and so their role is restricted to
contributing
to the discussion of lists of issues, lists of issues prior to
reporting, as well as to the constructive dialogue with the
State party concerned, and to the adoption of
recommendations. Their submissions enable committees to
put the human rights situation in the State party in context.
These organizations also follow up the national
implementation of the recommendations of treaty bodies
and can report on its success or failure.767

Constructive dialogue acknowledges, “the treaty bodies are not judicial bodies
(even if some of their functions are quasi-judicial), but are created to review the
implementation of the treaties”.768 In short, the treaty bodies have no ability to compel
states to implement their recommendations except through a dialogue that can escalate in
tone and record states’ implementation shortcomings in concluding observations.

5.3 Method for selecting CEDAW decisions
In exploring what patterns there are to be traced through the decisions of the
CEDAW Committee that relate to its adoption of intersectionality, Meghan Campbell’s
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work is ground breaking. In her 2015 piece referenced elsewhere in this dissertation,769
Campbell assesses CEDAW’s application of intersectionality through its general
recommendations, inquiry procedure, individual communications and COs. She
specifically does so through examining how the Committee deals with the intersection of
poverty, race and gender. She concludes, “there are a number of inconsistencies in how
the CEDAW Committee applies intersectional discrimination”.770 She says by way of
example that “even when the CEDAW Committee expresses concern on women’s
intersectional discrimination, it does not consistently follow this up with a tailored
recommendation”.771 In her conclusions, she calls for, among other things, a general
recommendation on intersectionality, as part of a more focused approach to directing
states in this way. It is not clear why Campbell does not consider GR 28 to be “on”
intersectionality; perhaps it is because of its thin theoretical grounding. Nonetheless,
since she has written her piece, additional GRs, as well as COs and individual
communications, have entered the record.
Given my research directly with committee members, and the augmented record
of interpretation, I will turn my attention to this new terrain with questions similar to
Campbell’s but tempered by intervening events and information. First, as background, I
will explore the embellishment of the Committee’s understanding of intersectionality as
revealed in the new GR 35. I will follow this with a method that uses a search-based
examination of all COs and individual communications since 2010 that deal with the
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terms “intersectionality”; “multiple discrimination”; “compound discrimination” and
“aggravated discrimination”.772
As we have seen from the literature explored in relation to the specific legal
connotations of intersectionality, these proxy terms are often used synonymously with it.
In light of the striking role played by the extension of gender protections to the categories
of gender identity and sexual orientation in both the augmentation of intersectionality in
and since GR 28, and in the minds of and dynamics between the CEDAW decisionmakers, my analysis will also track the search terms “sexual minorities”, “sexual
identity”, “sexual orientation” and related terms, such as “LGBTI”, “lesbian” and
“bisexual”. It is worth noting that, perhaps because of the novelty of the express inclusion
of these rights in the protection of women under the concept of intersectionality, sexual
identity, sexual orientation and sexual minority rights were not identified in the
Individual Communications of CEDAW that I reviewed; they rather come up in the COs
of the Committee. This makes sense since the constructive dialogue with States parties is
much more fluid and dynamic process, fed by the on-the-ground conditions identified by
activist groups and NGOs, whereas individual communication, like litigation, is a multiyear process, where sometimes a decade may have passed since the original harm being
identified was alleged to have taken place. As the recognition of these rights is still
emerging, the infractions would not have been identified a decade earlier.
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Where method and substance come together is in examining how these terms, as
the Committee employs them, bear up to the conceptual, rather than purely semantic
distinctions I have laid out in previous chapters. Of particular interest will be the
Committee’s ability to account for structural discrimination and remediation in its
application of the terms, as I found this a central aspect of intersectionality’s unique
contribution to anti-discrimination law. In light of this core intersectional marker, I will
be asking if the Committee is able to offer a focus that moves from the grounds-based
and comparator-ensnared notion of additive discriminations, and instead recasts
discriminations as mutually constitutive.
Following the analyses carried out throughout the other chapters of the
dissertation, I additionally will be watchful for the ways that the shadow of imperialism
persists in deliberations and decision-making, making special note of the work culture is
made to do in the decisions I am analyzing. In this way, I will assess the degree to which
intersectionality is an answer to Orford’s question guiding this dissertation.

5.4 CEDAW from 2010 onward
As we have explored, the international legal method of creating precedent and
building law from it shares some basic structures with the principles that inhere to
common law. In the case of IHRL, the committees charged with administering the
obligations under the treaty build on their prior de facto decisions to create guidance for
the future interpretation of states obligations under the treaty document. As I cited earlier,
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this has been characterized as a “broad remedial approach to interpretation”,773 or in
Orford’s less technical and more critical sense, an integration of “pre-existing but
dispersed practices”774 into “a coherent account”775 that justify and articulate its authority
in the present. I will test the employment of the concepts noted above in the individual
communications that come after GR 28, which introduced intersectionality as an
approach to Article 2—that is as a core aspect of state obligations. Where the interviews
of committee members speak directly to the types of decisions I am examining, they too
will be examined and weighed. At the conceptual level, the most express development of
the Committee’s reflections on intersectionality since 2010 come in the form of an
additional General Recommendation, GR 35. I will consider this first, as it articulates the
Committee’s consciousness of itself in relation to its decision-making and authority,
casting its own retrospective consideration of how its current decisions under the banner
of intersectionality consolidate what it has always already done.

5.5 General Recommendation 35
Having had the interval since the writing of GR 28 in 2010 to reflect on the role
of intersectionality in its decision-making, the Committee has issued the following
summary of its self-assessment of the meaning of intersectionality in its jurisprudential
deliberations within the context of an overall update on its seminal GR 19, on violence
against women. The Committee’s conclusion on this matter builds on GR 28
significantly, stating that their subsequent work,
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…confirms that discrimination against women is
inextricably linked to other factors that affect their lives.
The Committee’s jurisprudence highlights that these may
include ethnicity/race, indigenous or minority status,
colour, socioeconomic status and/or caste, language,
religion or belief, political opinion, national origin, marital
and/or maternal status, age, urban/rural location, health
status, disability, property ownership, being lesbian,
bisexual, transgender or intersex, illiteracy, trafficking of
women, armed conflict, seeking asylum, being a refugee,
internal displacement, statelessness, migration, heading
households, widowhood, living with HIV/AIDS,
deprivation of liberty, being in prostitution, geographical
remoteness and stigmatisation of women fighting for their
rights, including human rights defenders.776

The elaboration of intersectionality in this GR advances and details the
intersections under consideration considerably since the 2010 guidance of GR 28,
recalling the questions in Chapter 1 about the ontological and epistemological scope of
what is captured by an intersectional approach. This formulation of the intersections
under consideration in the above-sited article risks, in the words of one of the CEDAW
members, adding “this and that”.777
As Yuval-Davis cautioned, while it is true “that each social division has a
different ontological basis, which is irreducible to other social divisions”, it is equally
important to “acknowledge that, in concrete experiences of oppression, being oppressed
… is always constructed and intermeshed in other social divisions”.778 She warns against
a “fragmentation and multiplication of the wider categorical identities rather than
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[accounting for] more dynamic, shifting and multiplex constructions of
intersectionality”.779
Human rights defenders and those caught up in armed conflict surely experience
discrimination, but for properties that are not inherent to their natality,780 and are
therefore not experiencing discrimination that is of the same ontological inescapability
and intersectional categorization as the properties of being racialized, born to a caste, or
LGBTI. Does this laundry list of personal characteristics proffered in GR 35 rise to
Yuval-Davis’ challenge above, to account for the “dynamic, shifting and multiplex
constructions of intersectionality”?781 Does it weaken the concept of human rights as a
legal protection to expand its contextual reach? Does discrimination ultimately require a
“ground” to make sense of its impact and portent, such that we can distinguish between
that which is an aspirational policy outcome and that which is a legal, and therefore
justiciable concept?
These matters came up in my discussion with my informants in several ways, but
most precisely in the interview with Simon Walker:
I can see the risk with the extending grounds...[but I see it]
slightly differently…Obviously…the reason is, even if
someone is suffering discrimination, then whatever the
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grounds is then it’s … that’s the focus. It’s a differential
unjustifiable treatment… .
I could see the problem with the grounds … I mean I don't
have a problem with including age, for example, disability
has been added, sexual orientation has been added. There is
a number … gender identity has been added. I worry
maybe a bit more when people start adding … things which
might not be inherent to the person, I know that’s a wobbly
concept but, I’m trying to think of an example. I mean there
is a tendency, let’s say, particularly in western societies that
everything becomes discrimination. You know,
discrimination against cyclists or something like that. It just
happened that you decided to take your bike today rather
than your car, you know, and that I think is weakening the
concept.782

In the context of CEDAW, which sets a bar of human rights protections and
achievement through standards of law and policy to which states essentially hold
themselves and others to account, the hard line between what is a legal concept and what
is a preventative or ameliorative act of public policy is less related to a discernable
“ground” than it is to an overall regard for the state of human rights protection, and the
ability of all to access to the benefits of society. As Walker says, this has “less to do with
the grounds of discrimination” per se, and rather, with the best way to “avoid violation”
of the right in the first place.783
In this way, CEDAW’s formulation in GR 35 begins to set out the social context
or “background” discrimination we saw Crenshaw draw the UN’s attention to in cases of
overt gross human rights violations: that is, recasting discrimination as a social process,
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wherein an individual’s experience is unintelligible without the context of complex
systemic and group disadvantage and exploitation. The concern with grounds over
context characterizes discrimination as an aberration from the regular functioning of
(assumedly non-discriminatory) social and institutional relations, framing it as a singular,
discernable, legal phenomenon.
In Chapter 3, I characterized the formulation of intersectionality in GR 28 Article
18 as risking a neutering of the potency of intersectionality by characterizing it as an
additional event of discrimination based on multiple and specific grounds, identities or
vulnerabilities. In contrast, through the academic literature, we have seen that rather than
being merely an additional ground, intersectionality is understood as an approach, a
conceptualization and a frame of analysis that operates on many levels to challenge the
very basis of traditional grounds-based conceptions of discrimination. From Crenshaw
we learned that an important aspect of the intersectional turn is that it requires us to
consider the structural and group identity aspects of discrimination, in addition to the
vulnerabilities that attract the overt discrimination and marginalization of individuals. To
Crenshaw, these form the background systems that sustain and maintain systems of
subordination in a dynamic and ongoing way.
In GR 35, CEDAW sets its sights on these systems. That is, the Committee is
attempting to capture, in Crenshaw’s words, “both the structural and dynamic
consequences of the interaction between two or more axis of subordination”, as well as
“the manner in which racism, patriarchy, class oppression and other discriminatory
systems create background inequalities that structure the relative positions of women,

212

213
races, ethnicities, classes, and the like”. 784 As I explore below, CEDAW’s grouping of
conditions in GR 35 demonstrates a more advanced reckoning with the deeper analyses
possible through intersectionality employed as an analytic tool by addressing “the way
that specific acts and policies create burdens that flow along these axes constituting the
dynamic or active aspects of disempowerment”.785 This is evident throughout the articles
of the GR, which I explore in some detail below.
In keeping with the thematic focus of this GR, the Committee reflects on the
specific integration of intersectionality into its understanding of violence against women
—or what it now refers to as gender-based violence:
Accordingly, because women experience varying and
intersecting forms of discrimination, which have an
aggravating negative impact, the Committee acknowledges
that gender-based violence may affect some women to
different degrees, or in different ways, so appropriate legal
and policy responses are needed.786

Despite the disconnect I previously traced between CEDAW’s development of
intersectionality and Crenshaw’s, the framing of intersectionality in this article echoes
Crenshaw’s early accounts of violence against women from an intersectional perspective
in the national context, as explored in Chapter 1: “the location of women of colour at the
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intersection of race and gender makes our actual experience of domestic violence, rape
and remedial reform qualitatively different from that of white women”.787
The shift in the language from violence against women to gender-based violence
in this GR, keeps pace with semantic changes elsewhere in the UN, but additionally,
CEDAW specifies that this change allows them to focus attention on the structural
aspects of violence. In paragraph 9, the Committee remedially expands its understanding
of violence against women with the following:
The concept of ‘violence against women’ in general
recommendation No. 19 and other international instruments
and documents has emphasised that this violence is genderbased. Accordingly, this document uses the expression
‘gender-based violence against women’, as a more precise
term that makes explicit the gendered causes and impacts
of the violence. This expression further strengthens the
understanding of this violence as a social—rather than an
individual—problem, requiring comprehensive responses,
beyond specific events, individual perpetrators and
victims/survivors.788

In service to a thicker definition of intersectionality, we see the pattern I have
traced throughout this dissertation of putting an old concept to new purpose in CEDAW’s
articulation of its consciousness of itself. We have a clear articulation of violence, and
therefore of the discrimination it represents, being a social, rather than individual
problem, requiring comprehensive responses beyond individual events. In the following
paragraph (10), this positioning of gender as a category that extends the view of structural
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subordination is further articulated by categorizing gender-based violence as a
“fundamental social, political and economic means by which the subordinate position of
women with respect to men … is perpetuated”.789 Moreover, in answer to the question I
posed about the relation of the “identity” traits CEDAW listed as part of intersectionality
in the GR above, the following article expressly opens up the relation of women’s
intersectional identities to structural violence with phrasing that is worth quoting in full:
Gender-based violence against women is affected and often
exacerbated by cultural, economic, ideological,
technological, political, religious, social and environmental
factors, as evidenced, among others, in the contexts of
displacement, migration, increased globalization of
economic activities including global supply chains,
extractive and offshoring industry, militarisation, foreign
occupation, armed conflict, violent extremism and
terrorism. Gender-based violence against women is also
affected by political, economic and social crises, civil
unrest, humanitarian emergencies, natural disasters,
destruction or degradation of natural resources. Harmful
practices and crimes against women human rights
defenders, politicians, activists or journalists are also forms
of gender-based violence.790

Here CEDAW appears to face, head on, criticisms of feminist approaches to
international law that contribute to the obfuscation of global inequalities and the
structural sources for women’s intersectional subordination. Recalling Orford’s critique
that “[a] feminist analysis of international law that focuses on gender alone, without
analysing the exploitation of women in the economic ‘South’, would operate to reinforce
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the depoliticized notion of difference that founds the privileged position of the imperial
feminist,791 we can be encouraged by the manner in which these wider economic issues
are explicitly articulated in GR 35. The mantle of intersectionality, as it is operating in
the context of GR 35, appears to be facilitating an expansion of the field of the CEDAW
Committee’s conceptualization of (women’s) international (human rights) law such that it
is beginning to glimpse “the preservation and maintenance of a deeply unjust global
order,”792 if not (yet) its own role in it. In GR 33, CEDAW recognizes the role of law in
the intersectional subordination of women domestically.793
With these two potential building blocks framed within an elaboration of an
intersectional approach to women’s human rights—a recognition of an unjust global
order and the recognition of the role domestic legal frameworks play in maintaining
women’s oppression—the Committee appears both so close and so far from a recognition
of its own structural positioning within the intersectional discrimination it seeks to
unearth. Despite the contested nature of the concept and its uncertain application as I
have traced so far, at least one of my informants believed that GR 28 paved the way for a
more fully realized understanding of intersectionality in GRs 33 and 35:

Since I joined, 28 and intersectionality is gaining. GR 33
also reflects GR 28 article 18. [General Recommendation]
28 gives us license in the drafting of 35 for non-derogation.
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… Intersectionality compels you to do that deeper analysis.
It helps recast the context.794

Citing intersectionality as authority in this way, assisted this racialized committee
member to articulate concerns that both her state, and her fellow committee members had
previously dismissed —in particular, the extension of protections to LBT women.
Turning to the deliberations and decisions of the Committee, we will trace this
claim through the main activities of their interpretation, that is first through the
concluding observations; then the individual communications, which most closely
approximate what is traditionally understood in law to be jurisprudence; and then through
a particular ground-breaking intersectional inquiry into grave and systemic violations
which the Committee is authorized to initiate under Optional Protocol Article 8.795
This latter inquiry brings to bear the confluence of an intersectional approach in
the service of a critical analysis of neocolonial, systemic and racialized discrimination
carried out by Canada, a state from the Global North that is generally seen to be a
champion of gender protections in international law. As such, it goes some distance to
answer Orford’s call to cease a pattern of savior white feminism implicated in the
extension of empire,796 replacing it with an international approbation of a colonial state
denying basic gender protections to an oppressed Indigenous population within its
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borders. That the inquiry was expressly prompted by the request of domestic activist
groups further evidences the links I traced earlier between the movement-based origins of
intersectional critique and its uptake at CEDAW.797

5.6 Individual communications post-2010
As explored earlier in this chapter, individual communications are authorized
under the Optional Protocol of CEDAW. They most closely approximate the
jurisprudence of domestic systems, in that they allow for fact-specific interpretations of
the treaty in comparison to claims made against State parties to the treaty by individuals
claiming discrimination within the treaty’s terms after having exhausted domestic
remedies. Like domestic case law, these cases take on the name(s) of the claimants, or as
they are known in international human rights law, their authors. Decisions issued by the
committees on individual communications are considered authoritative interpretations of
the treaty’s articles and are most frequently categorized as its “jurisprudence”.
In a broad-based approach to discerning the frequency of the terms associated
with intersectional analysis in recent UN discourse explored in previous chapters, I
conducted a search of the UNHROHC jurisprudence database. This indicated a broad
deployment of the term “multiple discrimination”, with 37 instances concentrated in the
individual representation findings of CCPR, CEDAW, CERD and the newly ratified
CPRD.798 Both cases that were found to be inadmissible—that is, not considered on their
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merits but rather technically disallowed from being heard or adjudicated by the
Committee—and those cases for which a full hearing and decision were rendered, were
included in this count. The states represented in the data range from Canada to Uruguay.
A similar search for the use of the term intersectionality in the same database turns up a
mere six references, the chronological first of which is in 2000, at CPRD. In that context,
it was a word repeated in the decision of non-admissibility but quoted as submitted by the
claimant, who saw his situation as arising at the “intersection of political opinion, race
and religion”.799
The Committee itself provides a survey of its deployment of intersectionality post
GR 28 throughout GR 35. I will engage with this catalogue as an additional window into
the committee’s self-understanding of its deployment of intersectionality, recalling that
sometimes what at first seems a banal observation—intersectionality “might be used as
its proponents were suggesting it should be used”800—is also a reflection of the
Committee’s “consciousness of itself”. Put another way, CEDAW’s catalogue of
intersectionality’s appearances in its previous decisions can reveal its method of
consolidating and reassembling an intersectional approach over time and retrospectively.
Taken both at face value and eyed critically, it is a glimpse into the Committee’s
articulation and justification of its understanding of the concept of intersectionality in
relation to its authority to determine the scope of gender protection and state obligation in
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international human rights law. This fits squarely within the Orfordian approach to
critical international legal method.
With respect to individual communications, the Committee draws attention to
Jallow v. Bulgaria, 2012;801 S.V.P. v. Bulgaria, 2012;802 Kell v. Canada, 2012;803 A.S. v.
Hungary, 2006;804 and R. P. B. v. the Philippines, 2014,805 which I will examine in
relation to the earlier famous GBV case of Karen Tayag Vertido v. the Philippines,
2010.806 It also draws attention to M.W. v. Denmark, 2016,807 which I will explore below.
I will briefly explore the decisions in these cases, before moving on to consider the
concluding observations and then Special Inquiry, again following and updating those
singled out by the Committee with more current decisions as well as decisions arising
from reports I witnessed in 2016 during the 66th Session. As Canada’s inquiry follows
GR 28, I will concentrate on this from among the two inquiries the Committee has
conducted.

5.6.1 Intersectionality as a factor in the individual communications
decisions of the CEDAW Committee
Recalling that “jurisprudence” proper—while rightfully a contested notion808—is,
in the international human rights context, restricted to individual communications, I
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began my search for authoritative interpretations of intersectionality in CEDAW through
the jurisprudence database provided by the Office for the High Commission on Human
Rights. Perhaps due to a cataloguing error,809 the only instance of the term
intersectionality by name in CEDAW’s jurisprudence as catalogued in the UN’s
jurisprudence database, cropped up in a 2016 dissenting opinion (a rare occurrence), in
this case by Patricia Schulz (Switzerland), in M.W. v. Denmark.810 While the opinion is a
dissent, it is worthy of our attention first because it is the only occurrence of the word
intersectionality, and second because it articulates a desire to limit the Committee’s
conceptualization of intersectional discrimination. In the space between the majority
opinion and the dissent, the indeterminacy of the concept and role of intersectionality at
CEDAW gets traced. The dissent echoes concerns Schulz shared with me regarding the
possibility for intersectionality to blur rather than sharpen the Committee’s focus.
Schulz finds, in a complex custody case involving two different national legal
systems (Denmark and Austria) that had made contradictory custody decisions, that
intersectional discrimination was not present, and that having it as a frame of reference,
far from compelling the Committee to a deeper analysis, as referenced by another
committee member above, propelled them to widely miss the mark. The majority held

institutions and organs". Henry J Steiner, Philip Alston & Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights in
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that the author (in international human rights, claimants are called authors of the petition)
“suffered discrimination as a foreign mother”, citing its recollection “that discrimination
against women on the basis of sex and gender is inextricably linked with other factors
that affect women, such as nationality, and that States parties must legally recognize such
intersecting forms of discrimination and their compounded negative impact on the
women concerned, and prohibit them”.811
In her dissent, Schulz does not hold back: she states, “not every case of poor
treatment of a female claimant amounts to discrimination based on sex, or foreign
nationality or the intersection of both grounds”.812 Schulz appears in this paragraph to
pivot back to a grounds-based analysis in her interpretation of intersectionality. Her main
objection to the majority in this case is on the grounds of admissibility or what in
Common Law would be the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Nonetheless, while she
believes the case should not have been heard at all by the Committee on legal grounds,
her comments regarding the occurrence or not of discrimination can be viewed as an
attempt to provide guidance as to the boundaries of an intersectional interpretation. She
argues the facts in this case did not support a finding of discrimination, but rather it was a
“tragic case” with bad (legal) behaviour on all sides. The majority, she argues,
overstepped, and the fact that they found that “‘the custody of a minor child of tender
age’ amounts to a case where the ‘general public importance rule’ should apply is
disconcerting, and does not relate to sex-based discrimination”.813
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Schulz’s is the first post-2010 clear articulation from the Committee of ‘what
intersectionality is not’, and for this it is significant. Intersectionality is thus represented
as a double negative: defined in the negative in terms of what it is not, and in dissent
against the majority holding of what it is. Schulz appears to be taking a stance against a
notion of intersectionality as a catalogue of conditions, or as Schulz puts it,
women and all bad things and mix and there you have it.814
As we saw in the previous chapter, Schulz is one Committee member who is
against a “this and that” approach. It seems likely that the Committee will continue to
grapple with its task of discerning limits to the laundry list of conditions and
characteristics articulated in GR 35, explored above, as it evolves its working definition
of intersectionality.
The cases of two individual communications against the Philippines, Tayag
Vertido v. the Philippines, 2010, and R. P. B. v. the Philippines, 2011 (2014) can be
treated together. Both involve gender stereotypes and myths in the treatment of sexual
assault survivors by the criminal justice system. That these cases are cited in GR 35’s
catalogue of intersectionality decisions made by the Committee, means that we should
see the treatment of matters of race, culture religion, etc., named as aspects of the
Committee’s own definition of intersectionality, appear in the method of case analysis
and decisions rendered by CEDAW. The R.P.B. case follows Vertido, and the author
cites Vertido in her communication. The author R.P.B., a Filipino national, was executive
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director of the Davao City Chamber of Commerce and Industry when the defendant,
president of the Chamber at the time, sexually assaulted her. The judge who presided
over the trial in a domestic court questioned the credibility of the victim’s testimony and
found it implausible, using strong gender stereotypes in the language of her decision. The
defendant was found not guilty, despite the existence of corroborating evidence and a
medical report. In its decision, the CEDAW Committee held that the assessment by
domestic courts of the credibility of the claimant’s testimony was influenced by several
stereotypes about the “ideal victim” in cases of rape. The Committee found the state
responsible for failure to fulfill its obligation to take appropriate measure to modify and
abolish not only existing laws and regulations, but also customs and practices that
constitute discrimination against women.815
In R.P. B., the communication argues for a finding with respect to the chapeau
Article 1 on discrimination, and Articles 2 c, d and f. Article 2, which, we may recall, is
the article in which GR 28 situated the mandate to interpret state obligations regarding
anti-discrimination through an intersectional lens. R.P.B commenced her communication
with the Committee in 2011, after the release of GR 28; the Committee rendered its
decision in 2014. As such, we would expect to see intersectionality as a complication to
single-axis considerations of women’s human rights in this decision. I am neither the
first, nor alone in tracing a tendency of the Committee to interpret Article 2(f) with a
vague and thin understanding of culture.816 As I explored in Chapter 2, the framing of this
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article takes us into the territory of the role of custom and tradition in discrimination
against women, and the Committee’s mandate to demand that the state abolish it. This
exemplifies, and I argue roots, imperial approaches to women’s human rights law at
CEDAW. In R.P.B. v. Philippines, the Committee found that the Philippines State
breached the rights of a mute and hearing-impaired girl to non-discrimination under
Articles 2 and 5, in the investigation and trial of her alleged rape. The Philippines had, in
investigating the crime and in the trial, they found, failed to provide a free interpreter and
had used stereotypes and gender-based myths, disregarding the victim’s specific situation
as a girl who is disabled. Finding under Article 2, we see the Committee recasting culture
as a congealing of rape myths within the legal system, rather than a pre-industrial and
racialized set of vague customs. This foreshadows the application of a more structural
approach to the meaning of culture as specifically patriarchal in a case I analyze below,
Jallow v. Bulgaria.
The holding in R.P.B. shows the potential for the Committee to move from a view
of culture still crafted in the shadow of imperialism, to one that is augmented by
intersectionality’s concern with systems, structures and state apparatus. In R.P.B, the
Committee finds: “First, the court not only rendered judgement against the author using
gender stereotypes and myths, but also reasoned with manifest prejudice against her as a
deaf minor victim”.817 Here culture and tradition become the culture of patriarchy
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specifically, and this view is further complicated by recognition of a clear case of
intersectional discrimination based on disability.
Although this decision appears to take us into new territory with respect to
intersectionality and what it opens in the interpretation of custom and tradition, the
Philippines is a country that has been the subject of much imperial and globalized
capitalist intervention; it is, for the purposes of the foregoing analysis, part of the third
world from a TWAIL perspective, or the Global South from the perspective of the UN. It
is thus necessary to balance the interest CEDAW takes in the breaches it finds here with
its approach to states of the Global North. Does the interest in systems and contexts for
discrimination arise from an intersectional analysis, or is the interest a proxy for its
imperial predecessor, and restricted to the systems of those states located in the Global
South? In M.W. v. Denmark, explored above, we had a mixed response, complicated by a
dissent on procedural grounds. How does this new intersectional tool assist in the
examination of traditionally strong states, which are part of the Global North?
In Kell v. Canada, the Committee appears to find its voice with intersectionality. I
will argue below that the rubric of intersectionality now appears to be openly shaping
subsequent jurisprudence in such decisions as Jallow v. Bulgaria, decided in 2012, in
which CEDAW held a European state and one of its nationals responsible for the
violation of the treaty rights of a migrant woman on the basis of her daughter’s abuse,
and for the state’s subsequent lack of remedy.818 Both decisions foreground the specific
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experiences of discrimination against multidiscriminated women, and expand both the
kinds of gender discrimination states are required to prevent and the kinds of remediation
imposed. Both involve fact scenarios very familiar to women’s rights advocates in
several national settings. I will first turn to Kell.
In Kell vs. Canada, a decision adopted in 2012 in which the Committee found
against Canada, an Aboriginal woman was deemed discriminated against based on
gender, in a way that may not have been so for a white woman, when her property rights
were alienated after leaving an abusive relationship with a non-Aboriginal man. The facts
of Kell’s case are detailed below.
In 1990, William Senych applied for housing without the knowledge of his
common-law partner, Cecilia Kell, an Aboriginal woman from the Rae-Edzo community
in the Northwest Territories (NWT). Senych’s application was denied because he was not
a member of the Rae-Edzo community for which the housing was earmarked. On the
advice of a Tenant Relations officer at the Rae-Edzo Housing Authority, Kell then
applied for housing, listing Senych as her spouse. In 1991, the NWT Housing
Corporation issued an Agreement for Purchase and Sale to Kell and Senych as co-owners
of the property. Senych subjected Kell to domestic violence, including economic abuse,
over the subsequent three-year period.
In 1993, following a request from Senych and without Kell’s knowledge, the
NWT Housing Corporation (on instruction from the Rae-Edzo Housing Authority)
removed Kell’s name from the Assignment of Lease, the document that certified coownership. The removal had the effect of making Senych the sole owner of the property.
Senych was a board member of the Housing Authority at the time of his request. In 1995,
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Senych changed the locks and denied Kell access to the property. He subsequently sought
to evict her. While she sought protection in a shelter, Kell filed proceedings against
Senych in the NWT Supreme Court seeking compensation for assault, battery, sexual
assault, intimidation, trespass to chattels, loss of use of her home and consequential
payment of rent and attendant expenses. She also filed a declaration that Senych had
obtained the property fraudulently, aided and abetted by the NWT Government. Kell was
assigned a legal aid lawyer, who advised her to comply with the letter of eviction and did
not challenge the letter’s validity.
Shortly thereafter, Senych was diagnosed with cancer at which time Kell’s lawyer
advised her to delay proceedings. Senych later died, following which Kell’s lawyer
initiated proceedings against his estate, the NWT Housing Corporation and another. A
replacement legal aid lawyer added a claim for damages for assault and intimidation. In
1999, Senych’s estate and the Housing Corporation offered Kell a monetary settlement.
During negotiations, Kell’s case was twice reassigned to new lawyers. Both insisted that
Kell settle. She refused, however, as her key concern was regaining the property.
Following her refusal, Kell’s lawyer ceased acting on her behalf. Kell’s case was only reassigned to a new lawyer after she appealed to the Legal Services Board. The Supreme
Court dismissed both proceedings for “want of prosecution”. Costs were imposed against
Kell and subsequent appeals were unsuccessful. In 2004, Kell filed a third action related
to her interest in and right to the leasehold title and possession of the property. The
property had then been sold and the Court dismissed the matter.
Kell subsequently submitted a communication to the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women in which she claimed that Canada had
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violated articles 1, 2(d), 2(e), 14(2)(h), 15(1)-15(4), 16(1)(h) of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Kell claimed that Canada
had allowed its agents—the NWT Housing Corporation and the Rae-Edzo Housing
Authority—to discriminate against her on the grounds of sex, marital status and cultural
heritage and had failed to ensure that its agents provide equal treatment to female housing
applicants. Kell noted Canada’s failure to prevent and remedy the fraudulent removal of
her name from the Assignment of Lease and the failure to ensure that its agents afford
women and men equal rights in respect of ownership, acquisition, management,
administration and enjoyment of property.
The Committee concluded that Kell’s property rights had been prejudiced due to a
public authority acting with her partner, and that she had been discriminated against as an
Aboriginal woman. The Committee also found that Canada had failed to provide Kell
effective legal protection when she sought to regain her property rights. The Committee
established that Canada, as party to the Convention and its Optional Protocol, had failed
to fulfil its obligations under Articles 1, 2 and 16 and that it should provide monetary
compensation and housing matching what Kell was deprived of. The Committee also
recommended recruiting and training more Aboriginal women to provide legal assistance,
as well as review Canada’s legal system to ensure that Aboriginal women victims of
domestic violence have effective access to justice.819

819

“Case of Kell v. Canada”, (2012), online: Harv Univ Cent Hum Rights Policy Violence Women Res
Database <https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/violenceagainstwomen/publications/kell-v-canada-0>.

229

230
In Kell, the victory is a particularly poignant recasting of a famously different
decision on similar facts. In the 1981, Lovelace v. Canada820 case, predating both
CEDAW’s individual complaints mechanism and Canada’s Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, the complainant contested both the colonial state’s definition of (her) culture
and the Indigenous male leadership’s collusion with it in an access to matrimonial
property case. Importantly, the complexity of identity presented by Lovelace while
named in the protections under separate articles in the Treaty (ICCPR), was not
recognized in the holding by the Committee adjudicating (then, Human Rights
Commission), who found in her favour but on the basis of her Indigenous status alone. In
Kell, we see the operationalization of GR 28 in a holding against a state traditionally
immune from international approbation:
As an Aboriginal person, she experienced racism, and as a
woman, she experienced sexism. Both of these aspects of
discrimination contributed to a pattern of behaviour that
was―at best bullying and at worst abusive. Poverty,
unemployment, dislocation and homelessness resulting
from the theft of her home played a role because she could
not afford a lawyer of her own choosing[.]821

The Committee further underscores that “[a]s the author is an Aboriginal woman
who is in a vulnerable position, the State party is obliged to ensure the effective
elimination of intersectional discrimination”.822 Specifically, the Committee references
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GR 28 in its decision, and as justification for its articulation of state obligations and
reparations in this case:
In its general recommendation No. 28, the Committee
states that intersectionality is a basic concept for
understanding the scope of general obligation of States
parties contained in article 2 of the Convention. …
States parties must legally recognize and prohibit such
intersecting forms of discrimination and their compounding
negative impact on the women concerned.823

In Kell, the Committee found that article 2, paragraphs (d) and (e), of the Convention
were violated.824
In Jallow v. Bulgaria, 2012, referred to above, the CEDAW Committee found
against the state in a case involving Isatou Jallow and her minor daughter without express
use of the language of intersectionality but with use of its proxy term multiple
discrimination. Isatou was an immigrant from Gambia, her husband and the father of her
child, a Bulgarian national. Both mother and daughter were subjected to physical and
sexual abuse at the hands of her husband. State authorities, including child welfare, who
granted sole custody to the abuser, and initiated proceedings against the mother, based on
only unverified assertions from the abuser, were found to have failed to provide
protection, as required by Bulgaria’s obligations under CEDAW and the Optional
Protocol. “The State party … failed to take appropriate measures to protect women,
especially mothers, from domestic violence. The law and the practice of the authorities
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do not recognize many forms of violence against women, resulting in inequality with
men[.]”825
In this case as in the one against the Philippines, we see a holding that reads
Article 2(f) in relation to the intersectional discrimination congealed in the legal system
of the State party. The required compensation owed to the author and her daughter
included specific measures aimed at the rights of migrant women to state protection for
domestic violence and the right to access to translation and interpretation in the legal
system, as well as a requirement that the state,
provide for appropriate and regular training on the
Convention, its Optional Protocol and its general
recommendations for judges, prosecutors, the staff of the
State Agency for Child Protection and law enforcement
personnel in a gender-sensitive manner, having particular
regard to multiple discrimination, so as to ensure that
complaints regarding gender-based violence are received
and considered adequately.826

In S.V.P. v. Bulgaria,827 S.V.P. is the author of the communication on behalf of
her daughter regarding alleged discrimination under several articles of CEDAW. The
daughter was sexually abused by a neighbour as a child. The prosecution of the crime
was pursued laxly and tardily by authorities, who brought a lesser charge than the one in
evidence, according to an agreement of facts. In this case, the child’s sexual abuse and
subsequent mental health, developmental and trauma-related learning disabilities were
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also cited by the Committee in its holding against the state. Once again, the systemic
aspect of discrimination is featured in the finding against the state, using 2(f):
The Committee recalls that article 2, paragraphs (a), (f) and
(g), establishes the obligation of States parties to provide
legal protection and to abolish or amend discriminatory
laws and regulations as part of the policy of eliminating
discrimination against women and that they have an
obligation to take steps to modify or abolish existing laws,
regulations, customs and practices which constitute
discrimination against women.828

In S.V.P. we see again the pattern of ascribing to culture and tradition a less
colonial and more structural understanding of the operations of discrimination. Here what
Crenshaw called the “background conditions” are the concern of the treaty Committee,
tracing the systemic nature of discrimination and inequality, rather than the one-time
event, seen as an aberration from the norm. This is one of the fundamental aspects of an
intersectional approach, and it appears the Committee is finding its way with it.

5.6.2 Intersectionality as a factor in Concluding Observations
We are pretty clear on the definition of intersectionality.
We come at it from the perspective of the country report:
even when we use intersectionality, sometimes sexuality
and sexual orientation drops out. But race, ethnicity,
religion, caste, there isn’t a country where those don’t come
out. Where it is obvious, it comes out.829
I think that it actually happens routinely without devoting
any concrete or planned thought. It had become integrated
into our routine set of questions both … at the very first
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part of the dialogue under articles 1 and 2 when, you know,
the most emerging overarching issues are being laid out.830

Recalling the review earlier in the chapter, countries that have become party to
CEDAW are obliged to submit regular reports to the Committee on how the rights of the
Convention are implemented. During its sessions, the Committee considers each state
party report and addresses its concerns and recommendations to the state party in the
form of concluding observations. While concluding observations do not hold the same
place as ICs, it is nonetheless “the primary role of all the Committees … to review the
reports submitted periodically by State parties in accordance with the treaties’
provisions”.831
I asserted above that in the context of intersectionality, viewed here as an
approach to contextualized law making, the concluding observations may have an even
more important story to tell about the Committee’s interpretation of the concept. This is
because it is where the Committee articulates states’ obligations in broad public policy
prescriptions (and proscriptions), by necessity addressing the background conditions of
discrimination with an eye to prevention, rather than through technical interpretations of
breaches only. This, I have argued elsewhere (Chapters 1 and 3), brings us closer to the
potential operationalization of the radical roots of intersectionality, as articulated in
Crenshaw and Yuval-Davis.
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In GR 35, the Committee draws attention to the concluding observations of Papua
New Guinea, 2010,832 South Africa, 2011,833 Afghanistan, 2013,834 and Jordan, 2017835 as
exemplary of its adoption of intersectionality. I will examine these concluding
observations in light of the foregoing analyses. However, because GR 35 was focused on
an update of GR 19 on gender-based violence, I will expand the concluding observations
considered here to those that I witnessed the reporting cycle of, and for which there are
now concluding observations, taking us beyond the violations categorized exclusively
under gender-based violence. Thus, I will add to my examination, a brief consideration of
Canada 2016,836 Belarus 2016837 and Bhutan, 2016.838
In the concluding observations for Afghanistan, we see a return to the language of
“cultural beliefs”, “deep rooted patriarchal attitudes”,839 and familiar approbation with
which a neocolonial, deeply contingent and emerging state such as Afghanistan has
historically been regarded, with CEDAW using women’s international human rights as a
measure of its general acceptance into the international community. The CEDAW was
ratified by Afghanistan, without reservations, as part of a spate of human rights

832

Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women Papua
New Guinea, CEDAW/C/PNG/CO/3 (2010).
833
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women South
Africa, CEDAW/C/ZAF/CO/4 (2011).
834
Concluding Observations on the Combined Initial and Second Periodic Reports of Afghanistan,
CEDAW/C/AFG/CO/1-2 (2013).
835
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Concluding observations on the sixth
periodic report of Jordan, CEDAW/C/JOR/CO/6 (2017).
836
United Nations, Concluding Observations on the Combined Eighth and Ninth Periodic Reports of
Canada (2016).
837
note 766.
838
Concluding Observations on the Combined Eighth and Ninth Periodic Reports of Bhutan,
CEDAW/C/BTN/CO/8-9 (2016).
839
note 835, paras 22 & 28.

235

236
ratifications, all listed in the concluding observation, in keeping with the contingent
nature of Afghanistan’s acceptance into the global community. Yet, the litany of
violations the Committee goes through indicate the pro forma nature of this ratification
and point to CEDAW’s role—and consequently women’s international human rights—in
disciplining a rogue state.
The CO itself does not analyze the ways in which international interests and
outside pressures shape the fortunes and manipulations of a state and consequently, how
the instrumentalization of patriarchy is used as a bulwark against internal challenges and
external pressures. Should this have been the case, such as the ways state homophobia
was analyzed in the scholarship of Puar, Weiss & Bosia, intersectionality might have
emerged as potent tool in the critique of the imperial pedigree of international law.
Likewise, Bhutan’s concluding observations vacillate between a colonial
fascination with the state’s spiritual “gross national happiness (GNH)” indicator,
mentioning it six times in the concluding observations, and repugnance at its toleration of
polygamy.840 In my informal discussions with NGO representatives during the civil
society meetings before the state reporting session for Bhutan, women’s rights advocates
expressed concern with the lack of accountability for the degree of gender-based violence
in Bhutan and the soft manner in which the state was approached in this regard. Although
gender-based violence is mentioned as a condition of GNH in the concluding
observations, 841there is concern among activists that a colonial fascination with the GNH
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of Bhutan distracts the Committee from the harsher realities, particularly when it is seen
as a country that avoids some of the pitfalls of embracing neoliberalism in its
“development” path.842
The tension between the “women in development” narrative and the rights agenda
represented by CEDAW that I analyzed in Chapter 2 remains in play in this and the other
concluding observations for countries of the Global South analyzed by the Committee.
Recalling that this discourse traces its intellectual history to an often unquestioned
grounding in the unequal relations of international political economy,843 and posits a
social development role for women who, rather than appearing as rights bearers, are
viewed as indicators of a community’s capacity to advance toward a more developed
state, the Committee gestures to this context of measurement again when it states that
“the State party has not yet conducted a comprehensive analysis of existing
discriminatory stereotypes in order to assess their impact on the achievement of gender
equality”.844
In the concluding observations for South Africa, the Committee continues this
line of observation with multiple mentions of the importance of the Millennium
Development Goals. The references to development in South Africa’s case, follow the
strain within women’s human rights I examined in earlier chapters regarding the
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contextualization of women’s “advancement” as tethered to the very economic conditions
that many argue are the source of their disenfranchisement. In keeping with this
developmentalist narrative, the Committee’s view of intersectionality seems additionally
obscured by the imperial shadow we have traced through Orford in passages such as the
following:
The Committee is thus concerned about the inadequate
implementation of effective and comprehensive measures
to modify or eliminate stereotypes and negative traditional
values and practices in South Africa. The Committee also
expresses serious concern about the persistence of
entrenched harmful cultural norms and practices, including
ukuthwala (forced marriages of women and girls to older
men through abduction), polygamy and the killing of
“witches”.845

As I explored in Chapter 1, such preoccupation with what Letti Volpp calls
“bizarre and alien” forms of gender persecution as “traditional”,846 lifts these harms from
the global context of gender-based violence and consigns them to the local and cultural,
giving them status as backward spectacle. The Committee’s most frequent mention of
intersectionality in this CO is in relation to the intersection of gender and HIV status,
along with the specific impact of gender discrimination on rural women with respect to
property inheritance and ownership.847 Given the continuing impact of Apartheid and
globalization on South Africa’s present, an intersectional analysis might be expected to
take a step further in situating women’s oppression within this context.
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In the CO for Papua New Guinea, 2010, the Committee finds “the State party has
not taken sustained systematic action to modify or eliminate stereotypes and negative
traditional values and practices”, even while it acknowledges “the rich culture and
traditions of the State party and their importance in daily life”.848 In what appears a nod
to more recent understandings of the dynamic nature of culture, the Committee “invites
the State party to view culture and tradition as dynamic aspects of the country’s life and
social fabric and therefore as subject to change”.849
In Chapter 2, I explored how the language of “abolish” in Article 2(f) of CEDAW
echoes the presumed right of metropolitan centres to require change in the subjugated.
Despite the intervention of contemporary and critical perspectives on the textual
limitation in CEDAW’s formulation of culture, the Committee continues at times to
conflate culture with discrimination, or patriarchy with culture, giving an at once partial
and totalizing view of a state’s culture, no less fixed in conception for the gesture to its
changeability.
Earlier in the dissertation I explored how such commentary has “reinforced the
notion that metropolitan centres of the West contain no tradition or culture harmful to
women, and that the violence which does exist is idiosyncratic and individualized rather
than culturally condoned”.850 This theme of colonial superiority casts a pall over aspects
of the Committee’s reasoning, such as the one following the passage I’ve just quoted,
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where the Committee calls upon the state to “take steps to ensure that traditional
apologies are abolished” and ensure that “women and girls who are victims of violence
have access to … shelters and safe houses”.851 While clearly women in Papau New
Guinea have every right to find safety from violence, the prescriptive nature of the
solution seems out of keeping with the nod to cultural difference in the passage before. In
this instance, we see a post-intersectional CEDAW following in the footsteps of the
founders of international authority studied by Orford: confidently setting out to “remake
the world” in their (cosmopolitan) image.852
In what appears to be a blatant confirmation of this assessment of the
Committee’s reliance on its imperial roots, the 2016 concluding observations for Canada
start out the customary constructive dialogue by praising a piece of legislation853 that was
the subject of extensive feminist resistance and activism within Canada (Bill S-7,
Barbaric Cultures Act; 854 and the related Quebec Charter of Secularism),855 specifically
on the grounds that it advanced an expressly anti-intersectional analysis and racist
instrumentalization of feminism. The so-called Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural
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Practices Act, passed into law in 2015, was advanced in Canada along with a Barbaric
Cultural Acts tip line, in the name of securing the gains of white feminists against the
brown—literally barbarian—hordes who would bring unfiltered patriarchy with them
when they emigrated. Indeed, the language itself was so blatantly colonial and egregious
that there could be no clearer case of a single axis and racist feminism at work.
Domestically, the legislation became a focal point for activism,856 comedy,857 and
may have contributed to the defeat of the previous national government.858 It was brought
to the international community as an example of the state not fulfilling its international
obligations,859 by taking a non-intersectional approach to rights, by stirring up antiimmigrant sentiment and by legislating these values in ways that criminalized, isolated
and targeted vulnerable populations of women. Openly imperial, analytically
compromised or simply ignorant of the national details and tone deaf—and quite possibly
all of the above—CEDAW failed to apply its intersectional lens to this context where
perhaps the state’s bias confirmed and echoed its own legacy.
On other matters, the concluding observations for Canada advance an
intersectional approach, specifically on Indigenous issues and core human rights’
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protections, such as solitary confinement, more properly protected in the pre-CEDAW
treaties, such the ICCPR. And, contrary to Campbell’s finding of inconsistent follow up
from individual communications in the concluding observations,860 in Canada’s 2016
concluding observations, the Committee expressly asks for accountability with respect to
its findings in Kell:
The Committee urges the State party: (a) To fully
implement the Committee’s views concerning
communication No. 19/2008 regarding reparation and
compensation for the author of the communication and
inform the Committee without delay of all measures taken
and planned as a consequence of its recommendations[.]861

The Committee likewise follows up on its earlier recommendations in its inquiry,
which we will explore below, in these concluding observations, with the following
unequivocal statement: “The Committee recommends that the State party fully
implement, without delay, all recommendations issued by the Committee in its report on
its inquiry.”862
Additionally, the Committee takes account of the role Canada plays in the
perpetuation of international inequality through its trade and other economic dealings by
requiring attention to the gendered impact of its global extractive industry and other trade
activities. These intersectional aspects of the concluding observations for Canada may
have more to do with the intersectional formulations of the NGOs and INGOs submitting
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shadow reports to the Committee than with the coherence of CEDAW’s own
interpretation of intersectionality.863
Although all UN human rights treaty bodies rely on shadow reports, CEDAW, as
I explored in Chapters 2 and 3, has a long and slightly more nuanced tradition of working
with women’s rights NGOs due to its background as a body slightly outside the
traditional UN structure, and for its reliance instead on the Commission on the Status of
Women. While in the case of Canada the representation of women’s rights NGOs may be
more robust than most, the role of women’s rights groups based in the Global South is no
less important or influential.
As I explored in Chapters 2 and 3, women’s groups from the Global South were
present at the drafting stage of CEDAW, just as they were during the Beijing debates. As
I demonstrated in Chapter 3, it was their voices that gave rise to the demand for an
intersectional approach in the first place. Despite—or perhaps more accurately because
of—the Committee’s reliance on the shadow reports of the national and international
NGOs, there is evidence of an emergent and inconsistent intersectional approach in the
Committee’s deliberations.
Unlike Canada, Belarus can be seen as appearing before the Committee as more
of a supplicant nation, ambivalently engaging with the international treaty system as a
means to attaining access to the economic benefits of globalization,864 because, as we saw
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in Chapter 2, ratification of human rights’ instruments is “seen as an essential prerequisite
to the facilitation of societal, legal, economic and political progress”.865 Within this
context, the intersectional approach of CEDAW under Article 2 of the Treaty, which is
the textual location of states’ obligations, takes on the added dimension of explicit and
expanded gender protections. The attention the Committee draws to the rights of lesbian,
bisexual and trangender women is striking,866 as are of course, the corollary violations.
As previously mentioned, the persecution of human rights defenders meant that
during the country report before the Committee, NGO representatives had to have their
identity obscured, and required the protection of and screening by large INGOs to put
forward their experiences to committee members on the floor of the session. While the
criminalization of lesbians, the apprehension of the children of human rights defenders on
trumped-up grounds,867 and a variety of state suppression and repression, including
executions, are indeed grounds for a strongly worded set of concluding observations,
there are contextual issues to state homophobia in the global perspective that a nuanced
committee approach to intersectional oppression committed by a variety of states might
surface. For instance, in the case of terrorism and religious extremism, the context of
globalization is often mentioned.868
Where state homophobia comes before the Committee to examine, it might
contextualize the approbation to consider the role human rights obligations play in the
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state’s admission to the international community, and the corollary manufacture of a
common enemy that appeals to homophobia and repression exemplify. It may be too
much to wish for an acknowledgement of Puar’s sweeping yet even-handed mapping of
homophobia and its variants in the global security agenda, neoliberal promotion of
human rights, establishment of militarized hyper masculinity and the deployment of
sexualized racial violence against men and women under the guise of both state
homoprotectivism and state homophobia. Yet the Committee seems able at times to get
part way there, as the reviews of Jordan and Canada, explored below, indicate.
In Jordan, the Committee again finds focus on the women and development
discourse, concluding: “The Committee calls for the realization of substantive gender
equality, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, throughout the process of
implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”869
Nonetheless, the Committee balances this with a sustained intersectional
contextualization of the factors preventing Jordan from implementing the Treaty
adequately:
The Committee acknowledges the impact of the combined
economic, demographic and security challenges facing
Jordan as a consequence of the continuing conflicts in the
region, in particular the crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic,
which has resulted in: (a) A mass influx of refugees from
the Syrian Arab Republic, estimated at 1.4 million persons;
(b) A social and economic cost to Jordanian society,
reflected in a sharp increase in poverty and unemployment
and overstretched national health and education systems,
basic services and infrastructure; (c) A deteriorating
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security situation. The Committee notes with concern that
the support from the international community has been
insufficient to alleviate the burden on the State party and
the host community and calls upon donors to meet the
humanitarian needs identified by the United Nations. The
Committee is concerned about the persistent rise of
fundamentalism in the country, which has a negative
impact on women’s rights.870

It is a remarkable passage that gives hope for a new perspective on the full import
and meaning of intersectionality in the Committee’s deliberations. Given the multitude of
individual, state, geopolitical and bureaucratic determinants I have surfaced in the
forgoing chapters that effect decision making at the Committee, it would be overly
deterministic to conclude that this was solely the result of a further development of the
Committee’s understanding of intersectionality as laid out in the more robust GC 35.

5.6.3 Inquiry into Canada’s Treatment of Indigenous Women: CEDAW
/C/O P.8/CAN/1

... so being at the same time a woman, who is indigenous
and has a disability means that your life is going to be
extremely miserable because of the combination of the
three elements. So you’re always a woman, but the two
others are going to really add to the problems, the legal
problems, you'll be faced with. And, and, I mean the legal,
the practical problems in your daily life.871

870
871

Ibid, para C (7).
Interview of Patricia Schulz, CEDAW Committee (26 October 2016), supra note 655.

246

247
Under Article 8 of the Optional Protocol to CEDAW, the Committee has
authority to investigate “grave or systematic violations by a state party”. 872 Since
acquiring the additional authority, CEDAW has exercised it on three occasions, first in
relation to Mexico,873 subsequently on the Philippines,874 and most recently on Canada.875
The inquiry under consideration here, namely that of Canada, finds a country of the
Global North, and a traditional darling of feminist international law, keeping company
with States parties it normally sits in judgement of. In this sense, at a normative and
structural level, CEDAW/C/P.8/CAN/1 evidences a shift in protagonists, as Orford
characterized the position of the imperial feminist in international law, discussed in
Chapter 2. This could signal a holistic intersectional approach that goes beyond the
individual violations that characterize the “this and that” approach of listing sequential
harms as further enumerated grounds. The format of the inquiry procedure lends itself to
an intersectional approach, since the mechanism expressly deals with systemic matters,
which, to be properly investigated, require a deeper contextual approach. In the Canada
report, the CEDAW Committee delivers on the intersectional promise. In a tersely
worded 58-page report, it holds the State to account, recalling that,
under articles 2 (f) and 5 (a) of the Convention, States
parties have an obligation to take appropriate measures to
modify or abolish not only existing laws and regulations,
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but also customs, practices and stereotypes that constitute
discrimination against women. The Committee also notes
that the intersectional discrimination suffered by Aboriginal
women in the State party results in the gender stereotyping
they face. It considers that gender stereotyping is persistent
in the society of, and institutionalized within the
administration of, the State party, including within law
enforcement agencies. This stereotyping includes portrayals
of aboriginal women as prostitutes, transients or runaways
and of having high-risk lifestyles, and an indifferent
attitude towards reports of missing aboriginal women. The
Committee considers that, notwithstanding the fact that the
State party has made an effort to provide gender-sensitive
training for the police, the State party has failed to take
sufficient and appropriate measures to address gender
stereotyping, including institutionalized stereotyping, in
breach of its obligations under articles 2 (f) and 5 (a).876

Here 2(f), the source of so much difficulty for a committee wrestling with its
treaty’s imperial legacy, is marshaled to the intersectional purpose that GR 28,
augmented by GR 35, demands. The strong language of abolishment, so implicated in the
colonial projects of international law, but importantly also referencing genocide in
Canada as well as in other states, is here focused with more precision on the culture of
racist and sexist stereotypes that define and condition intersectional discrimination. In
this full consideration of the state’s role in the murder and disappearance of thousands of
Indigenous women, we can recall the words of Kimberlé Crenshaw when addressing the
UN back in 2000. Here she laid out as to how harms from one form of discrimination
may make a person vulnerable to another form; at other times, two forms of
discrimination are indistinguishable, and simultaneously occurring: in both instances,
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“[t]hese are the contexts in which intersectional injuries occur—disadvantages or
conditions interact with preexisting vulnerabilities to create a distinct dimension of
disempowerment”.877

In CEDAW’s inquiry into the state’s complicity in the grave and systematic
intersectional discrimination against Indigenous women in Canada, the continuing
conditions that make the remedies for intersectional atrocities impossible to achieve are
brought into visibility. Crenshaw’s earlier quoted encapsulation of intersectionality’s
unique analytic contribution is worth quoting again here, because it fits the Committee’s
insights accurately:
Propaganda against poor and racialized women may not
only render them likely targets of sexualized violence, it
may also contribute to the tendency of many people to
doubt their truthfulness when they attempt to seek the
protection of authorities.878

We saw earlier that Crenshaw is positing a different approach to intersectional
discrimination than that which has arisen out of the mass atrocity context, by pointing out
that such eruptions of targeted violence “draw upon preexisting gender stereotypes” but
are also based in “distinctions between women”, and on “racial or ethnic stereotypes”.879
In this way, she points out, race or ethnic, as well as class, and gender stereotypes work
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to characterize some groups “as sexually undisciplined”.880 It is precisely the intersection
of these pre-existing and powerful social tropes that has dire consequences for women:
making them “particularly vulnerable to punitive measures based largely on who they
are”.881 It is this reality of intersectional discrimination that the CEDAW inquiry into the
situation of Indigenous women in Canada draws out.

5.7 Assessing the Record

[T]he law is not the text, no, it’s the interpretation...And no
people more than us at the CEDAW Committee can
interpret with the same authoritative way.882

Overall, when assessing CEDAW’s decision-making record, the concluding
observations in particular reveal that states from the Global South or “non-western”
states, as we saw in the case of Papua New Guinea, tend to be subject to greater criticism
from the Committee regarding “the persistence of harmful norms, practices and
traditions, as well as patriarchal attitudes and deep-rooted stereotypes”.883 Meanwhile,
advanced liberal democracies, such as Canada, are subject to an inconsistent standard of
accountability, at once holding the state to account for neo-colonial violations of
Indigenous women’s rights, and shoring up a view of the colonized and barbaric
immigrant woman that belies a reliance on imperial authority vested in its status as an
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international law authority. As explored above, recent legal and public policy debate in
Canada, in both the common law and civil law contexts, has mobilized an essentialist
notion of women’s rights to limit religious and cultural rights (Bill S-7, Barbaric Cultures
Act; 884 Quebec Charter of Secularism),885 simultaneously abstracting women as rights
bearers from their race, culture and/or religion, and dissolving the harms they experience
into vague, colonial notions of culture—ones CEDAW does not only fail to condemn, but
goes out of its way to endorse. Openly deploying the term “barbaric” in public debate, in
law and in policy, has normalized aggressive colonial language, thought by many
academics in a post-Edward Said886 world to be impossible to deploy without irony,887
and it has done so expressly in the name of protecting women’s rights. Canada is not
alone in this trend, and CEDAW appears unprepared to challenge it, intersectional
framework or not.
As record numbers of peoples are on the move, many have identified safe
migration as a top global priority. The CEDAW Committee appears inconsistently able to
adhere to its own advancements in shaping a view of women and their rights that reflects
this global reality. At once a hope but not an immunization against the vestiges of
colonialism that continue to haunt and determine the protections offered by international
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law, CEDAW’s engagement with intersectionality requires a rigour not yet in evidence.
This rigour needs only to be based in analytic clarity, not academic purity. Recirculating
problematic discourses of “cultural” behaviour oversimplifies important complexities in
women’s experiences of violence. Practically, victims and survivors of gender-based
violence are actively discouraged from coming forward if disclosing that they have
experienced, for instance, forced marriage or trafficking, will mean criminal sanctions or
deportation for their own families.
Yet, while CEDAW has recently advanced cogent critiques of the effects of law
on women in the global context,888 it remains confident in the structures of legal sanction
to effect gender equity and regularly advances recommendations reliant on them. When
condemning violent and discriminatory practices against women, the recommendation
might better focus on the particular social location, contextual specificity and lived
experiences of the affected women. Broad stroke, culture-based assertions obscure the
nuances and intersecting vulnerabilities of women experiencing multiple sources of
marginalization, such as poverty, homelessness, racism, and discrimination on the basis
of indigeneity, religion, country of origin, newcomer status, mental health, and
disability—in short, the very contextual essence of an intersectional approach. Returning
the role of international law in the maintenance rather than the dismantling of women’s
global inequality, the mirror intersectionality can turn on law to reflect its oppressive
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shortcomings is an aspect of its analytic rigour not yet fully embraced in CEDAW’s
contributing observations.
In other decisions, such as the individual communications and the inquiry
procedure—the area of committee decision-making that rises to the level of
jurisprudence—CEDAW appears more capable of a nuanced engagement with the
criteria of an intersectional analysis. Here, background systems, the dynamics of historic
oppressions, stereotypes, contextual power dynamics and a consideration of targeted
remedy appear more readily in the Committee’s deliberations. It is perhaps a prosaic,
rather than grand theoretical moment that grants this clarity: the individual
communications are just that—individual—which, while counter-intuitive as a bolster to
a critique of individualistic liberal approaches to anti-discrimination law, also offer factspecific instances against which to develop considered analyses.
The inquiry process is by definition, attentive to systemic and structural grounds
of discrimination, and is charged with getting to the specifics of how discrimination plays
out through systems. In the contributing observations, a general approach to national
contexts runs the risk of imprecision, caricature, and in the case of Canada analyzed
above, tone deafness to the persistence of imperial views of women and their rights in the
international legal context. Although the CEDAW Committee’s adoption of
intersectionality fails the test of analytic precision or consistent application, there is little
question that its committee members, such as Silvia Pimentel, quoted at the outset of this
section, see the authority of their role as interpreters of women’s international human
rights bolstered, redefined and advanced by the development of intersectionality as a
concept, a discourse, an heuristic device and, ultimately, as a legal tool.
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6 Thinking While Acting: Conclusion
“Feminists seek to rule for emancipatory purposes, and the tools they find in
governance are among their best guesses as to how to move toward an
emancipatory future. Understanding how it is working seems crucial to deciding
how it should proceed going forward.”889

At the outset of this dissertation, I repeated a gauntlet thrown down by Anne
Orford, asking “[w]hat might a feminist reading [of international law] that attempts to
avoid reproducing the unarticulated assumptions of imperialism look like?”890 I proposed
that intersectionality, as an approach to women’s international human rights law, might
be a partial answer to this challenge. Taking up her invitation at both the substantive and
methodological levels, I adapted her method of critically assessing law’s appearances and
stories about itself, used in her account of R2P, and applied it to an account of
intersectionality in women’s international human rights.
I began with a curated approach to the literature on intersectionality, entering
scholarly conversations that spotlight the promise of its intervention and advance a
complex view of its dual roles as critic of and technician in law. Striving to recapture the
heuristic, ontological and epistemological critiques that intersectionality can offer to
inform an approach to law grounded in social activism, I used this exploration of the
literature to sharpen the focus on intersectionality’s most potent promise: to offer us a
structural analysis of the intersectional process of discrimination. Moving from
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intersectionality’s promise to its initial transmission to international human rights law, I
spent time exploring the textual ground into which it was being introduced. To do this, in
Chapter 2, I explored the nature of CEDAW as treaty. Here, by tracing the possible
unarticulated implications and imbrications of imperialism in women’s international
human rights law to situate the intersectional turn, I compared the academic literature
ascribing meaning and portent to the concept both as epistemological challenge and as
legal tool, using it to trace the limitations of CEDAW qua text. In Chapter 2 I also
provided an account of the treaty’s legal capaciousness to discover and explain why its
promise finds a home there. In doing so, I noted the thin understanding of culture rooted
in the text and the interpretations of the text that continue to obstruct intersectionality’s
full reach.
Beginning in Chapter 3, I traced the unfurling of intersectionality as it advanced
in relation to UN interpretations of women’s human rights. In this chapter I also began to
uncover the geopolitical realpolitik that gave rise to the introduction of intersectionality
in the context of genocide and international criminal prosecutions. In chapter 4, I
provided insights from CEDAW Committee members as to the retrospective nature of its
justification for the expansion of state obligations considered under the category of sex
and gender—specifically, the highly politicized introduction of LGBTI rights. From this
record, there is little doubt that intersectionality holds the hope and promise of pushing
against the limitations it was born of and into, at the same time as the thin application of
its potential to account for the same geopolitical forces it was born of leaves it, at times,
complicit in the very structural oppressions it was released on the world to right.
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As an approach to international human rights law, intersectionality seeks to
complicate the imperial image of the European woman as the essentialized model for
receiving the protections of human rights law. The entry of the term into the discourse of
international human rights bears the imprint of the radical critiques that produced it; it
also still bears the mark of its role in the unjust international order it plays a part in
maintaining.
An uneven grasp of intersectionality among the individuals of the CEDAW
Committee, and the inconsistent record of its employment in the various decisions, does
not tell a neat, teleological story of progress. The Committee’s engagement with
intersectionality as metaphor, sociological concept, heuristic device and legal tool
remains as contingent, iterative and imperfect as the field(s) of theory from which it
derives, and the economically and politically volatile and violent world it attempts to
address. Moreover, the Committee context mixes progressive analysis from individual
members with compromises with both state and fellow committee members, within an
overarching assumption of authority granted through the international legal system. In
this mix, intersectionality plays many roles.
Intersectionality in all its guises, is forged of both sincere and determined effort to
reveal and ameliorate the experiences of the most marginalized and runs the real risk of
fixing those experiences in a caricature of abject over-determinacy, where defiant,
disruptive and contradictory experiences of identity among the intended beneficiaries of
the human rights regime are flattened into a thin representation that intersectionality
promised to enrich.
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This dissertation tells a new story about the arrival and integration of
intersectionality as a form of anti-discrimination theory and praxis in the international
human rights context. It also reveals an older story about the risks inherent in any
engagement with the project of governance. Throughout this work, I aspired to take the
advice to “think anew about engaging with power”891 and to probe the apparently
mysterious ways in which the ideas we advance to improve the world can be traced to
some of its worst moments of failure.
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Appendix 1

Research Ethics Letter/Study Interviewee Agreement
Oct 25, 2016
Geneva/ Canada
Dear
I am writing this letter to ask if you would be available to speak with me. I am
conducting research on the origins of intersectionality in transnational human rights law,
and its applicability to Canadian claimants. I have been working with Professors {_,_,_}
at Osgoode Hall Law School.
I will be in Geneva and able to interview you during the CEDAW session
beginning {Date}. I only ask you to name the time and place and I will be there.
My study is called: Women’s Intersectional Transnational Human Rights: Origins
and Impacts.
My understanding is that you have had experience with the roll out, deliberations
and applications of intersectionality at CEDAW, as part of the CEDAW Committee. I
anticipate taking no more than forty-five minutes of your time.
I do not foresee any risks or discomfort from your participation in the research.
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I do anticipate that your participation will contribute to scholarship and practice,
which advances and legitimates the goals of an intersectional approach to human rights
both internationally and within Canada. Your specific observations and experiences will
thus inform ongoing development of theory and jurisprudence.
I anticipate our discussion would revolve around the following issues and themes:
1. What do you know about the text of CEDAW General
Recommendation 28 and how it was negotiated?
2. Does the Committee use this GR’s definition of “intersectionality” in
its deliberations?
3. What was the influence of the development of CERD’s statement on
intersectionality, General Comment 25, on CEDAW’s work in this
area?
4. What, if any, influence do you think the context of sexual violence in
conflict, such as the prosecutions in Bosnia Herzegovina and Rwanda
had on the development of CEDAWs intersectionality statement?
5. Do you feel the statement guides the Committee’s work?
6. What pressures are brought to bear with respect to the “culture”,
“religion” or race of the claimants/individual representations that come
to CEDAW?

Our meeting would be more like a consultation or a conversation than a formal
interview. In discussing the issues noted above, I will not have a formal list of questions
but rather let the discussion unfold. It should go without saying that, if you agree to meet
with me, you are under no obligation to answer any question I might ask.
I may bring a recorder. If I do, the recording is only to assist my note taking. My
intention is to use the notes from our discussion in connection with my dissertation in the
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PhD Program at Osgoode. Dissertations are published, but not widely circulated. As well,
I might later wish to publish an academic article that relies upon our discussion.
I would be pleased to speak with you either on a not-for-attribution basis or, if
you prefer, to attribute comments that you make or ideas that we have discussed. If I do
wish to quote you by name or in any way that could be attributed to you, I undertake to
provide you with a copy of the intended quotation based on my notes. You will have the
opportunity to revise any comments associated with your name. The notes (and
recordings) from our discussion will be kept in my safekeeping for a period of at least
two years. I will treat them as confidential to the limit allowed by law. Neither the topics
we will discuss, nor any writing I do afterwards, is intended to produce a "report card" on
any person or organization.
Needless to say, you are under no obligation to meet with me and you may call
the session to a close at any time.
You can stop participating in the study at any time, for any reason, if you so
decide. If you decide to stop participating, or to refuse to answer particular questions, it
will not affect your relationship with me, York University, or any other group associated
with this project. Should you wish to withdraw after the study, you will have the option to
also withdraw your data up until the analysis is complete.
If you agree to meet, I look forward to hearing from you. I will be in touch with
you within the next ten days to see if a convenient time for this meeting can be arranged.
Do not hesitate to be in touch with me if you have any questions or concerns. I can be
reached at ____________________________.
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York University has a policy on research ethics. You will find this at
http://www.yorku.ca/research/support/ethics/humans.html
If you have questions about the research in general or about your role in the study,
please feel free to contact XX, either by telephone at _____________ or by e-mail
___________________. This research has been reviewed and approved by the Human
Participants Review Sub-Committee, York University’s Ethics Review Board and
conforms to the standards of the Canadian Tri-Council Research Ethics guidelines. If
you have any questions about this process, or about your rights as a participant in the
study, please contact the Sr. Manager & Policy Advisor for the Office of Research Ethics,
{contact information}.
At the interview I will ask you to initial my copy of this letter to ensure that you
have given me your informed consent.
When we meet, I will ask you to indicate the following. By all means, you can do
so now in response to this letter if that is most convenient.
Legal Rights and Signatures:

I ___________________consent to participate in Women’s Intersectional
Transnational Human Rights: Origins and Impacts conducted by Amanda Dale I have
understood the nature of this project and wish to participate. I am not waiving any of my
legal rights by signing this form. My signature below indicates my consent.
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Signature

Date

Participant

Signature

Date October 25, 2016

Principal Investigator

I consent to have this discussion ______________________
With Attribution ______________________________
Without Attribution ____________________________

Sincerely,

Amanda Dale, BA, MA, MSt, PhD (Cand)
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